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Abstract
This dissertation investigates the syntax and semantics of two focus particles in Korean
with special reference to their scopal behavior. The two particles under consideration are
the exclusive particle man and the additive particle to. The main empirical concern of this
work is to show that despite apparent syntactic similarities between focused phrases (i.e.
phrases containing focus particles) and standard QPs, the former exhibits more diverse
scopal behavior than the latter. The claims that are made in the course of the discussion
of the scope patterns constitute the theoretical contribution of this work.
The scope of the particle man 'only' varies with the morphological marking of the man-
phrase, which is puzzling under the assumption that the particle is a scope-bearing
element. I argue that despite appearances, the particle is not a scope-bearing element,
but an agreement morpheme, and that the quantificational meaning comes from a null
head ONLY. I also claim that the position of the ONLY head can be deduced from the
order of nominal affixes, thanks to the strong correlation between morphology and
syntax. This new correlation between nominal affixes and the scope of focus particles
supports Baker's Mirror Principle in a new area outside the verbal domain.
The scopal behavior of to-phrases is also distinct from that of QPs. Three factors are
identified that affect the scope of to-phrases: scrambling, the kind of function in the
preceding context, and the nature of the focused phrase. I claim that (i) the anaphoric
view of additive particles is superior to the existential view, (ii) both syntactic and
semantic mechanisms are available for variable binding, thus the presence of a bound
variable in a dislocated position does not imply syntactic reconstruction, and (iii) covert
operations such as reconstruction and type raising are constrained by an economy
principle so that they are disallowed when not motivated.
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Danny Fox, Associate Professor of Linguistics
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Goal of the Dissertation
This dissertation investigates the scopal behavior of two focus particles in Korean. The
particles under consideration are the exclusive particle man 'only' and the additive
particle to 'also/too', as exemplified in (1) below.
(1) a. Mary-ka John-man-(ul) manassta.
Mary-Nom John-only-(Acc) met
'Mary only met JohnF.' l
b. Mary-ka John-to manassta.
Mary-Nom John-also met
'Mary met JohnF, too'
One striking characteristic of the Korean focus particles is that they have the status of an
affix. Thus, focus particles in (1) form a constituent with the focused DP that occurs
adjacent to the particle. The affixal status is clearly manifested in (la), where the
exclusive particle precedes the case marker. Note that this pattern contrasts with that of
the corresponding English items such as only, also, and too, as seen in the translation.
These items appear in a position away from the focused phrase, and associate with the
focused phrase, although only can form a constituent with the following DP (e.g. Mary
met only John).
This characteristic of focus particles in Korean creates new questions to explore
when combined with another distinct property of Korean, namely scrambling. After the
particle forms a constituent with a focused phrase, the whole phrase Uohn-man-ul in (la)
1 F-marking indicates focus, that is, phonetic prominence.
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and John-to in (lb)) can undergo scrambling just like other constituents. Therefore, we
can examine how the focused phrases (phrases that contain the focus particle) behave
scopally in scrambling contexts, especially how they interact with other quantificational
elements such as quantifier phrases (QPs). This question arises due to the implicit
assumption that phrases like only John and their counterparts in other languages have
the same semantic type as quantifier phrases. Specifically, both focused phrases and QPs
are assumed to be of type <et, t>, a set of sets of individuals; and this criterion
categorizes both of them as generalized quantifiers. The null hypothesis under this
assumption is that focused phrases and QPs would exhibit the same scopal behavior. In
particular, it is expected that the scopal interaction of a focused phrase and a QP will
follow the same pattern as the scopal interaction of two QPs. Since the study of the
scopal interaction of QPs is quite established, we can use it as a reference point in
investigating the scopal interaction of a focused phrase and a QP. The main empirical
concern of this dissertation is to examine this implicit assumption and expectation,
which will lead to discussions of the syntax and semantics of the focus particles that
goes beyond their scopal behavior. To state briefly, the findings of this work suggest that
we cannot assume by default that focused phrases would behave in the same way as
QPs do. Despite apparent similarities in their semantic types, focused phrases exhibit
more diverse scopal behavior than QPs. Evidence such as this motivates a previously
unrecognized distinction between focused phrases and QPs.
1.2 Overview
This dissertation consists of two main chapters, which are devoted to two focus particles
in Korean (the exclusive particle man and the additive particle to). Chapter 2 examines
the scopal behavior of the exclusive particle man. This chapter starts with some novel
data showing that the scopal behavior of a phrase with the particle man does not
conform to the behavior of QPs. This disproves the null hypothesis stated above. The
main proposal of this chapter is that despite appearances, the particle man is not a scope-
bearing element, but an agreement morpheme signaling the presence of an abstract head
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ONLY. This abstract head is the real source of the quantificational force, namely
exhaustivity. Since the abstract head is phonetically null, we need to identify the
position of the abstract head by looking at some other aspect of the sentence, which I
argue is the order of nominal affixes. This correlation between the nominal affixes and
clausal structure supports Baker's (1985) Mirror Principle in a new area outside the
verbal domain. I show that the proposed analysis explains the hitherto unnoticed scope
facts without making special stipulations, unlike other alternative analyses.
Chapter 3 is devoted to the additive particle to. As in the case of the exclusive
particle, the scopal behavior of the focused phrase with the particle to does not fulfill the
expectation that it will behave like other QPs. Furthermore, the scopal behavior of the
additive particle is distinct from that of the exclusive particle presented in chapter 2. In
order to derive the scope facts, I adopt three elements, each of which is independently
motivated. First, I argue that the anaphoric approach to the additive particle (Kripke
1990, Heim 1992) is superior to the existential approach (Karttunen & Peters 1979). I
propose a specific implementation of the anaphoric approach, which says that the
particle to takes three arguments and that the first one among the three is a covert
pronoun. Secondly, I claim that both syntactic and semantic mechanisms are available
for variable binding, thus the presence of a bound variable in a dislocated position does
not always indicate that syntactic reconstruction has occurred. The third and final claim
is that covert operations such as scope reconstruction and type raising are constrained
by an economy principle, which allows these operations only when they are licensed by
a licit motivation. Specifically, I argue that reconstruction is allowed only when it has
effects on truth-conditions (Fox 2000), and type-raising is motivated by the lexical entry
of the additive particle, which requires what I call Type Parallelism. I also consider a few
alternative accounts, and show that they run into problems, unlike the proposed account
which successfully derives the seemingly confusing scope pattern.
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1.3 Assumptions
Before moving on to the main chapters, this section provides a brief introduction to basic
rules of semantic composition that will be used later. The semantic composition in this
dissertation follows the fundamental assumption that the meaning of a complex
expression is a function of its parts and the way they are combined in the syntax (The
Principle of Compoisitionality). Specifically, this work follows the implementation of
this principle as presented in Heim & Kratzer (1998). The rules of composition given in
(2) - (7) are from Heim & Kratzer (1998), where the double bracket [ represents the
interpretation function and [a] a stands for the semantic value of a under the assignment
function a.
(2) Terminal Nodes
If a is a terminal node occupied by a lexical item, then I al] is specified in the
lexicon.
(3) Non-Branching Nodes (NN)
If a is a non-branching node and 3 is its daughter, then, for any assignment
function a, [ala = [pia.
(4) Functional Application (FA)
If a is a branching node and {P, y is the set of its daughters, then, for any
assignment function a, if [P]a is a function whose domain contains [yDa, then [aDa
= [Dla ([vy a)
(5) Predicate Modification (PA)
If a is a branching node and {p, y} is the set of its daughters, then, for any
assignment a, if [Pl]a and [yja are both functions of type <e, t>, then [aja =Xx E D.
[p]a(x) = Iyla(x) = 1.
16
(6) Predicate Abstraction (A)2
If ca is a branching node and {3, y} is the set of its daughters and P is a numerical
index, then for any assignment a, [acl a =Xx E D. [y]xa[x/l], where y]Da[x/ I] represents
the semantic value of y under the modified assignment aIx/Pl which is just like the
original assignment a, except for the assignment of x as the value of a(p).
(7) Traces and Pronouns Rule
If a is a trace or pronoun with index , then i[cia = a (P).
Let me illustrate how the semantic value of a sentence is read off its syntactic tree, given
these rules. An example sentence is given in (8a), and its LF structure in (8b).
(8) a. John invited every linguist.
b. [every linguist]s [John invited ts]
14
Vx[linguist(x) - John invited x]
XP<e, t>. x[linguist(x) - P(x)] Xx.John invited x
every linguist 8 John invited a(8)
A
l John Xy.y invited a(8)
invited ts
The quantifier in the object position moves at LF due to type mismatch, and leaves
behind a trace of type e, which is interpreted by the Traces and Pronouns Rule in (7).
The index right below the moved phrase becomes the binder of the trace. The structure
triggers Predicate Abstraction, which gives an expression of type <e, t>. The result has
2 This is also known as Functional Abstraction or Lambda Abstraction.
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no difficulty in combining with the QP, as shown above. Everything else in this
calculation straightforwardly follows from the lexical entries of expressions used and
their functional composition.
18
Chapter 2
Man 'only', Scope, and the Mirror Principle
2.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates the scopal behavior of the Korean exclusive particle man, which
corresponds (in many but not all ways) to English only. I first present puzzling facts
about the particle's scope and distribution, and then argue that, despite appearances, the
particle is not a scope-bearing element. Specifically, I argue that the particle man is an
agreement morpheme that indicates the presence of a null head ONLY, which carries the
exhaustive meaning of English only. I also claim that there is a strong correlation
between syntax and morphology, as claimed under the name of the Mirror Principle by
Baker (1985); thus, the relative order among the particle, case marker, and postposition
reflects the hierarchy of corresponding functional heads. Thanks to this correlation, we
can identify the position of the null head ONLY based on the order of nominal affixes. It
turns out that it is the position of our postulated ONLY head, not that of the particle,
that determines the scope relation in the sentence. I show that the proposed analysis
accounts for the peculiar scope behavior of the particle without making special
stipulations, unlike the commonly held view that takes the particle to be a
quantificational element.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides some background
regarding the distribution of the particle man. Section 2.3 presents the scope facts, and
spells out problems raised by them; the particle man shows different scopal behavior
depending upon the syntactic environment in which it appears. In sections 2.4 and 2.5, I
put forward the main proposal and analysis, and show that the proposed analysis
successfully derives the particle's scope patterns. Section 2.6 enumerates and confirms
various predictions of the null head analysis, providing further support for the current
proposal. Section 2.7 discusses implications of the proposed analysis. In sections 2.8 and
2.9, I focus more on the syntactic aspects of the particle man. I present another case of
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correlation between scope and morphology, and address various issues that emerge
from the current analysis including locality and binding. Finally, section 2.10 concludes
the chapter with a summary.
2.2 Background
This section provides a brief description of the distribution of the particle man. First, it
can be attached to DPs, PPs, and CPs, but not directly to predicates. Secondly, it must
precede grammatical case markers, but follow postpositions.
2.2.1 Distribution
The particle man attaches to DPs (1), PPs (2), and both adjunct and argument CPs (3)
(Yang 1993, among many others).
(1) a. Mary-man oassta.
Mary-only came
'Only Mary came.'
b. Mary-ka thongsalon-man
Mary-Nom syntax-only
'Mary studies only syntax.'
(2) a. Mary-nun Boston-eyse-man
Mary-Top Boston-in-only
'Mary has lived only in Boston.'
kongpwuhanta.
study
salassta.
lived
b. Mary-ka John-ul Bill-hanthey-man
Mary-Nom John-Acc Bill-to-only
'Mary introduced John only to Bill.'
sokayhayssta.
introduced.
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(3) a. Mary-nun [kulim-ul kuliki-wihayse]-man santa.
Mary-Top painting-Acc draw-to-only live
'Mary lives only to paint.'
b. Mary-nun [JohnF-i Boston-ey on-ket]-man anta.
Mary-Top John-Nom Boston-to came-that-only know
'Mary only knows that JohnF came to Boston.'
(I.e. She does not know whether others came to Boston or not)
Notice that the particle man is always adjacent to a phrase which contains focus. In most
cases, focus is on the whole phrase that the particle is attached to, as in (1-2) and (3a). In
others, focus is on some part of the adjacent phrase, as in (3b). In (3b), the embedded
subject receives focus, that is, focal stress, which plays a semantic role by constraining
the domain of quantification. Thus, this sentence conveys that Mary does not know
whether people other than John came to Boston. Without stress on John, however, it is
not clear which propositions Mary does not know. The sentence simply states that the
embedded clause is the only proposition that Mary knows among the contextually
relevant propositions.
If a predicate (verb or adjective) is to be focused, a nominalizer must be present
between the predicate and the particle.3 Consequently, the dummy verb ha 'do' is
introduced to mark tense:
(4) a. Mary-nun yeppu-ki-man hay-ss-ta.
Mary-Top pretty-Nml-only do-Past-Decl
'Mary was only pretty (e.g. she was not smart).'
3 In Korean, adjectives show the same syntactic distribution as verbs. For example, tense
morphemes directly combine with adjectives as well as verbs. Note that there is no copula in (i).
(i) Mary-nun yeppu-ess-ta.
Mary-Top pretty-Past-Decl
'Mary was pretty.'
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chayk-ul sa-ki-man
Mary-Nom book-Acc buy-Nml-only do-Pres-Decl
'Mary only buys books (e.g. she doesn't read them).'
2.2.2 Case Marking
Another noteworthy property of the particle man is the position of case markers and
postpositions when they co-occur with the particle. There is a well-known distributional
asymmetry between case markers and postpositions. The particle man must precede case
markers, but follow postpositions (S. Cho 2000 among others).4
Sentences in (5) and (6) illustrate how nominative and accusative markers are
positioned with respect to the particle.5 Note that case markers are optional and can be
dropped in (5).
(5) a. Mary-man-(i) oassta.
Mary-only-Nom came
'Only Mary came.'
b. Mary-ka thongsalon-man-(ul) kongpwuhanta.
Mary-Nom syntax-only-Acc study
'Mary studies only syntax.'
The other possible order, where case markers precede man, is ungrammatical:
41 use the term "case markers" to refer only to grammatical case markers such as nominative,
accusative, and genitive. I do not intend the term to cover postpositions, which might be called
"semantic case markers."
5 Note that in some languages (e.g. Hungarian) focus particles tend to appear outside case
markers, as pointed out to me by Sabine Iatridou. I presume that this is due to the fact that focus
particles in those languages are a kind of an adverbial, whereas case markers are inflectional
affixes that are attached to DPs. Therefore, case markers are expected to be closer to DPs than
focus particles. As we will see shortly, I do not assume that there is one single underlying
ordering between these elements, and therefore do not derive the surface ordering in Korean
from a different underlying ordering where case markers are closer to the DP than the focus
particle. See also section 2.7.1 for a related discussion.
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b. Mary-ka ha-n-ta.
(6) a. *Mary-ka-man
Mary-Nom-only
'(Intended) Only Mary came.'
b. *Mary-ka
Mary-Nom
thongsalon-ul-man
syntax-Acc-only
kongpwuhanta.
study
'(Intended) Mary studies only syntax.'
The particle also precedes the genitive marker, but the genitive case marker is not
optional, unlike nominative and accusative.
(7) Mary-man-*(uy)
Mary-only-Gen
chayk
book
'Only Mary's book, i.e. the book belonging to Mary alone'
In contrast to case markers, postpositions including the dative marker must precede the
particle man.' Also, postpositions are obligatory.
(8) a. Mary-nun John-*(hako)-man
Mary-Top John-with-only
'Mary plays only with John.'
nonta.
play.
6 The nominative marker in Korean alternates between i and ka ((5a) vs. (6a)). The former follows
a closed syllable, and the latter an open syllable. The same is true of the accusative marker ul
(after a closed syllable) and lul (after an open syllable).
7 There is one exception to this generalization. Postposition lo 'with', a marker for Instrumental,
can either precede or follow the particle man, as shown in (i). Yet, different orderings match with
different truth conditions. See section 2.9.1 for discussion.
(i) a. kukot-ey-nun cacenke-lo-man
there-to-Top bicycle-with-only
'One can get there only on a bicycle (no other
ka-lswuiss-ta.
go-can-Decl
means are allowed).'
b. kukot-ey-nun cacenke-man-ulo ka-lswuiss-ta.
there-to-Top bicycle-only-with go-can-Decl
'One can get there with only a bicycle (no other means are needed).'
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oassta. 6
came
b. Mary-nun Boston-*(eyse)-man
Mary-Topic Boston-in-only
'Mary has lived only in Boston.'
c. Mary-ka John-*(ekey)-man
Mary-Nom John-to-only
'Mary apologized only to John.'
sakwahayssta.
apologized
As with case markers, the reverse order is not grammatical:
(9) a. *Mary-nun John-man-hako nonta.
Mary-Top John-only-with play.
'Mary plays only with John.'
b. *Mary-nun Boston-man-eyse salassta.
Mary-Topic Boston-only-in lived
'Mary has lived only in Boston.'
c. *Mary-ka John-man-ekey
Mary-Nom John-only-to
'Mary apologized only to John.'
sakwahayssta.
apologized
With this background, the next section goes into the scopal behavior of the particle man.
2.3 The Scope Facts
This section presents the scopal behavior of the particle man, with special focus on how
the phrase that man is attached to (henceforth the man-phrase) scopally interacts with
another quantificational element in scrambling contexts. As already mentioned in
chapter 1, the particle man forms a constituent with the phrase it is attached to, and thus
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salassta.
lived
it can undergo scrambling just like other constituents do in Korean. Now the question is
how the particle takes scope in general, and whether scrambling affects this general
pattern. Also interesting is whether the scope pattern of the man-phrase conforms to that
of QPs. Surprisingly, we find that the scope of the scrambled man-phrase depends upon
the syntactic environment in which it appears. Specifically, its scope varies with its
morphological marking. If a man-phrase is case-marked, its scope is fixed to its case
position no matter where it appears in the sentence. By contrast, if it is marked by a
postposition, its surface position affects scope relations. The discussion leads to the
conclusion that this non-uniform scope pattern cannot be accounted for if the particle
man is a scope-bearing element.
2.3.1 The Scope Pattern of Man-phrases
Let us start with case-marked man-phrases (e.g. Mary-man-ul 'Mary-only-acc'). Case-
marked man-phrases appear to obligatorily reconstruct in clause-internal scrambling.
That is, clause-internal scrambling of a man-phrase does not induce an ambiguity.
Relevant examples are illustrated below.
(10) a. Motun-salam-i John-man-ul
every-person-Nom John-only-Acc
'Everyone loves only John.'
(i) Everyone loves John and no one else.
(ii) *John is the only one whom everyone loves.
b. John-man-ull [motun-salam-i
John-only-Acc every-person-Nom
'(Lit.) Only John, everyone loves t.'
(i) Everyone loves John and no one else.
(ii) *John is the only one whom everyone loves.
salanghanta.
love
(every > only)
(*only > every)
ti salanghanta.]
love
(every > only)
(*only > every)
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The sequence of a universal quantifier and a man-phrase in (10a) only allows a surface
scope reading whereby motun-salm 'everyone' has wider scope than John-man-ul 'only
John'. So (10a) is true if and only if each person loves John and no one else. The other
reading, where John is the only one whom everyone loves, is not available. In (10b), the
man-phrase is scrambled across the subject quantifier. Here the scope relation remains
the same as in (10a); wide scope for the man-phrase is still not possible.8 Therefore, both
(10a) and (10b) are judged to be false if anyone in the discourse domain loves John and
someone else too, even if John is the only person who is loved by everyone. Notice that
the particle man precedes the case marker, as already mentioned in the previous section.
Now we turn to man-phrases marked by a postposition. Postposition-marked
man-phrases show a different scopal behavior from case-marked ones. If a man-phrase is
marked by a postposition, it can take scope in the surface position. Importantly, it can
take scope in the scrambled position, thus creating an ambiguity, as shown in (11).
a. Motun-salam-i John-hako-man
every-person-Nom John-with-only
'Everyone shook hands only with John.'
(i) Everyone shook hands with John and with no
(ii) *John is the only one with whom everyone sh
b. John-hako-manl [motun-salam-i
John-with-only every-person-Nom
'(Lit.) Only with John, everyone shook hands t.'
(i) Everyone shook hands with John and with no 
(ii) John is the only one with whom everyone shoe
akswuhayssta.
shook_hands
one else. (every > only)
look hands. (*only > every)
ti akswuhayssta.]
shook_hands
one else. (every > only)
ok hands. (only > every)
8 The man-phrase can take scope over the subject QP if it appears in the S-initial position without
any case marker, as in (i). Thus the sentence in (i) is ambiguous, unlike (10b). See section 2.8.
(i) John-manl [motun-salam-i el salanghanta.]
John-only every-person-Nom love
'Only John, everyone loves e.'
a. Everyone loves John and no one else. (every > only)
b. John is the only one whom everyone loves. (only > every)
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(11)
---
Without scrambling, the base order between the universal quantifier and the man-phrase
determines the scope relation, thus (11a) is not ambiguous. However, if the man-phrase
is scrambled as in (11b), it can also take scope over the subject quantifier, thus the
sentence becomes ambiguous. Note also that the particle follows the postposition.
This contrast between case-marked and postposition-marked man-phrases is
most clearly manifested in double object constructions, where true minimal pairs can be
constructed. The indirect object in the Korean double object construction can be marked
either with accusative case or by a dative postposition.9 Surprisingly, the scope of the
scrambled man-phrase depends upon how the indirect object is marked.
(12) a. Motun-salam-i Mary-ekey-man/man-ul senmwul-ul
every-person-Nom Mary-to-only-Acc gift-Acc
'Everyone gave a gift only to Mary.'
(i) Everyone gave a gift to Mary and to no one else.
(ii) *Mary is the only person that everyone gave a gift to.
b. Mary-man-ull [motun-salam-i ti senmwul-ul
Mary-only-Acc every-person-Nom gift-Acc
'(Lit.) Only Mary, everyone gave a gift t.'
(i) Everyone gave a gift to Mary and to no one else.
(ii) *Mary is the only person that everyone gave a gift to.
cwuessta.
gave
(every > only)
(*only > every)
cwuessta.]
gave
(every > only)
(*only > every)
c. Mary-ekey-manl [motun-salam-i ti senmwul-ul
Mary-to-only every-person-Nom gift-Acc
'(Lit.) Only to Mary, everyone gave a gift t.'
(i) Everyone gave a gift to Mary and to no one else.
(ii) Mary is the only person that everyone gave a gift to.
cwuessta.]
gave
(every > only)
(only > every)
9 Cross-linguistically, it is controversial whether the dative marker belongs to postpositions or
case markers. In Korean, however, dative markers have been shown to pattern with postpositions
rather than with case markers on the basis of syntactic tests such as quantifier floating. The scope
facts presented here also support this classification. See Kuh (1987), O'Grady (1991), and
Urushibara (1991) for arguments along this line.
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When there is no scrambling, the base order determines the scope relation, as in the
previous cases. In (12a), the subject QP takes scope over the man-phrase irrespective of
what kind of marker is used. When scrambling takes place, however, the marking on the
indirect object makes a difference. If it is marked with accusative case, the man-phrase
seems to obligatorily reconstruct, as in (12b). If it is marked by a dative postposition, the
man-phrase seems to optionally reconstruct, as in (12c).
2.3.2 The Scope Puzzle
This non-uniform behavior of man-phrases contrasts with the scopal behavior of run-of-
the-mill quantifier phrases. As is well known, scrambled QPs optionally reconstruct and
induce an ambiguity in so-called scope-rigid languages (see Hoji 1985 for Japanese, Ahn
1990, Sohn 1995 for Korean). The sentences in (13) exemplify this point for Korean.
(13) a. Nwukwunka-ka manhun-salam-ul salanghanta.
someone-Nom many-person-Acc love
'Someone loves many people.'
(i) There is someone who loves many people. (some > many)
(ii) *There are many people who are loved by someone. (*many > some)
b. Manhun-salam-ull [nwukwunka-ka ti salanghanta.]
many-person-Acc someone-Nom love
'(Lit.) Many people, someone loves t'
(i) There is someone who loves many people. (some > many)
(ii) There are many people who are loved by someone. (many > some)
When two quantifiers are in their base position, as in (13a), the surface word order
determines the scope relation between the two.1o When there is scrambling, however, the
10 There are some researchers (e.g. Hayashishita 2000) who doubt scope rigidity and argue for an
ambiguity of sentences like (13a). Note that the debate on this issue does not bear on the puzzle
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wide scope reading of the object QP becomes available, as in (13b). The scrambled QP
can but need not undergo reconstruction, thus the sentence is ambiguous. Furthermore,
the morphological marking on a QP does not affect the scope of the scrambled QP; thus
a QP marked by a postposition behaves in the same manner as an accusative-marked
QP. A schematic summary of the scope patterns is given in (14), where the solid line
indicates obligatory reconstruction, and the dotted line optional reconstruction. The
non-scrambled versions of each case are omitted since they all pattern in the same way.
(14) a. [TP DP-man-Accl [TP QP tl verb]] (unambiguous: 10b & 12b)
I A
b. [TP PP-manl [TP QP tl verb]] (ambiguous: 11b & 12c)
c. [TP QP1 [TP QP ti verb]] (ambiguous: 13b)
L-------------------------
Let's suppose that the man-phrase is a QP of type <et, t>, that is, the set of properties that
no one other than John has (J.-W. Choe 1998).l Then the non-ambiguity in (14a) is
puzzling. Apparently, it undergoes obligatory reconstruction when scrambled, unlike
QPs. In order to account for this frozen scope effect, one might stipulate that the man-
phrase is a special QP that can only undergo PF movement/scrambling; then its surface
presented here. Whether or not one accepts scope rigidity for sentences with base order, it is
agreed that that scrambled QPs induce ambiguity, which makes the scope facts more puzzling.
" In this approach, John-man 'John-only' has the entry in (i) as its denotation, and man has (ii) as
its lexical entry, where ALT is the set of alternatives created by the focus marking (see Rooth
1985).
(i) [John-man]l = XP<e,t>.P(John) = 1 & VzeALT(John): P(z) = 1 - z = John
(ii) [man] = Xe.XP<e,t>.P(x) = 1 & VzEALT(x): P(z) = 1 - z = x
But the problem noted here does not hinge on what kind of entry we adopt for man. The same
problem arises as long as we identify man as a quantificational element. E.g. the Roothian account
of only for the particle man runs into the same problem.
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position would not affect interpretation at LF (see Aoun and Benmamoun 1998,
Sauerland and Elbourne 2002 for PF movement). However, this account lacks reasonable
motivation, and faces empirical problems once we consider (14b). The stipulation does
not hold of the case of PP-man, and we need another stipulation to distinguish the two
cases. Any account that treats the man-phrase as a QP without further assumptions
would fail to account for both the non-ambiguity of (14a) and the ambiguity of (14b).12 A
proper analysis must derive the scope patterns without making stipulations, and also
account for the correlation between the morphological shape of the man-phrase and its
scope behavior.
2.3.3 Digression: Test of Ambiguity
The ambiguous sentence in (llb) is repeated below as (15).
(15) John-hako-manl [motun-salam-i ti akswuhayssta.]
John-with-only every-person-Nom shook_hands
'(Lit.) Only with John, everyone shook hands t.'
(i) Everyone shook hands with John and with no one else. (every > only)
(ii) John is the only one with whom everyone shook hands. (only > every)
This sentence is true in a situation where each person shook hands only with John
(reading (i)). However, the sentence is also true in a situation where each person shook
hands with more than one person, as long as John is the only one with whom everyone
shook hands (reading (ii)). Here one might think that we cannot tell whether (15) is
really ambiguous. In every situation where every person x is such that x shook hands
with John and with no one else, it is also true that John is the only one that everyone
12 Another possible account is to employ semantic reconstruction (Cresti 1995, Rullman 1995) by
assuming that the case-marked man-phrase always leaves a trace of a higher type (T<et, t>). In other
words, the trace of the man-phrase cannot be of type e when it is case-marked. This account is not
just empirically challenged (for the contrast between DP and PP), but it is also stipulative in that
there is no principled reason why this should hold. The same criticism applies to an account
which argues that the man-phrase scrambles to a position that is associated with obligatory
reconstruction. This account also runs into a problem in the PP-man case.
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shook hands with. That is, the wide scope reading of the subject quantifier (reading (i))
entails the wide scope reading of the man-phrase (reading (ii)). For this reason, the
sentence in (15) may seem to lack the wide scope reading of the subject quantifier. A
closer look, however, tells us that it is ambiguous. If we embed the sentence in
downward entailing contexts such as conditionals or negation, the wide scope of motun-
salam 'everyone' becomes clear. 13
(16) John-hako-manl
John-with-only
talun-namcatul-un
other-men-Top
[motun-eycatul-i ti
every-women-Nom
akswuha-l-salam-ul
shake_hands-Rel-person-Acc
akswuha-lyekoha-myun,]
shake_hands-intend-if
chacki-ka
find-Nom
elye-ulkeya.
difficult-will
'If every woman wants to shake hands only with John, it will be difficult for
other guys to find someone to shake hands with.'
Imagine a situation in which each man is supposed to shake hands with a woman. In
such a situation, the salient reading of the antecedent clause is that every woman wants
to shake hands with John and with no one else, not that John is the only one with whom
every woman wants to shake hands. If the first reading in (15) were not available, the
antecedent and the consequent clauses of the conditional sentence in (16) would not
form an appropriate discourse, contrary to fact. The same is true of negation.
(17) John-hako-manl [motun-salam-i ti akswuhayssta]-nun-ket-un
John-with-only every-one-Nom shook_hands-Rel-that-Top
'It is not the case that everyone shook hands only with John.'
sasil-i anita.
fact-Nom not_be
In a situation where each person shook hands with two people, but John is the only one
with whom everyone shook hands, the sentence in (17) can be judged to be true. This
131 thank Danny Fox and Shoichi Takahashi for discussion on this point.
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means that the wide scope of every over only is available (not > every > only). If it were
not available, that is, if the sentence only allowed the other relation (not > only > every),
the sentence would have to be judged to be false since John is the only one with whom
everyone shook hands. Both tests confirm that the sentence is ambiguous.
2.4 The Proposal
This section spells out the main proposal that I will make in this chapter. I propose that
the particle man is actually an agreement morpheme that marks the presence of a null
head ONLY, which carries the meaning of English only. I also argue that the ordering
among the particle, case marker, and postposition reflects the hierarchy of
corresponding functional heads. This helps detect the position of the null ONLY head.
2.4.1 Man is an Agreement Morpheme
What does it mean for a focus particle to be an agreement morpheme? It means that the
particle man is an indication of a focus head, just as the nominative case marker is an
indication of the T(ense) head under standard assumptions. In that case, what kind of
focus head is the particle agreeing with? The focus head that we are discussing here is of
a special kind in that it carries a very specific meaning, namely exhaustivity, hence the
name ONLY. Since the head ONLY carries the quantificational meaning that is
attributed to the particle man, the particle ends up having no meaning of its own, and
man-phrases (e.g. John-man) are referential expressions of type e.14 Therefore, the position
of the ONLY head, not that of the particle, determines the scope relation with respect to
other quantificational elements in the sentence.'5
14 I will continue to gloss man as 'only' for the sake of convenience.
15 For the role of abstract heads in the semantics literature, see Karttunen (1977) for questions, and
Laka (1990), Ladusaw (1992), von Stechow (1993), Beck & Kim (1997), Kelepir (2001), Penka
(2002), and Ovalle & Guerzoni (2002) for negation. Also, Groenendjik and Stokhof (1984), Krifka
(1995) and Fox (2003) postulate a null exhaustivity operator.
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I propose (18) as the lexical entry of the head ONLY, where ALT is the set of
alternatives created by focus marking. This is the result of replacing the focused element
with contextually plausible alternatives (see Rooth 1985).
(18) [ONLYI= XP<e,t>.xe.P(x) =1 & VzeEALT(x): P(z) = 1 - z = x 16
The ONLY head takes two arguments (a predicate and an individual), and asserts that
the individual argument is the only element that satisfies the predicate argument. Since
the individual argument is in focus, ALT(x) is a set of individuals which are contextually
salient.l7 The ONLY head takes the same arguments as English only when it forms a
constituent with a DP, although the order of arguments is reversed (Horn 1969; see also
footnote 11). Basically, it is a covert only.
2.4.2 Where is the ONLY Head Located?
The next question to ask, then, is where the ONLY head is located. I claim that the
ONLY head can occur in several distinct positions in the clause, as long as the semantic
conditions imposed by (18) are satisfied. In other words, there is no one fixed position
for the ONLY head.l8 Specifically, it can be above TP (high ONLY-P) or below TP (low
ONLY-P). Now that the ONLY head can occur in various positions and is phonetically
null, a crucial task is to detect the position of this head. I argue that the position of the
ONLY head can be deduced, thanks to a strong correlation between morphology and
16 Admittedly, this is a simplified and informal entry of the exclusive particle - see for instance
von Fintel (1997) regarding issues related to defining the entry of only. For now, the entry deals
with one specific case where the focused phrase is an individual, and adjustments will be made
when necessary (for PP and CP arguments). Also, I assume that ALT(x) is a function from an
ordinary semantic value of x to its focus value in the sense of Rooth (1985).
17 As described in section 2.2, the particle can be attached to non-nominal elements as well (PPs
and CPs); however, the entry given in (18) can deal with these cases, too, as will be shown later.
See section 2.5.2 for PPs and section 2.9.4 for CPs.
18 A similar approach was taken for NegP in Beck & Kim (1997), Zanuttini (1997), and Cinque
(1999). In particular, Zanuttini's (1997) position is similar to mine in that various positions of
NegP are posited on the basis of scope interaction between negation and adverbs. Simpson & Wu
(2002) also present a similar theory of focus where the position of FocP is not limited to a unique
location in the left periphery, but occurs in a variety of positions.
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syntax, as claimed by Baker (1985) under the name of the Mirror Principle. 19 In
particular, I argue that the relative order among the focus particle, case marker, and
postposition reflects the hierarchy of corresponding functional heads.2 0 Take for example
John-man-i 'John-only-nom.' Since the particle man is closer to the DP than the case
marker, we conclude by the Mirror Principle that the process that adds the particle man
(or checks a relevant feature) precedes the process that adds the case marker i. This
means that the ONLY head is lower than the nominative case checking/assigning head,
namely T. By the same reasoning, we infer from the order John-hako-man 'John-with-
only' that ONLY-P is higher than VP where PP is generated, assuming that PPs do not
need licensing and thus do not move to a VP-external position as DPs do. Sometimes the
order of the affixes is not enough to determine the position of the ONLY head, as in the
case of PP-man. In those cases, the surface position of the man-phrase helps to
disambiguate the structure, as will be shown shortly.
2.4.3 A Sample Derivation
Having said this, let us move to see how this works through an example. We start with a
simple sentence in (19).
(19) John-man-i oassta.
John-only-Nom came
'Only John came.'
19 Baker's (1985) original proposal is stated below in (i)
(i) The Mirror Principle
Morphological derivations must directly reflect syntactic derivations (and vice versa)
(ii) ... verb-affixA-affixB ...
Applied to the example in (ii), this means that the order in which morphemes appear on the verb
reflects the order in which the morphological processes that add those morphemes apply. That is,
the process that adds affix A precedes the process that adds affix B.
20 This idea was suggested to me by Danny Fox.
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In (19), the particle man precedes the nominative marker, so the Mirror Principle tells us
that ONLY-P is lower than TP. I claim that the subject, which is generated VP-internally,
moves first to [Spec, ONLY-P],21 and then undergoes a second movement to [Spec, TP]
to check the nominative feature (Chomsky 1995, S. Cho 2000). The DP picks up the
affixes through derivation, and the order of affixes reflects the derivational steps.22 This
is illustrated in (20a) along with the semantic composition in (20b). As one can verify,
the tree correctly derives the meaning of the sentence.2 3
(20) a. TP®
John-man-i (
T'
LY-P () T[NOM]
ONLY' ®
(2)__ ONLY
VP O
t2 came
b. I[O = x came
11(4) =Xx.x came by PA
I®D= Xy.y came & VzeALT(y): z came -* z = y by FA
21 Man-phrases can also be generated in [Spec, ONLY-Pi. See section 2.8 for a distinction between
movement and base-generation strategies.
22 Note that this is not a necessary assumption, and that the analysis can also be couched within
the lexicalist hypothesis, which argues that the DP is inserted in the syntax fully inflected, that is,
with all the affixes attached to the DP (Chomsky 1993). Under the lexicalist hypothesis, however,
an additional assumption is required. If feature checking can be done in-situ by AGREE
(Chomsky 2000), we need to assume that feature checking takes place from the innermost
feature/affix outwards, as suggested in Chomsky (1995: 195). Otherwise, the effects of the Mirror
Principle are hard to capture under these two assumptions. This point is independent of the
particular use I make of the Mirror Principle, and readers are referred to relevant literature.
23 assume that case heads (T and Agro) are semantically vacuous.
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[() = u came & VzeEALT(u): z came - z = u by FA
l5] = Xu.u came & VzeEALT(u): z came - z = u by PA
I®] = John came & VzeEALT(ohn): z came - z = John by FA
In (20a), the focused phrase John undergoes focus movement to [Spec, ONLY-PI, creating
a lambda-predicate. This predicate is the first argument of the ONLY head, and the
focused phrase in [Spec, ONLY-P] is the second argument. This movement is motivated
both syntactically and semantically: syntactically, it is triggered for agreement/feature-
checking (say, man-feature) purposes; semantically, it provides an argument for the
ONLY head so that the interpretation can proceed. For these reasons, the movement is
obligatory although it sometimes applies string-vacuously and has no effect on word
order.
Notice that the lambda-abstractor assumed in the focus movement does not
conform to Heim & Kratzer's (1998) interpretational mechanism (see the tree in (8b) in
section 1.3 for an example). Specifically, the lambda-abstractor in the first movement of
(20a) (index 2) is in an unusual place, not directly under the moved element (see also
von Fintel 2001 for the same point). There are other possible implementations that do
not involve this choice (e.g. late merge of the ONLY head or movement to the sister node
of the ONLY head), but the analysis does not hinge on this issue.
The movement idea advanced here is similar in spirit to Beghelli & Stowell's
(1994, 1997) position. They argue that scope is the by-product of agreement processes
that take place through Spec-Head agreement. As each QP moves to its targeted scope
position (at LF) in their approach, the focused phrase moves to the spec of the ONLY-P
(in the overt syntax). In both approaches, the landing site determines the scope relation.
Although this is not a traditional account of focus, it is an extension of the widespread
accounts in the domain of wh-words and negative QPs to the domain of focused phrases
(see Rizzi 1996 for the Wh-Criterion; Zanuittini 1991, Haegeman 1995, and Sohn 1995 for
the Neg-Criterion). One might wonder why we complicate the system by introducing
the abstract head. When we look at simple cases like (19), the motivation is not clear. Yet,
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this approach offers a non-stipulative account of the scope pattern of man-phrases, as
will be shown in the following two sections.
To sum up this section, I argued that the focus particle man is an agreement
morpheme for an abstract head ONLY, which carries the exhaustive meaning of English
only. In order to detect the position of the null ONLY head, I argued that the order of
nominal affixes reflects the syntactic hierarchy of functional heads.
2.5 Deriving the Compositional Meaning
Based on the proposal made in the previous section, this section solves the scope puzzle
noted in section 2.3. I first discuss case-marked man-phrases (section 2.5.1), and then
turn to PP-man cases (section 2.5.2).
2.5.1 Case-Marked Man-Phrases
The scope pattern of the case-marked man-phrase is repeated in (21). The point here is
that clause-internal scrambling of the man-phrase does not affect scope interpretation.
Sentence (21b) is not ambiguous.
(21) a. Motun-salam-i John-man-ul
every-person-Nom John-only-Acc
'Everyone loves only John.'
(i) Everyone loves John and no one else.
(ii) *John is the only one whom everyone loves.
b. John-man-ull [motun-salam-i
John-only-Acc every-person-Nom
'(Lit.) Only John, everyone loves t.'
(i) Everyone loves John and no one else.
(ii) *"John is the only one whom everyone loves.'
salanghanta.
love
(every > only)
(*only > every)
ti salanghanta.]
love
(every > only)
(*only > every)
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Let us start with (21a). From the order man-ul 'only-acc', we conclude by the Mirror
Principle that ONLY-P is lower than AgroP where Accusative is assigned/checked. The
AgroP in turn is below TP which contains the universal quantifier in its spec position.
Therefore, the universal quantifier takes scope over the ONLY head. The structure of
(21a) is given in (22a) along with the semantic value of the top node in (22b). See the
appendix for a detailed calculation.
(22) a. TP ()
everyone
1
AgroP T[NOM]
John-man-ul
.A
2
ONLY-P Agro[ACC]
t2 ONLY'
ONLY
VP
t3 love
b. I(]i = For each person x, x loves John & VzeeALT(John): x loves z - z = John
The reading in (22b) is the meaning we want: each person has the property of loving
John and no one else. Note that we must not allow reconstruction of the subject QP to its
0-position (th), since that would produce the unattested reading (only > every). This is
independently justified from the behavior of QPs in scope-rigid languages. If
reconstruction of a subject were possible, sentences in the base order would be
ambiguous, as in English (see (13) in section 2.3).
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Alternatively, if we can employ only QR (instead of reconstruction) to account
for scope ambiguity, we can do without this restriction. We can simply conclude that
there is no covert quantifier movement in scope-rigid languages, and that the scope
position of the subject QP is always [Spec, TP]. Since the subject QP does not reconstruct,
there is no need to rule it out in the first place.24 Another possibility, pointed out to me
by Danny Fox and Alec Marantz, is to adopt Kratzer's (2000) proposal that the Voice
head introduces the external argument. Under this hypothesis, there is no trace of the
subject within VP, thus the issue of subject reconstruction does not arise.
Next, consider (21b) where John-man-ul 'John-only-acc' is scrambled to the
sentence-initial position. Since man is a mere agreement morpheme, the man-phrase is a
referential expression, not a QP. Given this, it naturally follows why scrambling of the
man-phrase does not affect scope relations, since that is the case with referential
expressions. This is what we expect from scrambling of an expression of type e, not <et,
t>. The structure of (21b) is given in (23a), where the clausal structure remains the same
as in (22a) except that the man-phrase is adjoined to TP via scrambling.25 The semantic
value of the top node is in (23b). See the appendix for a detailed calculation.
24 See also Johnson & Tomioka (1997) for a claim that reconstruction does not target 0-positions
even in scopally non-rigid languages like English.
25 assume that scrambling is TP-adjunction.
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(23) a. TP (
John-man-ul
-~
TP
2
AgroP T [NOM]
I-.
3
ONLY-P Agro[ACC]
t3 ONLY'
ONLY
t
love
b. [(0] = For each person x, x loves John & VzeeALT(John): x loves z - z = John
Compare the semantic values in (22b) and (23b). They are the same: each person loves
no one other than John. Even though John is interpreted in the scrambled position in
(23a), the same reading obtains as when we interpret it in [Spec, ONLY-Pi. This is
because the ONLY head is below AgroP in both cases. Thus the apparent
"reconstruction" effect is explained, even though there is no reconstruction of a QP in
the real sense. What determines the scope relation is not the surface position of the
particle, but the position of the ONLY head, which is not affected by scrambling. The
following schemas represent the two structures for an easy comparison. The movement
of the subject is not specified by an arrow, but just by the lambda-abstractor.
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(24) a. [TP everyone Ax [AGRoP John Au [ONLY-P u [ Ay [VP x y love]] ONLY]AGRo] T]
Case mvt. Focus mvt.
b. [TP JohnAv [TP everyone Ax [AGRoP v Au [ONLY-P u [y [VP X y love]] ONLY] AGRo] T]]
* 1A 1A 1
Scrambling Case mvt. Focus mvt.
One might wonder at this point why ONLY-P should be below AgroP and if there is any
principled reason to rule out ONLY-P above AgroP, a question raised by many people.
At this point, the present analysis does not offer a principled reason to rule out such a
configuration. If such a structure exists, however, the derivation would result in a form
in which the particle man is preceded by an overt case marker, for example *Mary-lul-
man 'Mary-acc-only.' This is not a possible form in Korean. 26 For now, I will assume that
in such a configuration the case marker must be realized as a zero variant, which filters
out the form if the case marker is overt. In other words, both DP-Case-man and DP-man-
Case are possible configurations, but only the latter can be spelled out with overt case
marking. This will be an extension of the well-known allomorphic variation of case
morphemes in Korean (see footnote 6). We are simply adding another allomorph (a zero
form) for both nominative and accusative markers, which appears when they are
preceded by particles like man 'only' and to 'also'. 27 The additive particle to disallows
case marking in any position.
26 Danny Fox and Heidi Harley suggested to me that we can account for the absence of the form
DP-Case-man by assuming that case is the ultimate motivation that drives movement. Once the
case feature is checked, the DP is stuck in its case position and no further movement takes place.
Since no focus movement follows, the DP cannot pick up the particle man. However this account
is only valid for the DP case, given that we do have movement to check only the focus feature in
the PP-man case.
27 Thanks to Alec Marantz for suggesting this idea.
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2.5.2 Postposition-Marked Man-Phrases
This section turns to the scope pattern of the PP-man case. A man-phrase marked by a
postposition does not have a fixed scope, unlike a case-marked one. Its scope seems to
be affected by its surface position; that is, the readings available to a PP-man depend on
its surface position. The data is repeated in (25).
(25) a. Motun-salam-i John-hako-man akswuhayssta.
every-person-Nom John-with-only shook_hands
'Everyone shook hands only with John.'
(i) Everyone shook hands with John and with no one else. (every > only)
(ii) *John is the only one with whom everyone shook hands. (*only > every)
b. John-hako-manl [motun-salam-i ti akswuhayssta.]
John-with-only every-person-Nom shook_hands
'(Lit.) Only with John, everyone shook hands t.'
(i) Everyone shook hands with John and with no one else. (every > only)
(ii) John is the only one with whom everyone shook hands. (only > every)
In (25a), the man-phrase can only take scope below the universal quantifier, whereas in
(25b) it can take scope either above or below the universal quantifier. The ambiguity of
(25b) stands in contrast to the non-ambiguity of (21b) in the previous section.
Why is it that postposition-marked man-phrases are different from case-marked
ones? The ordering among the affixes provides an answer to this question. Crucially,
postpositions do not provide as much information about the position of the ONLY head
as case markers do. Postpositions precede the particle man (e.g. John-hako-man 'John-
with-only'), which shows that ONLY-P is higher than VP, where PP is generated. But it
does not tell us whether ONLY-P is higher than TP or lower than TP, whose spec is
occupied by the subject QP. By contrast, case markers explicitly specify that ONLY-P is
lower than AgroP or TP since they always follow the particle man.
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With this contrast in mind, let us derive the scope patterns in (25). First, in (25a),
ONLY-P is positioned above VP (as inferred from the morpheme order) but below TP. If
ONLY-P were located above TP, we would expect the man-phrase to occur to the left of
the subject QP. This is because focused phrases move overtly to [Spec, ONLY-Pi. Thus
the surface position of the man-phrase marks the upper bound for possible ONLY heads.
The man-phrase can occur higher than ONLY due to scrambling, but not lower than
ONLY. The structure of (25a) is represented in (26).
(26) [TPeveryone Ax [ONLY-P withJohn [Ay [vP x y shake_hands ONLY] T]
* I
Focus Movement
The PP, which is generated within VP, undergoes focus movement to [Spec, ONLY-P].
Since the subject QP is above ONLY-P in (26), the scope relation follows from this
configuration: for each person x, x shook hands with John, and for all alternatives z to
John, if x shook hands with z, z is John. I assume that the postposition moves along with
the focused phrase in the overt syntax, but reconstructs at LF for semantic interpretation.
Under this assumption, there is no need to adjust the entry of ONLY for the PP case.2 8
Let us next see the case of the ambiguous sentence in (25b). I argue that the two
readings are due to different positions of ONLY-P, not to reconstruction of the man-
phrase as a QP. On the first reading, where the subject QP takes scope over the man-
phrase, ONLY-P is still below TP. The S-initial appearance of the man-phrase is due to
scrambling that takes place after focus movement. Thus the clausal structure is the same
as the one in (26) except that the PP is adjoined to TP. The same interpretation results,
although the man-phrase is interpreted in the scrambled position.
(27) [TP withJohn Az [TP everyone Ax [ONLY-P z [ Ay [vP x y shake_hands ]]ONLY] T]]
* I1 I
Scrambling Focus Mvt.
28 Thanks to Irene Heim for suggesting this possibility.
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On the second reading of (25b), the ONLY head takes scope over the subject QP. That is,
ONLY-P is positioned above TP. The S-initial appearance of the man-phrase is due to
focus movement, not to scrambling. The structure is represented in (28).
(28) [ONLY-P withJohn [Ay [TP everyone Ax [VP x y shake_hands] T]] ONLY]
I
Focus Movement
Thus, the S-initial appearance of a PP-man could either be due to scrambling as in (27) or
to focus movement as in (28), whereas that of a case-marked man-phrase could only be
due to scrambling. The ordering between the postposition and the particle man is
compatible with both positions of ONLY-P (high ONLY-P above TP and low ONLY-P
below TP); and the surface postposition of the postposition-marked man-phrase does not
distinguish focus movement from scrambling. This is why postposition-marked man-
phrases trigger ambiguity in the S-initial position unlike case-marked ones. Overt case
marking rules out the high ONLY-P, which brings about the scope-fixing effect.
This section has shown how the current proposal accounts for the scope patterns
of man-phrases. It turns out that the apparent reconstruction of the man-phrase is not the
reconstruction of a QP, and that the scope is determined by the position of the ONLY
head. It was also shown that the difference between case-marked and postposition-
marked man-phrases correlates with the distribution of the particle with respect to case
markers and postpositions. The proposal derived this correlation without stipulations,
unlike the QP approach under which the man-phrase is a QP that shows a non-uniform
behavior.
2.5.3 Speculations on Scrambling
The current proposal derives the scope pattern of man-phrases by showing that a man-
phrase is an expression of type e. Being an expression of type e, its scrambling does not
affect scope relations. Behind this explanation lies the assumption that scrambling of a
QP, which is of type <et, t>, induces an ambiguity, which is indeed the case. The
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question, then, is how the scrambled QP induces ambiguity, and why the man-phrase
scrambles to begin with if it does not lead to a different interpretation.
As for the first question, there seem to be (at least) two ways to understand this.
The first option is to argue that scrambling is an instance of overt QR in languages with
no optional QR (Sohn 1995, Miyagawa 2003).29 This overt movement creates a new scope
relation that is otherwise not available. The original scope relation is also available if the
copy in the trace position is interpreted (Chomsky's (1993) Copy Theory of movement).
The second option is to distinguish two kinds of scrambling: PF scrambling and LF
scrambling. The former only affects sound, while the latter affects both sound and
meaning.3 0 If a QP undergoes PF scrambling, no semantic change is expected, and the
scope relation remains the same. This will be the "reconstruction effect" from the
perspective of the first approach. By contrast, if a QP undergoes LF scrambling, this
amounts to overt QR and a new scope relation is created. The surface position of a QP is
its LF position, where it is interpreted. The two positions seem to account for the scope-
changing effect of scrambling to the same degree, and the issue is whether we can find
empirical evidence to support one or the other position. I leave this matter for future
research.
The second question goes beyond the specific case of the man-phrase. The more
general question to be asked is why scrambling takes place to begin with. If one claims
that scrambling is licensed only if it affects truth-conditions, this would be too strong
since we are aware of scrambling that does not affect truth-conditions. An alternative
might be to say that scrambling is licensed if it affects interpretation where
'interpretation' covers information structure as well as truth-conditions (see Ishihara
2000 for such a proposal for Japanese). Given this, scrambling of the case-marked man-
phrase might belong to this category, along with the scrambling of referential
expressions. Yet another option is to follow Krifka (1998a) and Fox (2000), who say that
the phonological effect due to word order change is enough to motivate overt optional
29 Optional QR means long QR that moves an object QP across the subject. By contrast, obligatory
QR means short QR that moves an object QP to a clause-denoting expression (type t) due to type
mismatch (Heim and Kratzer 1998).
30 Thanks to Irene Heim for suggesting this idea.
45
operations like scrambling. At this point, I do not commit to any of the positions, and
submit that there will be more possibilities beyond these two. More in-depth study is
required on this topic, which is left for future investigation.
2.6 Further Predictions on Scope
This section enumerates and confirms various predictions of the null head analysis. I
first provide an overview of scope predictions (section 2.6.1), and then show that each
prediction is indeed borne out (sections 2.6.2 through 2.6.4). The result lends further
support to the proposed analysis.
2.6.1 An Overview
The first prediction is that multiple occurrences of the particle man would be able to
indicate the presence of a single instance of the ONLY head. Suppose that ONLY-P
could host more than one focused phrase in its spec position. In that case, the number of
particles in a sentence would not necessarily match the number of ONLY heads in the
syntactic tree. Interpretation would depend on the number of ONLY heads, not on the
number of particles.
The second prediction is that if the scrambled man-phrase contains a scope-
bearing element, the scope of the new scope-bearing element can be dissociated from the
ONLY head.31 This is so because the new scope-bearing element, contained in the man-
phrase, can be interpreted in the scrambled position, whereas the ONLY head can still
be lower than TP. Suppose there is a subject QP intervening between the scrambled man-
phrase and the low ONLY head. Then the subject QP would be able to take scope
between the new scope-bearing element and the ONLY head.
The third prediction relates to the correlation between the morpheme order and
the scope-fixing effect. Suppose that some other kind of affix can follow the particle man
31 Since the first argument of ONLY is of type e, scope-bearing elements that can appear in that
position are very limited. One candidate to be introduced shortly is the conjunction (k)wa 'and'
which forms a group individual.
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just like a case marker, but that the syntactic head that licenses this affix can be
positioned above TP, unlike case markers. Now scramble the man-phrase marked with
this affix across the subject QP. We predict that the scrambled sentence will be
ambiguous. From the order man-affix, we infer that the ONLY head is lower than the
syntactic head that licenses that affix, but it does not say more than that. Since the
relevant head can be above TP, it is compatible with both positions of the ONLY head
(above TP and below TP). Thus, no scope-fixing effect is expected.
2.6.2 Multiple Occurrences
Multiple occurrences of the particle man can indicate the presence of a single instance of
the ONLY head.32 Therefore, when the particle occurs twice in a sentence, the sentence is
ambiguous between one ONLY and two ONLY heads, as illustrated in (29).
(29) John-man sakwa-man mekesse.33
John-only apple-only ate
'Only John ate only apples.'
(i) John is the only one who ate only apples. Others ate other fruits as well as apples.
(ii) John is the only one who ate anything, and he ate only apples (not other fruits).
The first reading involves two ONLY heads. It says John is the only one who has the
property of eating only apples. By contrast, the second reading involves just one ONLY
head, and says that the pair <John, apples> is the only element that satisfies the eating
relation.3 4 Here the second reading is interesting. If the particle man carried the exclusive
32 Thanks to Kai von Fintel and Danny Fox for bringing this prediction to my attention.
33 Korean does not have overt determiners, and thus bare nouns appear in argument positions
without any problem. I assume that bare nouns in Korean can be expressions of type e. They
either undergo type-shifting (from <e, t> to e), or inherently are of type e, as claimed in Chierchia
(1998) for languages that lack determiners.
34 Contexts where the two interpretations are appropriate are given in (i) and (ii) respectively.
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meaning, the second reading would not arise. Only the first reading is predicted. This
lends further support to the claim that man is a mere agreement morpheme.
Let me briefly mention how the two readings are derived syntactically. In the
first reading of (29), both subject and object undergo focus movement to the spec of two
separate ONLY heads (one below TP and the other below AgroP). Then, each of them
moves to case-checking positions ([Spec, TP] and [Spec, AgroP] respectively). Thus, in
both subject and object, DP-man is a realization of DP-man-Case. In the second reading of
(29), by contrast, both subject and object undergo case-checking movement before they
move to the spec positions of the ONLY head, which is positioned higher than both TP
and AgroP. Thus, in both subject and object, DP-man is a realization of DP-Case-man. The
ambiguous structure of DP-man in the two derivations leads to an interesting prediction,
given that case markers can be overt only in the configuration DP-man-Case. The
prediction is that if case markers are overt, only the first reading will be available. This
prediction seems to be borne out. If case marking is overt, the ambiguity disappears,
although the judgment here is subtle.
This prediction would not arise under an alternative structure for the sentence
with overt case markers. Suppose that a single ONLY head is positioned right above VP
but below AgroP. Under such a structure, both DPs undergo focus movement first, and
then move on to their case positions. Whether case marking is overt or not, the second
reading of (29) is predicted to be available. This alternative structure, however, is
rejected, given that adjacent morphemes in word structure must reflect adjacent
(i) A: Ecey John-kwa-Mary-nun sakwa-man mekesse.
yesterday John-and-Mary-Top apple-only ate
'Yesterday, both John and Mary ate only apples.'
B: Aniya. John-man sakwa-man mekesse. Mary-nun pay-to mekesse.
No John-only apple-only ate Mary-Top pear-also ate
'No (you're wrong). Only John ate only apples. Mary ate pears, too.'
(ii) A: Ecey John-un sakwa-lul, Bill-un pay-lul, kuliko Tom-un banana-lul mekesse.
Yesterday John-Top apple-Acc Bill-Top pears-Acc and Tom-Top banana-Acc ate
'Yesterday, John ate apples, Bill ate pears, and Tom ate bananas.'
B: Aniya. John-man sakwa-man mekesse. Talun-aytul-un anwuketto an mekesse.
No John-only apple-only ate other-kids-Top anything Neg ate
'No (you're wrong). Only John ate only apples. The other kids didn't eat anything.'
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projections in the syntactic tree. One argument for this position comes from the scopal
behavior of nominative-marked man-phrases (see section 2.9.2 for more discussion). In
sentences with base order, a nominative-marked man-phrase (e.g. Mary-man-i 'Mary-
only-Nom') takes scope over an object QP, which is accusative-marked. If the ONLY
head were below AgroP, the object QP in [Spec, AgroP] would take scope over the man-
phrase, contrary to fact. Thus we conclude that the ONLY head in this case must be right
below TP. Just being lower than TP is not enough.
In order to compositionally derive the second reading, we need to introduce
another entry of the ONLY head, which takes a relation (of type <e, et>) and two
individuals as arguments. The new entry given in (30) asserts that the pair <x, y> is the
only element that satisfies the relation R:
(30) [ONLY = XR<e,<e,t>,.Xe.Aye.R(x)(y) =1 & VzeeALT(x)VweeALT(y): R(z)(w) = 1
- z = x & w =y35
One can think of this as being parallel to negation in negative concord languages,
where multiple occurrences of negation can contribute a single instance of negation. For
instance, in the following English and Italian sentences, the multiple negations do not
cancel each other out. The interpretation involves only one negation.
(31) a. Maria didn't say nothing to nobody. (Nonstandard English)
35 So far we have two entries of ONLY as given (i) and (ii).
(i) [ONLY l] = XP<e,t>.Ae.P(x) = 1 & VzeEALT(x): P(z) = 1 - z = x
(ii) [ONLY 2] = XRep>xye.R(xy(X)(y) = 1 & VzeEALT(x)VweEALT(y): R(z)(w) = 1 - z = x &w = y
Irene Heim suggested that we can define a generalized version of ONLY in the following way.
First, we define <en, t>, where n > 0 and <eo, t> = t and <en +l, t> = <e, <en, t>>. With this notation,
the generalized ONLY will have the following lexical entry:
(iii) [ONLY n] = XR,en, t>X1 ..... ~n.R(x0 .... . .(x) = 1 & Vyl ...... yn[yl E ALT(x) ...... ynE ALT(x)
& R(y) ...... (y - xl = yl & ...... & Xn = y]
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b. Mario non ha parlato di niente con nessuno. (Italian)
'Mario hasn't spoken with anyone about anything.' (Ladusaw 1992:237)
A widely accepted account for this phenomenon is that the apparent negative
morpheme does not have negative force, but merely marks the presence of an abstract
negation somewhere in the clause (see footnote 15 for references). The behavior of
negation falls under the same account as given here if we assume that the spec position
of the abstract negation can be multiply filled. In short, the unexpected readings attested
with multiple occurrences of negation and the particle man support the abstract head
analysis in both cases.
2.6.3 Scope Splitting
This section turns to the second prediction, concerning what happens if the man-phrase
contains a scope-bearing element. As shown in section 2.5, the surface position of the
particle man does not determine scope relations in the sentence. No matter where the
man-phrase enters the semantic composition, the same interpretation obtains as long as
the position of the ONLY head is fixed in one place. This means that the man-phrase
does not always have to be in [Spec, ONLY-P] once it has passed through that position.
Now the question is whether the scrambled man-phrase is required to be back in the
spec of ONLY-P at LF, although interpretability alone does not require such
reconstruction. For example, Beghelli & Stowell (1994, 1997) and Beghelli (1995) assign
specific LF positions to different types of QPs. If the ONLY head is like one of the QP
positions in Beghelli & Stowell's approach, the man-phrase would have to reconstruct to
the spec position. In other words, if the ONLY head turns out to have such a
requirement, we would need to postulate an ONLY-criterion similar to the Wh-Criterion
(Rizzi 1996) or the Neg-Criterion (Haegeman 1995).
One way to answer this question is to introduce a new scope-bearing element
into the man-phrase and look at its scope-taking position in a scrambled sentence.
Specifically, the question would be whether the scope of the new scope-bearing element
can be dissociated from the ONLY head. If dissociation is possible, this would mean that
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the man-phrase is interpreted in the scrambled position without being reconstructed to
[Spec, ONLY-Pi. The present analysis predicts this dissociation to be possible, and this
section confirms that this prediction is borne out.36 For this, we introduce a conjoined DP
as a new scope-bearing element.
2.6.3.1 Background: Scrambling and Conjunction
Consider the following sentences, which exemplify the scope-bearing property of a
conjoined DP.
(32) a. Nwukwunka-ka John-kwa-Bill-ul salanghanta.
Someone-Nom John-and-Bill-Acc love
'Someone loves John and Bill.'
(i) There is someone who loves both John and Bill. (some > and)
(ii) *There is someone who loves John and someone who loves Bill (*and > some)37
b. John-kwa-Bill-ull [nwukwunka-ka ti salanhanta.]
John-and-Bill-Acc someone-Nom love
'(Lit.) John and Bill, someone loves t.'
(i) There is someone who loves both John and Bill. (some > and)
(ii) There is someone who loves John and someone who loves Bill. (and > some)
The sentences in (32) contain an existential quantifier in the subject position and a
conjoined DP in the object position. When there is no word order change, the sentence
only allows a surface scope reading (some > and), as shown in (32a). In order for this
reading to be true, there needs to be someone who loves both John and Bill. By contrast,
if the object is scrambled, as in (32b), the sentence becomes ambiguous. The sentence
36 I thank Danny Fox and Sabine Iatridou for bringing this question to my attention.
37 Note that the reading in (i) entails the reading in (ii), but not vice versa. In situations where
someone loves both John and Bill, it is always true that someone loves John and someone loves
Bill. Since there is a situation where (i) is false but (ii) is true, namely one in which different
people like John and Bill, the two readings are still distinct.
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retains the original reading of (32a), but it also has a reading that is compatible with
there being no person who loves both John and Bill.
In order to derive these two readings, we introduce a D(istributivity) operator in
the syntactic tree. Following Link (1983), Roberts (1987), and Beck (2000) among others, I
assume the following lexical entry for the D-operator.
(33) [DI = Af<e,t>.XXe. VxX: f(x) = 1
The D-operator takes two arguments, a predicate and a group individual. The group
individual is marked by a capital letter to be distinguished from an atomic individual.
The D-operator asserts that the property f holds of all the atomic individuals that are
part of the group individual X.
With this in mind, we first address the case of (32a). As has been assumed so far,
the object DP moves to [Spec, AgroP] for case reasons. The structure is given in (34a)
along with the semantic value of the top node in (34b).
(34) a. TP 
someone
1
AgroP T[NOM]
John & Bill
VP Agro[ACC]
t2 love
b. [(I)] = There is someone x such that x loves John and x loves Bill.
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The movement of John-kwa-Bill 'John and Bill' creates a syntactic environment where the
D-operator can be inserted.38 The D-operator takes the lambda predicate in node () and
the conjoined DP as its arguments, and asserts that both John and Bill have the property
denoted by node (). This leads to the reading in (34b). Notice, however, that the same
reading can be derived without the D-operator. In that case, the semantic value of the
top node is that there is someone who loves the group individual that consists of John
and Bill. Under the assumption that love is a distributive predicate in the object
position,39 this amounts to saying that there is someone who loves both John and Bill.
The unavailability of the other reading in which two different people love John and Bill
is due to an independent property of Korean, specifically the lack of covert movement
like QR. One way to make this reading available is to move John-kwa-Bill 'John and Bill'
at LF to a position higher than the subject quantifier and to insert the D-operator right
below the moved element. This option, however, is not allowed, as manifested in the
scope rigidity of the language.
Next, we turn to the scrambled sentence in (32b). Here the conjoined DP is
adjoined to TP via scrambling, as illustrated in (35). Scrambling creates another position
where the D-operator can be inserted, namely below the scrambled DP. Unlike the
previous case in (34), the presence or absence of the D-operator gives rise to different
semantic values. If the D-operator is not present, this results in the same reading as the
non-scrambled sentence in (32a): there is someone who loves the group individual that
38 I assume that the D-operator is inserted after movement of John and Bill. This is why the lambda
abstractor is split from the moved element. See also Sauerland (1998).
39 Distributive predicates are predicates that are true of a group iff they are true of all individuals
making up the group (Scha 1984). It is plausible to assume that love is a distributive predicate in
the object position, but this is not necessarily true. First, the size of the group affects
interpretation. For example, it is possible to love a group without loving all the atomic
individuals that compose that group, especially when the group is relatively large. But this is
quite odd if the group only contains two atomic individuals (e.g. see the contrast between I love
the Korean people and I love my parents). Secondly, the ambiguity between non-distributive and
distributive reading does exist in object position as well. Suppose, for example, that you weighed
John and Bill together on a scale; so you knew how much they weighed together, but didn't know
how much each of them weighed. In this example, 'weighing John and Bill' does not mean
'weighing John and weighing Bill.' Given these considerations, the equivalence of the two
readings in (34) (the one with the D-operator and the other without the D-operator) is due to the
lexical meaning of the predicate and our world knowledge, but it is not absolute equivalence.
Thanks to Kai von Fintel, Danny Fox, and Irene Heim for pointing this out to me.
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consists of John and Bill. Again, under the assumption that love is a distributive
predicate in the object position, this means there is someone who loves both John and
Bill. By contrast, if the D-operator is present, the distributive reading obtains.40 It asserts
that both John and Bill have the property denoted by node (, which is the property of
being loved by someone. This reading does not require the same person to love both
John and Bill. The value of the top node is given in (35b). See the appendix for details.
(35) a. TP ()
John & Bill
P
A roP T[NOM]
t
VP Agro[ACC]
t3 love
b. [(D] = VxeJ&B: there is someone who loves x, i.e. there is someone who loves
John and there is someone who loves Bill.
40 It is crucial that the D-operator is inserted below the scrambled DP. If the D-operator is inserted
at a lower point, it can still produce the collective reading (some > and).
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2.6.3.2 Scope Splitting
Having established this background, let us move to the case of a man-phrase containing
a conjoined DP. Relevant examples are given in (36).
(36) a. Nwukwunka-ka John-kwa-Bill-man-ul
someone-Nom John-and-Bill-only-Acc
'Someone loves only John and Bill.'
(i) There is someone who loves only John and Bill.
(ii) *There is someone who loves only John and someone
salanghanta.
love
(some > only > and)
who loves only Bill.
(*and > some > only)
b. John-kwa-Bill-man-ull [nwukwunka-ka ti salanhanta.]
John-and-Bill-only-Acc someone-Nom love
'(Lit.) Only John and Bill, someone loves t.'
(i) There is someone who loves only John and Bill. (some > only > and)
(ii) There is someone who loves only John and someone who loves only Bill.
(and > some > only)
Sentence (36a) is not ambiguous. It only allows a surface scope reading. For this reading
to be true, there needs to be someone who loves John and Bill and loves no one else.
Sentence (36b), by contrast, has two readings. In one reading, one and the same person
loves only John and Bill, as in (36a). In the other reading, there must be two different
people involved such that one person loves only John, and the other person loves only
Bill.
The ambiguity of (36b) is interesting since scrambling of case-marked man-
phrases has not induced ambiguity so far. This ambiguity, however, is not a counter-
example to our analysis. Compare the scope relations in the two readings. In (36a) and in
the first reading of (36b), the subject QP takes scope over both the conjunction and the
ONLY head. In the second reading of (36b), the conjunction takes scope over the subject
QP, which in turn takes scope over the ONLY head. In both cases, the scope relation
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between the subject QP and the ONLY head remains the same; the former takes scope
over the latter. What differentiates the two cases is where the conjoined DP takes scope.
If the conjoined DP is interpreted in the scrambled position, the D-operator can apply
and produce a new reading that is otherwise unavailable. This makes the scope of the
conjunction split from the ONLY head (and > some > only).
Let me spell out how each reading is derived, starting with (36a). Based on the
morpheme order man-ul 'only-acc', we conclude that the ONLY head is positioned lower
than Agro. The structure of (36a) is represented in (37a) along with the value of the top
node in (37b).
(37) a. TP 
someone
1
AgroP T [NOM]
John & Bill
2
ONLY-P Agro[ACC]
t2 ONLY' )
ONLY
VP
t3 love
b. [()] = There is someone x such that x loves John and Bill & VZeE ALT(&B):
x loves z -, z e J & B41
4 1 The lexical entry of ONLY is slightly modified in this example because a group individual is in
focus. I assume that the set of alternatives to a group individual still includes atomic individuals.
This is due to the existence of predicates that are not distributive in the object position (e.g. weigh;
56
Note that we cannot apply the D-operator in this tree. There are two positions where the
D-operator could be inserted: nodes () and (). In both cases, this would lead to a
reading "there is someone who loves only John and loves only Bill." There cannot be
such an individual since this property is a contradiction; no one can simultaneously love
only John and love only Bill. Therefore, the D-operator cannot be inserted in this tree.
Next consider the scrambled sentence in (36b). The scrambling of the conjoined
DP creates a position where the D-operator can be inserted, as illustrated in (38) on the
next page. In this structure, the readings diverge depending upon whether the D-
operator is present or not. Without the D-operator, the first reading in (36b) obtains
(some > only > and), which is the same as the case with no scrambling. For this reading to
be true, there has to be someone who loves only John and Bill. That person does not love
Tom, for example. The reading we are interested in (and > some > only) arises when the
D-operator is present. In this reading, the one who loves only John does not love Bill and
the one who loves only Bill does not love John. The two values of the top node are given
in (39). The one in (39a) is without the D-operator and the one in (39b) is with the D-
operator. See the appendix for a step-by-step derivation.
see footnote 39). Suppose that I weighed John and Bill together, but not separately. Then I could
say "I weighed only John and Bill, so I don't know how much each of them weighs by
themselves." If this is felicitous, the alternatives to John and Bill should include atomic individuals
such as John and Bill. Under this assumption, we need to adjust the entry so that we do not
wrongly rule out some elements from the set of alternatives. Note that the entry is
intensionalized in order to encode the entailment relation.
(i) [ONLY]w = AP<e,t>x.P(w)(x) =1 & VzeEALT(x): P(w)(z) = 1 --+ [w'.P(w')(x) X Xw'.P(w')(z)]
The revised entry says that P(x) is true in w and if some alternative satisfies the predicate, the
resulting proposition P(z) is entailed by the presupposed proposition P(x) (see also von Fintel
1997). With respect to our example, this means that if x loves z among the alternatives, z is a part
of J&B. That is, z is John, Bill, or John & Bill. I thank Irene Heim for pointing this out to me.
57
(38) TP 
John & Bill
TP
e
2
AgroP T [NOM]
tli
3
ONLY-P Agro[ACC]
t3 ONLY'
ONLY
VPe
, t4 love
(39) a. IO)] = There is someone x such that x loves John and Bill & VzeE ALTU&B):
x loves z - z E J & B
b. [O(] = VzeJ&B: there is someone who loves only z, i.e. there is someone who
loves only John and there is someone who loves only Bill.
The existence of the reading in (39b) confirms our second prediction. The scope of a
scope-bearing element within the man-phrase can be split from the scope of the ONLY
head. At the same time, it answers the question raised at the beginning of the section.
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The man-phrase does not have to reconstruct to [Spec, ONLY-P].42 If it had to
reconstruct, the scope splitting would not be possible, and no ambiguity would be
expected in (36b). Specifically, the reading in (39b) is not available if the conjoined DP
reconstructs to a position below the subject QP, either to [Spec, AgroP] or to [Spec,
ONLY-Pi. In those cases, the D-operator cannot be inserted since it leads to a
contradiction.
2.6.3.3 Quantifiers within the Man-Phrase
Before closing this section, I will briefly discuss one issue that requires further attention.
The only example of a scope-bearing element that we have dealt with so far is
conjunction. Although conjunction is a scope-bearing element, as shown here, it is not
the most representative example. So, what happens if the man-phrase contains a more
typical QP like every professor? Here it seems we run into a problem. If a QP is always of
type <et, t>, our current entry for ONLY produces a wrong (and contradictory) reading.
Consider the following sentence.
(40) Mary-ka motun-kyoswu-man-ul mannassta.
Mary-Nom every-professor-only-Acc met
'(Lit.) Mary met only every professor.'
If motun kyoswu 'every professor' is interpreted as a QP of type <et, t>, the current
semantics of ONLY wrongly predicts this sentence to mean that for all x, if x is a
professor, Mary met only x. This is contradictory since it is not possible for Mary to meet
only Professor A and meet only Professor B at the same time. Of course, the sentence
does not allow this reading.
So what does this sentence mean? In theory, we expect two readings. If the noun
kyoswu 'professor' alone is in focus, we expect that all alternatives x to this noun make
the sentence Mary met every x false. For example, Mary met every student should be false if
42 In this regard, the ONLY head is distinguished from other functional heads (e.g. NegP and C).
A remaining question, then, is why this should be the case. I leave this for future investigation.
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sentence (40) is true. This sentence can be true under this reading even if Mary met some
students, as long as she did not meet all of them. Let's call this a weak reading. By
contrast, if the whole DP motun kyoswu 'every professor' is in focus, we get a strong
reading, which says that Mary met every professor and nobody else (see Krifka 1993 for
what would be legitimate alternatives to the quantified DP). Under this reading,
sentence (40) cannot be true if Mary met even a single student.
In actuality, however, this sentence does not allow both of these readings.43 For
all the speakers that I consulted, it can only mean that Mary met no one other than
professors (the strong reading). Even when the noun receives a strong focus, speakers
find the first reading very difficult to get. In order to derive the strong reading, I propose
that the QP motun kyoswu 'every professor' can be optionally interpreted as a group-
denoting term, i.e. as a definite plural like the professors (Beghelli & Stowell 1997,
Matthewson 2001).44 Being a group-denoting individual, the QP is an expression of type
e, and the sentence is interpretable with our current entry of ONLY.45 Under this
proposal, sentence (40) means that Mary met a group individual that consists of all the
contextually relevant professors, and for all the alternatives X to this group individual,
Mary met none of the individuals that belong to X. In order to get this reading, we need
to adopt a few assumptions. First, we assume that meet is a distributive predicate in the
object position (see footnote 39). This is done by an implicit all or a D-operator that
applies to the predicate. Applied to the example in hand, if Mary met a group
43 English allows the expected ambiguity, although judgments vary among speakers. See Bonomi
& Casalegno (1993) and von Fintel (1997) for conflicting judgments.
44 A remaining question is why Korean does not allow the weak reading. One way to rule out the
weak reading is to stipulate that Korean does not have an association-with-focus effect that looks
inside QPs, and a QP is obligatorily interpreted as a group-denoting term in the context of man. In
order for the weak reading to be possible in Korean, the DP-internal quantifier must be replaced
by a floating quantifier, as in (i).
(i) Mary-ka kyoswu-tul-man-ul motwu manassta.
Mary-Nom professor-Pl-only-Acc all met
'Mary met every professor, and there is no other P other than 'professor' such that Mary
met every P. For example, Mary met some but not all students.'
451 I do not commit myself to the claim that QPs in Korean are always a group-denoting
expression. We still allow the QP motun kywswu 'every professor' to be an expression of type <et,
t>. In that case, sentence (40) becomes contradictory as soon as there is more than one professor.
See Krifka (1993).
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individual, she met all members of that group. Secondly, we need to assume that when
negated, this implicit quantifier obeys the Excluded Middle due to the Homogeneity
Presupposition (von Fintel 1997, L6bner 1998). This ensures that if Mary did not meet a
certain group individual, she met none of the members that belong to that group. This
second assumption is necessary; otherwise, we end up with the weak reading instead of
the strong reading.
One argument for this position comes from English.4 6 The English sentence that
corresponds to (40) allows an ambiguity if the QP is headed by every. If the QP is headed
by each, however, only the weak reading is available. It has been shown that in contrast
to every N, each N does not allow a definite non-distributive construal (Tunstall 1998,
Matthewson 2001). Since the group reading is not available for each professor, the strong
reading is not available in Mary met only each professor. This supports the claim that the
strong reading arises when the QP receives a group interpretation.
2.6.4 Case Marker vs. Topic/Contrastive Marker
The topic (or contrastive) marker (n)un exhibits an interesting contrast to case markers.47
Both the topic marker and the case marker follow the particle man, but topic-marked
man-phrases behave differently from case-marked ones. Specifically, the scope of a topic-
marked man-phrase is not fixed to one position. Consider the following sentences, where
the particle man is followed by the topic marker (n)un.48
(41) a. Motun-salam-i John-man-un salanghanta.
every-person-Nom John-only-Top love
'Everyone loves only John.'
(i) Everyone loves only John. (every > only)
(ii) *John is the only one whom everyone loves. (*only > every)
46 Thanks to Danny Fox for suggesting this test.
47 The form nun is preceded by an open syllable, and un is preceded by a closed one.
48 Thanks to Shinichiro Ishihara for bringing this question to my attention.
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b. John-man-unl [motun-salam-i el salanghanta.]
John-only-Top every-person-Nom love
'(Lit.) Only John, everyone loves e.'
(i) Everyone loves only John. (every > only)
(ii) John is the only one whom everyone loves. (only > every)
Sentence (41a) only allows a surface scope reading. If the man-phrase appears S-initially,
however, the sentence becomes ambiguous, as in (41b).49 This pattern contrasts with that
of a case-marked man-phrase, where a change in word order does not lead to a
difference in scope. Given that both the topic marker and the case marker follow the
particle man, this contrast is striking.
The answer to this puzzle lies in the fact that the marker (n)un does not have one
fixed position, unlike case markers (see below for this). Crucially, it has a position higher
than TP. The morpheme order man-un 'only-top' indicates that the ONLY head is below
the head that licenses the topic marker. But this does not guarantee that the ONLY head
is lower than TP since the topic head can be higher than TP in the first place. The order,
then, is compatible with both positions of the ONLY head (above TP and below TP).
Recall that the presence of case markers indicates that the ONLY head is lower than
Agro, and thus lower than TP. This contrast explains why no scope-fixing effect arises in
the topic-marked man-phrase.
Before we address the scope relation in (41) in more detail, some background is
needed on the syntax and semantics of the marker (n)un. Although it is most often
referred to as a topic marker, (n)un does not always function as a sentential topic.
Another important function of the marker (n)un is its contrastive use (the same for
Japanese wa). In fact, there are proposals that distinguish the two uses and assume (at
least two) different topic positions for each use (See C. Han 1998, Choi 1997, M. Lee 2001,
49 The translations given here do not fully convey the readings. Closer readings are (i) for each x,
the only person that I know x loves is John, and (ii) the only person that I know everyone loves is
John, respectively. There are more issues than I can discuss here regarding the exact semantic
properties of the marker (n)un. Interested readers are referred to the works cited in the text.
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C. Lee 2000, 2003 for Korean, and also Kuno 1973, Miyagawa 1987, 1989 for Japanese).50
Specifically, it has been pointed out that if the topic marker appears S-medially, it is
contrastive, whereas if it appears S-initially, it can be neutral or contrastive. One
example is given below.
(42) a. Mary-ka John-un salanghanta.
Mary-Nom John-Top love
'Mary loves John (but not the others).'5l
b. John-unl [Mary-ka el salanghanta.]
John-Top Mary-Nom love
'John, Mary loves e.'
(i) As for John, Mary loves him.
(ii) Mary loves John (but not the others).
Sentence (42a) contains a contrastive topic, whereas the topic in (42b) can be a neutral or
contrastive topic although its salient reading is the first one. The contrastive reading in
(42b) arises if a strong pitch accent is given to John. Given that the contrastive reading is
the only reading in (42a) and that it is still available in (42b), we conclude that the
second reading in (42b) arises via scrambling. Therefore, the empty element in (42b) is a
trace when it contains a contrastive topic. By contrast, when the topic in the S-initial
position is a neutral topic, it is base-generated in that position, and the empty category is
a pro (see section 2.8 for the contrast between a pro and a trace). For this reason, the
empty category is neutrally marked as e in the sentence. Setting the details aside, the
point of the discussion is that the marker (n)un is licensed both S-initially (TopP above
50 Several people have claimed that TopP is located in two positions in the clausal structure, not
just in Korean and Japanese, but in other languages as well. See Rizzi 1997, Cecchetto 1999, and
Jayaseelan 2001 for further discussion.
51 Phrases in parentheses are meant to be a continuation rather than entailment. Also, the topic
marker is not compatible with any case marker (but compatible with postpositions). Overt case
marking makes the sentences ungrammatical.
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TP) and S-medially (TopP below TP). The former is mapped to the neutral topic, and the
latter to the contrastive topic.
Now back to the scope relation. In (41a), both ONLY-P and TopP are below TP
(TP > TopP > ONLY-P). Thus, the subject QP in [Spec, TP] takes scope over the ONLY
head (every > only). Given the lack of covert movement in Korean, the topic-marked man-
phrase does not move to the higher topic position. From this it follows that (41a) is not
ambiguous. The sentence in (41b) has different structures for the two readings. On the
first reading, the man-phrase undergoes scrambling to the S-initial position. The source
of the sentence is (41a), and both ONLY-P and TopP are below TP (every > only). On the
second reading, both ONLY-P and TopP are above TP (TopP > ONLY-P > TP). Thus, the
ONLY head takes scope over the subject QP in [Spec, TP] (only > every).52
Thus the discussion in this section has confirmed the third prediction. The topic
marker is the type of affix that follows the particle man but whose licensing head can be
higher than TP (note that the presence of another licensing head below TP is not relevant
here). As predicted, there is no scope fixing effect if the topic-marked man-phrase is
scrambled. Word order change gives rise to a new scope relation. This contrast is
reminiscent of the contrast between the accusative marker and postpositions.
Postpositions indicate that ONLY-P is higher than VP, but they are compatible with both
positions of ONLY-P (above TP and below TP). Whether a certain morpheme precedes
or follows the particle man, what is important is how much it can narrow down possible
positions of ONLY-P. Discussion in this section further supports the thesis that the
morpheme order reflects the syntactic hierarchy.
52 Note that the account for the contrast in (41) would hold even if one rejected the low topic
head. Whether one adopts the low TopP or not, we still have the high TopP. What is crucial is
that TopP can be higher than TP and thus compatible with the high ONLY-P above TP. Such an
assumption, however, would have difficulty in explaining the non-ambiguity of (41a) unless one
adopted an LF/covert movement of the topic phrase. As already mentioned, the lack of covert
movement is a general property of scope-rigid languages, and for this reason, I reject this
alternative.
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2.7 Implications
This section addresses implications of the present analysis on broader issues such as the
syntax-morphology interface (section 2.7.1) and the contrast between lexical focus and
discourse focus (section 2.7.2).
2.7.1 Implications for the Syntax-Morphology Interface
One of the main components of the proposed analysis is that the order of nominal affixes
mirrors syntactic derivations. This makes a crucial role in identifying the position of the
ONLY head and thus deriving the scope patterns of the man-phrase. To the extent that
these claims are on the right track, the present study lends support to a syntactic view
(rather than to a lexicalist view) of the relation between syntax and morphology.5 3
Where the Mirror Principle applies is a long-standing debate between two
camps. The lexicalists claim that words are built in the lexicon, and the Mirror Principle
is just a consequence of morpheme combination (Grimshaw 1986, DiSciullo & Williams
1987, and Alsina 1999). By contrast, the syntacticists, like Baker (1985, 1988), integrate
morphology into syntax and argue for a strong connection between syntax and
morpheme structure. The source of controversy seems to be that discussions in this area
revolve around grammatical function changing rules such as causatives, passives, and
applicatives. These rules can be treated either in the lexicon or in syntax depending
upon one's assumptions. The matter of quantifier scope, however, seems difficult to deal
with in the lexicon. If the order of morphemes within a word has an effect beyond the
word boundary, for example if it affects the scope relations as reported here, the
morpheme structure should be dealt with outside the lexicon.
A specific case of this general debate is found in the Korean linguistic literature
as well. The debate is regarding where the nominal affixes are added to the nominal
root. One camp argues for a lexicalist approach, and claims that all the nominal affixes,
53 Note that the lexicalist view discussed here is one specific version that Cho & Sells (1995) and
Sells (1995) advocate. As mentioned already (footnote 22), the analysis can be made compatible
with the lexicalist hypothesis assumed in the Minimalist Program (Chomsky 1993).
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including case markers and focus particles, are attached in the lexicon (Cho & Sells 1995,
Sells 1995). The other camp advocates a syntactic approach, and provides solutions to
problems noted by the lexicalists (Yoon 1995, to appear, Koopman 2003). Given the
strong association between the morphological shape of the man-phrase and the clausal
structure assumed here, this study is in line with the syntactic approach.
Unlike the lexicalist hypothesis assumed in the Minimalist Program, the one
espoused by Cho & Sells (1995) and Sells (1995) does not assume any functional head.
The order of nominal and verbal affixes is due to morphological templates that merely
specify a particular slot for each affix, and therefore does not have any association with
syntactic hierarchy. Since the lexical view "separates what information morphemes
provide from where they appear" (Sells 1995:299), it predicts that the order of affixes
does not affect the syntax or semantics of sentences. Understood in connection with the
issue of this chapter, this means that the position of the focus particle man with respect
to postpositions and case markers would not affect their syntactic or semantic behavior.
Specifically, the lexical view predicts that there should be no difference between John-
man-ul 'John-only-acc' and John-ekey-man 'John-to-only'. But the preceding sections
showed that this prediction is not borne out and that the scope of the particle varies with
its syntactic environment. If there is no dependency between morphology and syntax, as
claimed by the lexicalists, the contrast between case-marked and postposition-marked
man-phrases would be hard to capture and require adopting a stipulation that we
rejected earlier. Thus, we conclude that the order of the nominal affixes should be the
product of syntactic derivation.
Although I support the syntactic view, I also note that specific implementations
of the syntactic approach can be different. One case worth mentioning is Koopman
(2004), which addresses problematic cases noted by the lexicalist view (specifically Sells
1995) including the order of nominal affixes. Unlike the current approach, however, she
bases her claim on the assumption that the focus head (man) is always merged higher
than the case head (ul). If DP moves from its theta position through case and focus
positions, this assumption leads to an unattested form *DP-Case-man. In order to avoid
this problem, Koopman (2004) argues that case markers are stranded when DP moves to
[Spec, man] after case checking. Given that there are many issues (other than scope) that
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Koopman (2004) deals with, I will not go into specific details of the analysis. However, it
should be noted that the core idea that runs through her analysis and mine is the same,
namely that nominal affixes are part of syntax, and that the morpheme order is not an
arbitrary fact due to templates. The scope pattern of the man-phrase and its correlation
with the morphological form add an argument for the syntactic approach.
2.7.2 Lexical Focus vs. Discourse Focus
The second issue to address is whether the ONLY head can be identified with the focus
head that is assumed in the focus literature (e.g. Choe 1995, Rizzi 1997), and whether the
approach to the exclusive particle can be extended to other focus particles.
In the literature, the focus head is usually posited to represent discourse focus,
which normally expresses new information in contrast to given information. Given that
the ONLY head carries a very specific meaning, namely exhaustivity, it may be distinct
from this focus head. However, it is also noted that the focus head is associated with
exhaustivity in some cases. Kiss (1998), following Brody (1990, 1995), posits such a focus
head to represent identificational focus in Hungarian. Another difference between the
ONLY head and the focus head assumed in the literature is that the focus head has a
designated position in the clause, usually in a higher domain such as CP. By contrast,
the ONLY head proposed here does not have one fixed position. It can occur not just in a
higher domain but also in a lower domain such as below TP. This difference, however,
seems to be weakened by recent proposals which argue that the focus head does not just
belong to the CP domain. They argue that there is at least one more focus projection in
the lower domain, for example, above VP (Miyagawa 1997, Jayaseelan 2001, Belletti
2001, Simpson & Wu 2002, and Drubig 2003). If these proposals are on the right track
and thus FocP is freer in its distribution than has been assumed so far, the ONLY head
may be identified with the focus head in these works, at least in its distribution. Of
course, there could be differences that arise due to their different nature, for example,
the presence or absence of a lexical item involved. At this point, I do not take any stand
regarding the relation between lexical focus and discourse focus, and leave this for
future research.
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The second issue is whether the analysis of the exclusive particle can be extended
to other focus particles, for instance, to the additive particle to in Korean. Ideally, the
additive particle would behave in the same way as the exclusive particle. This issue will
be addressed in more detail in the following chapter, and here I briefly introduce some
differences between the two particles.
Hasegawa (1994) and Sohn (1995) propose that focus phrases move to [Spec,
FocP], which is located between CP and NegP. Their arguments are based on the
behavior of Japanese mo 'also' and Korean to 'also', both of which always have scope
over negation as a Positive Polarity Item (PPI). The following data is from Sohn (1995).
(43) Mary-ka John-to mannaci ani hayssta.
Mary-Nom John-also meet not did
(i) Mary didn't meet John, either. (also > Neg)
(ii) *Mary didn't meet John, although he met someone else. (*Neg > also)
Following Hasegawa (1994), Sohn (1995) argues that FocP is higher than NegP since the
to-phrase (the phrase which the particle is attached to) always takes scope over negation.
He further assumes that all focus particles move to the spec of FocP in the overt syntax,
which leads to an expectation that the man-phrase would also always take scope over
negation. This expectation, however, is not fulfilled.
(44) Mary-ka John-man mannaci ani hayssta.
Mary-Nom John-only meet not did
(i) John is the only one that Mary didn't meet. (only > Neg)
(ii) It is not the case that Mary met only John. She met someone else, too. (Neg > only)
Unlike (43), (44) is ambiguous. The man-phrase can take either wide or narrow scope
with respect to negation, as also observed by J.-W. Choe (1998). Given this contrast, it
seems difficult to make a claim about focus particles in general based on the behavior of
one particle. Also, the PPI status of the particle to is an issue independent of whether the
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syntax of the two particles is distinguished. Thus, we cannot tell whether their syntax is
really distinguished. More will be said on this issue in the next chapter.
2.8 Extension: Man-Phrases with No Additional Marking
So far I have shown that the scopal behavior of a man-phrase varies with the
accompanying affixes (case marker, postposition, or topic marker). This section presents
another case where the morphological marking affects the scopal behavior of a man-
phrase, specifically a man-phrase with no additional marking. The particle man can
combine with a DP without other morphemes, in which case it exhibits different syntax
and semantics from case-marked and postposition-marked man-phrases. The discussion
starts with the scope pattern (section 2.8.1), and then turns to syntactic differences due to
the morphological marking (section 2.8.2). The final subsection (section 2.8.3) touches
upon why there is a correlation between morphological marking and syntax.
2.8.1 Scope Patterns
When there is a man-phrase with no overt case marking (henceforth bare man-phrase),
the S-initial appearance of the man-phrase always allows an ambiguity with respect to a
following scope-bearing element. The dependency between the man-phrase and the
empty element associated with it can be clause-internal or extend across a clausal
boundary. Let us first consider the clause-internal dependency given in (45).
(45) a. John-manl Imotun-salam-i el salanghanta.]
John-only every-person-Nom love
'(Lit.) Only John, everyone loves e.'
(i) Everyone loves John and no one else. (every > only)
(ii) John is the only one whom everyone loves. (only > every)
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b. John-man-ull [motun-salam-i t
John-only-Acc every-person-Nom
'(Lit.) Only John, everyone loves t.'
(i) Everyone loves John and no one else.
(ii) *John is the only one whom everyone loves.
salanghanta.]
love
(every > only)
(*only > every)
Sentence (45a) is ambiguous. Unlike (45b), it can mean that John is the only one whom
everyone loves. While the non-ambiguity of (45b) is puzzling under the QP approach to
man-phrases, the ambiguity of (45a) is puzzling under the present account. Let's suppose
that (45a) is a result of case drop from (45b), and further that case drop is a PF
phenomenon and does not affect LF operations such as scope relation. Under these
assumptions, John-man 'John-only' would be a realization of John-man-ul ohn-only-acc,'
and ONLY-P would be positioned in the same place in both sentences. This approach,
then, wrongly predicts (45a) to be unambiguous like (45b), contrary to fact. This suggests
that John-man cannot be always identified as John-man-Case, and its S-initial appearance
cannot be due to scrambling, as in (45b). For this reason, we conclude that case drop and
scrambling do not give a proper account for the contrast.54 For the same reason, the
empty element in (45a) is marked as e, which is neutral regarding the type of the empty
category, whereas the empty category in (45b) is a trace (t) of a movement, namely
scrambling.
The same problem holds of (46), where the dependency between the man-phrase
and the empty element goes across a clausal boundary.
(46) a. John-man nwukwunka-ka [Mary-ka el pinanhayssta-ko] malhayssta.
John-only someone-Nom Mary-Nom criticized-that said
'(Lit.) Only John, someone said that Mary criticized e.'
(i) Someone said that Mary criticized only John. (some > only)
(ii) Only about John did someone say that Mary criticized him. (only > some)
54 I thank Shoichi Takahashi for discussion on this part.
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b. John-man-ull nwukwunka-ka [Mary-ka ti pinanhayssta-ko] malhayssta.
John-only-Acc someone-Nom Mary-Nom criticized-that said
'(Lit.) Only John, someone said that Mary criticized t.'
(i) Someone said that Mary criticized only John. (some > only)
(ii) * Only about John did someone say that Mary criticized him. (*only > some)
Sentence (46a) is ambiguous. As indicated, this sentence allows the man-phrase, i.e. the
ONLY head, to take scope either above or below the matrix subject QP. In order to show
how the two readings are distinguished in (46a), I will illustrate possible situations that
make these readings true or false. Imagine a situation where Mary criticized John, Bill,
and Tom. Sue, who is a close friend of Mary's, knew that Mary criticized John, but she
didn't know that Mary criticized Bill and Tom, as well. Later, Sue said to another friend
of hers that Mary criticized John, but said nothing more. Suppose further that Sue is the
only person who is aware of the situation, and no one mentioned anything about it.
Note that Sue said that Mary criticized John, not that Mary criticized only John. In this
situation, (46b) is false, since no one said Mary criticized only John. But (46a) can be true
or false depending upon how we interpret the sentence. If we interpret it as in (i) (some >
said > only), the sentence is false since no one said Mary criticized only John. If we
interpret it as in (ii) (only > some > said), the sentence is true, since John is the only one
about whom someone said that Mary criticized him. What is crucial here is that (46a) can
be true in this situation, unlike (46b).
The case in (46b) is easily accounted for. The case-marked man-phrase behaves in
the same way whether it undergoes clause-internal or long-distance scrambling. Thus
the account for the former is straightforwardly extended to the latter. In (46b), the ONLY
head is positioned within the embedded clause, as inferred from the morpheme order,
and the man-phrase undergoes long-distance scrambling after focus movement within
the embedded clause. Similarly to the case in (45), the contrast between (46a) and (46b)
would not be captured, if the two have identical structures and one is derived from the
other via case drop.
To conclude this section, all the cases show that the absence of morphological
marking greatly affects the scopal behavior of the man-phrase, and it is not due to simple
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case drop. The bare man-phrase neither behaves like a case-marked man-phrase nor a
postposition-marked man-phrase with respect to scope and reconstruction.
2.8.2 Another Alternative Account Rejected
Despite these problems, one might think that there is a way for the scrambling analysis
to work here. This alternative approach appeals to the idea that case markers in Korean
are actually focus markers (e.g. Schiitze 2001).55 If we look at the data from this angle, it
seems that the scrambling analysis can derive the scope patterns. Under this hypothesis,
the man-phrase is a QP, and the ambiguity in (45a) and (46a) is due to scrambling of a
QP. The reconstruction effect in (45b) and (46b) is instead attributed to the fact that the
case marker is a focus marker. The focus marker needs to be licensed in the focus
position, which is around the case head. Although it seems attractive at first sight, this
approach runs into several problems. First of all, the ambiguity of (46a) is a crucial
argument against this view. It has long been noticed that long-distance scrambled QPs
obligatorily reconstruct to their base position, unlike QPs that are scrambled clause-
internally (Tada 1993, Sohn 1995).56 This means that long-distance scrambling of a QP
does not induce an ambiguity. The examples in (47) illustrate this point.
(47) a. Nwukwunka-ka [Mary-ka motun-salam-ul pinanhayssta-ko] malhayssta.
someone-Nom Mary-Nom every-person-Acc criticized-that said
'Someone said that Mary criticized everyone.'
(i) Someone said that Mary criticized everyone. (some > every)
(ii) *For every x, someone said that Mary criticized x. (*every > some)
55 This alternative was suggested to me by Minjoo Kim and Dong-Whee Yang.
56 Under the position that scrambling of QPs is overt QR (Sohn 1995, Miyagawa 2003), the fact
that long-distance scrambled QPs obligatorily reconstruct is covered by the generalization that
QR is clause-bound (but see also May 1988, Reinhart 1995, Fox 2000 for a different opinion about
the clause-boundedness of QR). The answer, however, is not complete in that we do not
understand why QR should be clause-bound. Tada (1993), for example, argues that the position
created by long-distance scrambling is an illegitimate LF object, and thus the long-distance
scrambling must be undone. Yet this seems to be a different way of describing the facts.
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b. Motun-salam-uli nwukwunka-ka [Mary-ka ti piphanhayssta-ko] malhayssta.
every-person-Acc someone-Nom Mary-Nom criticized-that said
'(Lit.) Everyone, someone said that Mary criticized t.'
(i) Someone said that Mary criticized everyone. (some > every)
(ii) *For every x, someone said that Mary criticized x. (*every > some)
These examples show that unlike clause-internal scrambling, long-distance scrambling
of a QP does not change scope relations. In (47a), the subject QP takes scope over the
object QP in the embedded clause. In (47b), where the object QP is scrambled across the
subject QP, the scope relation remains the same. Neither sentence can convey that for
each person, there is someone who said that Mary criticized him or her. In light of this,
the S-initial appearance of the man-phrase in (46a) cannot be due to scrambling of a QP.
If it were, there ought to be no difference between (46a) and (47b).
This approach would also assume the same syntax for a bare man-phrase and a
postposition-marked man-phrase, given that both allow ambiguity in clause-internal
scrambling. This leads to an expectation that they should behave in the same way in
long-distance scrambling. This expectation, however, is not fulfilled.
(48) a. Nwukwunka-ka [Mary-ka John-hako-man akswuhayssta-ko] malhayssta.
someone-Nom Mary-N John-with-only shook_hands-C said
'Someone said that Mary shook hands only with John.'
(i) Someone said that Mary shook hands only with John. (some > only)
(ii) *Only about John did someone say that Mary shook hands with him. (*only > some)
b. John-hako-manl nwukwunka-ka [Mary-ka t akswuhayssta-ko] malhayssta.
John-with-only someone-Nom Mary-N shook_hands-C said
'(Lit.) Only with John, someone said that Mary shook hands with t.'
(i) Someone said that Mary shook hands only with John. (some > only)
(ii) * Only about John did someone say that Mary shook hands with himrn (*only > some)
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Although the postposition marked man-phrase induces an ambiguity in clause-internal
movement (sections 2.3 and 2.5), it does not do so in long-distance movement. Both (48a)
and (48b) are unambiguous. The existential QP in the matrix clause takes scope over the
man-phrase, i.e. the ONLY head.5 7 Contrast (48b) with (46a), which shows that the bare
man-phrase behaves differently from the postposition-marked man-phrase. This contrast
again confirms that we cannot derive the scope pattern of bare man-phrases via
scrambling. Ample evidence suggests that scrambling is not the right way to account for
the ambiguity due to the bare man-phrase.
2.8.3 Syntax of Man-Phrases: Base-Generation vs. Movement
This section proposes an analysis of the bare man-phrase which will account for the
scope pattern noted in the previous section. On the basis of syntactic tests like
resumption and island constraints, I argue that a bare man-phrase in S-initial position is
base-generated in that position, whereas both case-marked and postposition-marked
man-phrases in the same position are derived by movement. The distinction between
these two mechanisms receives further support from the existing literature, which also
argues for such a distinction based on case marking (Saito 1985, Hoji 1987, Fukaya &
Hoji 2000). The analysis here focuses on the case in (45), repeated below as (49), but the
account is easily extended to the long-distance dependency case in (46).
(49) a. John-manl [motun-salam-i el salanghanta.]
John-only every-person-Nom love
'(Lit.) Only John, everyone loves e.'
(i) Everyone loves John and no one else. (every > only)
(ii) John is the only one whom everyone loves. (only > every)
57 The non-ambiguity of (48b) actually shows that focus movement (movement of DP to [Spec,
ONLY-P]) is clause-bound. If this were not the case, the PP could have moved to the spec
position of the matrix clause, and the sentence would have the unattested reading. In this way,
focus movement is similar to QR in that both are clause-bound.
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b. John-man-ull [motun-salam-i tl salanghanta.]
John-only-Acc every-person-Nom love
'(Lit.) Only John, everyone loves t.'
(i) Everyone loves John and no one else. (every > only)
(ii) *John is the only one whom everyone loves. (*only > every)
How is the ambiguity of (49a) explained? I claim that the ambiguity is due to two
structures. The first reading of (49a) is easy to derive. We simply assume that case
marking is covert there. Under our assumption that John-man can be a realization of
John-man-Case or John-Case-man (see section 2.5.1), ONLY-P here is either below AgroP,
as in (49b), or right above AgroP. In either case, ONLY-P is below TP, whose spec is
occupied by the universal quantifier. The man-phrase undergoes scrambling to the S-
initial position. However, this is not the only structure available for this sentence. The
second reading of (49b) is derived from another structure. Given the scope relation here
(only > every), the ONLY head must be positioned above TP. Recall that ONLY-P can
appear anywhere in the clausal structure, and we identified ONLY-P above TP and
below TP. Here I propose that DP is base-generated in the spec of the high ONLY-P,
which is above TP (arguments for this claim follow shortly). The scope relation follows
from this configuration. I also argue that the empty element in the object position is a pro
rather than a trace, given that there is no movement involved. The structure of (49a)
under the second reading would be like (50) below.
(50) [ONLY-P Johnl [TP everyone Ax [VP x prol love] T] ONLY]
Through abstraction on the pronoun (pro), the TP is interpreted as a property.5 8 The
whole sentence leads to the reading we want: John is the only individual who has the
property of being loved by everyone. One might point out that the Case Filter is not
58 This is what is implicitly assumed in the literature in interpreting sentences containing pro, and
I cannot be more explicit than this about how it works. See Cecchetto & Chierchia (1999) for the
interpretational mechanism for Clitic Left Dislocation (CLLD) and Heycock & Doron (2003) for
that of Broad Subject Construction. See also Cinque (1990) and Iatridou (1995) for the base-
generation analysis for the CLLD.
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satisfied with the DP in [Spec, ONLY-P]. This problem goes away if we assume that the
Case Filter applies to DPs in argument positions and that the spec of the ONLY head is
not an A-position. I also assume that the Accusative case is assigned to the empty
element (pro), assuming that pro is licensed by case marking (Rizzi 1986).
Now let's turn to arguments for the base-generation structure. The first argument
comes from the resumption test. The bare man-phrase allows a resumptive pronoun in
the position of the gap, whereas case-marked and postposition-marked man-phrases do
not, as illustrated below.
(51) a. Johnl-man [motun-salam-i ku-lul
John-only every-person-Nom he-Acc
'(Lit.) Only John, everyone loves him.'
(i) *Everyone loves John and no one else.
(ii) John is the only one whom everyone loves.
b. *Johnl-man-ul [motun-salam-i
John-only-Acc every-person-Nom
'(Lit.) Only John, everyone loves him.'
kul-lul
he-Acc
c. *Johnl-hako-man [motun-salam-i kul-hako
John-with-only every-person-Nom he-with
'(Lit.) Only with John, everyone shook hands with him.'
salanghanta.]
love
(*every > only)
(only > every)
salanghanta.]
love
akswuhayssta.]
shook_hands
When the man-phrase does not have any marking, the gap can be replaced with an overt
pronoun, as in (51a). By contrast, when it is marked by a case-marker or a postposition,
replacement of the gap with an overt pronoun leads to ungrammaticality, as shown in
(51b-c). This contrast shows the different nature of the empty elements in the two cases.
The empty element in (51a) - before resumption takes place - is a pro and compatible
with resumption, whereas those in (51b-c) are a trace of scrambling or focus movement,
and not compatible with resumption. Also note that resumption disambiguates an
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otherwise ambiguous sentence. Once the gap is replaced with an overt pronoun, (51a) is
no longer ambiguous.
Another argument for the base-generation structure comes from cases where a
bare man-phrase is followed by a full sentence. In those cases, the sentence following the
man-phrase does not contain a gap from which the man-phrase is extracted. For these
cases, it is difficult to argue for the existence of movement. Similar kinds of arguments
have been presented for other base-generation structures (Saito 1985, Yoon 2004 among
others). Examples are given below.
(52) a. Yenghwa-man [TP mikwuk-ket-i caymi-issta.]
movie-only America-thing-Nom fun-be
'Only for movies are American ones fun.'
(For other things, e.g. novels, American ones are not fun.)
b. Enehak-man [TP chwicik-i elyepta.]
linguistics-only employment-Nom difficult
'Only for linguistics is getting a job in it difficult.'
(For other fields, getting a job is not difficult.)
Note that although there is no syntactic movement, we need to assume that some kind
of predicate abstraction takes place in these sentences. This will allow the bracketed TP
to be interpreted as a property; otherwise it leads to an uninterpretable structure. This
property becomes the predicate argument of the ONLY head.59
59 The same pattern is attested for the topic marker (n)un and the additive particle to 'also'.
(i) Yenghwa-nun [mikwuk-ket-i caymi-issta.]
movie-Top America-thing-Nom fun-be
'As for movies, American ones are fun.'
(ii) Yenghwa-to [mikwuk-ket-i caymi-issta.]
movie-also America-thing-Nom fun-be
'Also for movies (in addition to something else, e.g. novels), American ones are fun.'
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Lastly, a bare man-phrase in the sentence-initial position is not subject to island
constraints. This further confirms that we are not dealing with a movement structure,
but a base-generation structure. The following examples illustrate Complex NP and
Adjunct Islands.
(53) a. W&P-manl Mary-ka [el ilk-un salam-ul] chass-ulswuiss-ess-ta.
W&P-only Mary-Nom read-Rel person-Acc find-can-Past-Decl
'(Lit.) Only War and Peac, Mary could find a person who read e.'
(i) War and Peace is the only x such that Mary could find a person who read x.
(ii) *Mary could find a person who read only War and Peace.
b. John-manl [Mary-ka el chwuchenhayss-ulttay] motun-salam-i chansenghayssta.
John-only Mary-N nominated-when every-person-N agreed
'(Lit.) Only John, when Mary nominated e, everyone approved of it.'
(i) John is the only x such that when Mary nominated x, everyone approved of it.
(ii) When Mary nominated only John, everyone approved of it.
(i.e. When Mary nominate John and someone else as well, some disapproved of it.)
In (53a), the empty element is positioned within a relative clause. The man-phrase takes
scope over the whole sentence, not just over the relative clause. The second reading is
not available since it implies a violation of island constraints on scrambling. Similarly in
(53b), the man-phrase can take scope over the whole sentence, not just over the adjunct
clause. It can also take scope within the adjunct clause, which is due to scrambling of the
man-phrase within the adjunct clause. In both (53a) and (53b), the man-phrase associates
with an empty element (pro) - which can be replaced by an overt pronoun - within an
island. This would not be possible if the dependency were due to a movement strategy.
The island insensitivity in (53) disappears once the man-phrase contains a case
marker or a postposition. The sentences become ungrammatical, as shown below.
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(54) *W&P-man-ull Mary-ka [tl ilk-un salam-ul] chass-ulswuiss-ess-ta.
W&P-only-Acc Mary-Nom read-Rel person-Acc find-can-Past-Decl
'(Lit.) Only War and Peace, Mary could find a person who read t.'
(55) a. Mary-ka [John-i Sumi-ekey-man malhaycwu-n pimil]-ul alkoissta.
Mary-Nom John-N Sumi-to-only tell-Rel secret-Acc know
'Mary knows the secret that John told only to Sumi.'
b. *Sumi-ekey-manl Mary-ka [John-i th malhaycwun-n pimil]-ul alkoissta.
Sumi-to-only Mary-N John-Nom tell-Rel secret-Acc know
'(Lit.) Only to Sumi, Mary knows the secret that John told t.'
(i) *Mary knows the secret that John told only to Sumi.
(ii) *Sumi is the only person x s.t. Mary knows the secret that John told to x.
(56) a. [Mary-ka John-hako-man akswuhayss-ulttay] motun-salam-i nolassta.
Mary-N John-with-only shook_hands-when every-person-N was_surprised
'When Mary shook hands only with John, everyone was surprised.'
b. John-hako-mani [Mary-ka t akswuhayss-ulttay] motun-salam-i nolassta.
John-with-only Mary-N shook_hands-when every-person-N was_surprised.
'(Lit.) Only with John, when Mary shook hands t, everyone was surprised.'
(i) When Mary shook hands only with John, everyone was surprised.
(ii) *John is the only x s.t. everyone was surprised when Mary shook hands with x.
(Mary shook hands with other people as well, but not everyone was surprised at those.)
Sentence (54) is bad because scrambling is subject to island constraints (Saito 1985).
Sentences (55)-(56) show that focus movement is also subject to island constraints -
Complex NP and Adjunct Islands respectively. In particular, the ungrammaticality of
(55b) and (56b) in the second reading is a clear contrast to the grammaticality of (53a-b).
Let me explain a bit about (55b) and (56b). The two readings that we need to
consider for (55b) are based on the fact that the S-initial appearance of the man-phrase
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can be due to scrambling or focus movement. In the first reading, the man-phrase has
been scrambled, and the sentence retains the same reading as (55a). The sentence is not
grammatical under this reading since scrambling is subject to island conditions. In the
second reading, the PP has undergone focus movement. The PP has moved from the
complex NP to a [Spec, ONLY-PI that is higher than the matrix TP. The sentence is
ungrammatical, which shows that focus movement is subject to the Complex NP Island.
Analogously, the S-initial appearance of Johhn-hako-man in (56b) may be due to
scrambling or focus movement. However, the sentence is grammatical only under the
scrambling structure, where the man-phrase is scrambled within the adjunct clause. The
second reading is not available, since PPs cannot move from an island to [Spec, ONLY-
P] in the matrix clause.
To summarize, the S-initial appearance of the man-phrase can be due to base-
generation as well as to movement (scrambling and focus movement). If the man-phrase
is bare, it could be either scrambling or base-generation. If the man-phrase is overtly
case-marked, it is an obvious instance of scrambling. Lastly, if there is a postposition, the
process can be either scrambling or focus movement. I have shown that the syntax of the
base-generation structure is distinct from that of the movement structure, whether it is
scrambling or focus movement.6 0
2.8.4 A Remaining Question
As for the distinction made in the previous section, one question remains. 6 Why is it
that the bare man-phrase is base-generated in the sentence initial position? Why is the
movement structure ruled out for the bare man-phrase, if the high ONLY-P allows
movement structure for PP? Similarly, why is base-generation not allowed for case-
marked and postposition-marked man-phrases when they appear at S-initial positions?
This section provides possible but speculative answers for these questions.
60 There might be more arguments that will distinguish movement and base-generation
structures such as WCO and Condition C violations. I leave them for future investigation.
61I thank Shigeru Miyagawa and Alec Marantz for bringing up this issue.
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As for the first question, we can say that the bare man-phrase in the S-initial
position could be generated by movement as well as by base-generation, unless the gap
is positioned in an island or the gap is replaced by an overt pronoun. If this is possible,
the second reading of (57), repeated from (49a), would have the movement structure
given in (58b) in addition to the base-generation structure in (58a), repeated from (50).
(57) John-manl [motun-salam-i el salanghanta.]
John-only every-person-Nom love
'(Lit.) Only John, everyone loves e.'
(i) Everyone loves John and no one else. (every > only)
(ii) John is the only one whom everyone loves. (only > every)
(58) a. [ONLY-P Johni [TP everyone Ax [VP x proi love] T] ONLY]
b. [ONLY-P John [Az [TP everyone Ax [AGRoP z Ay [VP x loves y] AGRo] T] ONLY]
* 1A I
Focus movement . Case mvt.
The derivation in (58b) leads to the form DP-Case-man, which will be spelled out as DP-
man without the overt case marker. Given that this condition on case realization is
needed anyway (section 2.5.1), movement structure seems to be a possible option. When
there is an island between the ONLY head and the empty element, or the gap is replaced
by a resumptive pronoun, the movement structure is ruled out and base-generation
becomes the only option.
The second question is why base-generation is not allowed in case-marked and
postposition-marked man-phrases when they occur sentence-initially. If this were the
case, the empty element in those cases could be a pro instead of a trace. I believe that this
is due to the assumption that morphological marking (both case markers and
postpositions) is only possible in certain positions, specifically in the lower domain. I
assume that accusative case is available only in [Spec, AgroP], and postpositions are
generated only within VP. Therefore, the presence of these morphemes in an S-initial
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man-phrase indicates that they do not originate in that position but have gotten there via
some kind of movement operation. Furthermore, if a pro appeared in the position of the
gap, it would not be licensed, given that relevant cases are already assigned to the DPs
in the S-initial position. The empty element must be a trace, then.
This position, however, cannot be the whole story, given some cross-linguistic
differences. In some languages, expressions that are base-generated in non-argument
positions still carry case morphemes. Clitic Left Dislocation (CLLD) in Romance
languages is such a case.62 If we stick to the assumption that case assignment is limited
to certain syntactic positions, these cases will have to be analyzed as some kind of
concord phenomenon. The case marking is present in dislocated positions, but it is only
agreeing with pro in the clause, which is involved with real case assigning/checking.
Since an answer to this question is independent of the facts discussed here, we do not go
into further details.
2.9 Miscellaneous Issues
This section addresses a few issues raised by the proposed analysis including occurrence
of the particle within DP and PP (section 2.9.1), binding properties of the man-phrase
(section 2.9.2), the contrast between nominative and accusative marked man-phrases
(section 2.9.3), and the particle attached to the embedded clause (section 2.9.4).
2.9.1 The Particle within DP and PP
It has been mentioned several times that the particle man must follow postpositions. I
have argued that this distribution follows from the assumption that the ONLY head is
positioned above VP, where PP is generated. The Mirror Principle and the head-final
nature of Korean dictate that postpositions precede the particle man. Given this
understanding, the appearance of the particle man within DP and PP seems problematic.
62 thank Sabine Iatridou for pointing this out to me.
82
This section shows that these apparently problematic cases receive the same account. We
first start with the particle within PP, and then proceed to the case of DP-internal man.
The postposition (u)lo 'with', which marks Instrumental, can either precede or
follow the focus particle, as also noted by Yoon (to appear).63
(59) a. Ku-kot-e-nun cacenke-lo-man ka-lsuissta.
that-place-to-Top bicycle-with-only go-be able to
'One can get there only on a bicycle (no other means are allowed).'
b. Ku-kot-e-nun cacenke-man-ulo ka-lsuissta.
that-place-to-Top bicycle-only-with go-be able to
'One can get there with only a bicycle (no other means are needed).'
The order in (59a) conforms to the pattern of other postpositions, but that in (59b) is the
opposite of the general pattern but still grammatical. For this reason, the case in (59b)
has been treated as an exception or as a single item. Notice, however, that the two
sentences are distinct in their meanings, and the scope of the ONLY head is different. In
(59a), the particle has a sentential scope, whereas in (59b) the scope is just PP-internal.64
Since the first case is already explained above, let's focus on the second case.
63 A similar (though not exactly the identical) pattern is found in Japanese. See Harada &
Noguchi (1992) and Hayashishita (2003) for further discussion.
64 The contrast in (59) is parallel to the following example in English noted in Liberman (1974).
(i) With no job would John be happy.
(ii) With no job, John would be happy.
The two sentences are distinguished by the scope of negation. Sentence (i) says that there is no
job such that if John had it, he would be happy. Sentence (ii), by contrast, says that if there were
no job that John had, i.e. if John were unemployed, he would be happy. In (i) the negation takes
scope over the whole sentence, whereas in (ii) it takes scope only within the PP. This difference is
reflected in the fact that Subject-Auxiliary Inversion occurs only in the first case. I assume that the
analysis of (59b) can be extended to (ii). I thank Irene Heim and David Pesetsky for bringing this
parallelism to my attention.
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For the sentence in (59b), I claim that the PP cacenke-man-ulo 'bicycle-only-with'
contains a clausal structure. There is an implicit predicate within this PP, and the ONLY
head takes this predicate as its argument. The structure is as follows.
(60) PP
ONLY-P P
bicycle-man, ONLY' with
ONLY
VP
ti have
I assume that the VP contains PRO in the subject position, which is of type e and
controlled by the matrix subject. I also assume that the implicit predicate is have,
although this is not the only possibility. In the given example, one does not have to own
a bicycle as long as he can use one to get there. If we interpreted the postposition as
heading an adjunct clause, the tree would be interpreted as 'if/when one has only a
bicycle,' for example; this is what the PP in (59b) means. It is crucial that this reading
does not exclude the possibility of getting there by other means. In fact, it implies that
one can get there with other means as well. In this structure, the DP cacenke 'bicycle'
moves to [Spec, ONLY-P]. Since the ONLY head is lower than the postposition, the
expected order is man-ulo 'only-with', which is the case. 65
65 One remaining question is why the postposition ulo 'with' is the only postposition that allows
ONLY-P within its projection. Why is it not possible with other postpositions, e.g. locatives, given
that covert subjects are posited in PPs in general? (See Stowell 1983 and Heim & Kratzer (1998:
Ch.8) for subjects within PP and NP.) Irene Heim suggests that ONLY-P may be ruled out within
other PPs for semantic reasons. If a PP is an argument of a verb, the postposition has no meaning
of its own. The postposition is a kind of a case marker and thus cannot have a predicate in it. Or If
the postposition imposes some semantic condition, this might rule out ONLY-P within its
projection. For instance, locatives have a uniqueness condition since one cannot be in more than
one place at the same time. Thus ONLY-P within a locative would not give a sensible meaning.
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Now we move on to the occurrence of the particle man within DP. The genitive
marker uy, like other case markers, must follow the particle man, as illustrated below.
(61) John-man-uy chayk
John-only-Gen book
'Only John's book, i.e. the book that only John owns'
Under the proposed theory, the ordering between the particle and the genitive case
marker indicates that the ONLY head is positioned lower than the genitive head, which I
assume to be D. Adopting the structure of possessive DPs proposed in Cho (2002) and
Larson & Cho (2003), the structure of (61) is represented as (62a), with the semantic
value of the top node shown in (62b). See the appendix for a detailed derivation.
(62) a. DP O
D
book
PRO
D
LY'
ONLY
;sP
Poss'
t3 Poss
b. ()] = The unique x such that x is a book & John possesses x & VzeEALT(John):
z possesses x -, z = John, i.e. the book that only John possesses.
85
Cho (2002) and Larson & Cho (2003) propose a structure of the possessive DP that is
parallel to that of the possessive clause. The possessor is in the complement of the Poss
head and the possessee is in [Spec, PossP]; and the Poss head denotes [Xx.Xy.x possesses
y].6 6 Such an entry for the Poss head correctly derives the desired reading. Simply put,
node © denotes the set of things that only John possesses. The PRO that moved from
[Spec, PossP] is semantically vacuous (Heim & Kratzer 1998: Ch.8). 67 Node combines
with the noun book via Predicate Modification. Following the view that possessive
nominals are definite descriptions (Barwise and Cooper 1981), I assume that the D head
is an abstract definite determiner (THE), i.e. an element of type <et, e> as in the Fregean
analysis of the definite determiner. The possessor undergoes focus movement to [Spec,
ONLY-PI, and then moves to [Spec, DP] for Case assignment/checking. This derivation
leads to the form John-man-uy 'John-only-gen'. Unlike the D head at the top node, I
assume that the D head responsible for Case does not carry the semantic force of the
definite determiner.
This section has offered an account of the particle's occurrence within DP and PP.
I have shown that these cases are also covered by our general claim that the order of
nominal affixes reflects the syntactic hierarchy. Given these analyses, one might raise
suspicions about positing a focus head and focus movement within DP and PP. I note
that these are unfamiliar, but not unattested. Aissen (1996) argues for focus movement
within DP and PP in Tzotzil, and thus for the existence of FocP within DP and PP.
Simpson & Wu (2002) also present a structure where the D head optionally selects a
focus projection. I conclude that focus movement does occur within DP and PP.
2.9.2 Nominative vs. Accusative Marking
One of the main claims of this chapter is that case markers help detect the position of the
ONLY head thanks to the Mirror Principle. If you take a close look at the data provided
66 Cho (2002) and Larson & Cho (2003) assume a PP (headed by to) instead of PossP. But this
change from PP to PossP is trivial, and does not affect the analysis presented here.
6 7 It is not necessary to posit PRO in [Spec, PossP]. One alternative is to put the possessee within
PossP and move it later to a higher position for the semantic computation, as is often assumed in
the analysis of head-internal relative clauses.
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so far, you may notice that all the case markers have been accusative rather than
nominative. There is a reason for this asymmetry, and this section discusses why this has
to be the case. First, consider the following sentences, in which the man-phrase is marked
as nominative.
(63) a. Mary-man-i motun-salam-ul
Mary-only-Nom every-person-Acc
'Only Mary loves everyone.'
(i) Mary is the only one who loves everyone.
(ii) *For each person x, only Mary loves x.
b. Motun-salam-ull [Mary-man-i
every-person-Acc Mary-only-Nom
'(Lit.) Everyone, only Mary loves t.'
(i) Mary is the only one who loves everyone.
(ii) For each person x, only Mary loves x.
salanghanta.
love
(only > every)
(*every > only)
tl salanghanta.]
love
(only > every)
(every > only)
Sentence (63a) is not ambiguous. The only reading available is that Mary is the only one
who loves everyone. Sentence (63b), by contrast, is ambiguous and allows another
reading by which for each person, Mary is the only one who loves him or her.
On a cursory look, the ambiguity in (63b) may seem problematic. When the man-
phrase is marked as accusative, scrambling does not change scope relations. Here the
man-phrase is marked as nominative, and scrambling affects scope relations. Notice,
however, that the ambiguity in (63b) is due to scrambling of motun-salam 'everyone'
rather than the man-phrase. Given that scrambled QPs can optionally reconstruct and
induce an ambiguity, all the readings of (63) follow from the current proposal. In (63a),
ONLY-P is right below TP, as indicated by the morpheme order. Thus, it takes scope
over the object QP, which I assume to be in [Spec, AgroP]. In (63b), ONLY-P is still
below TP, but the scrambled QP is higher than ONLY-P, since it is adjoined above TP. If
the QP is interpreted in the trace position via reconstruction, we get the first reading,
whereas if it is interpreted in the scrambled position, we get the second reading.
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Therefore, the case in (63) does not tell us whether the nominative marker plays
the same role as the accusative marker. In order to prove this, we need to show that the
subject man-phrase does not induce an ambiguity when scrambled clause-internally.
Long-distance scrambling is not enough as evidence since focus movement is clause-
bound anyway. The task may not be possible to begin with, given that subjects are
assumed not to undergo scrambling (Saito 1985). However, some recent work argues for
subject scrambling (Sohn 1995 and Ko 2004), and here I will assume that it is possible. In
order for the man-phrase to scramble, we need a scope-bearing element that precedes the
subject man-phrase. One candidate will be an adverbial, as illustrated below.
(64) a. Hangsang Mary-man-i cikakhanta.
always Mary-only-Nom be_late
(i) It is always the case that only Mary is late. (always > only)
(ii) *Mary is the only one who is always late. (*only > always)
b. Mary-man-il [hangsang th cikakhanta.]
Mary-only-Nom always be_late
(i) It is always the case that only Mary is late. (always > only)
(ii) Mary is the only one who is always late. (only > always)
Sentence (64a) is not ambiguous; the adverb hangsang 'always' takes scope over the man-
phrase. This scope relation changes in (64b), where the man-phrase is placed in front of
the adverb. Here both surface and inverse scope relations are possible. 68
Now if the word order change in (64) is only due to scrambling, this will be an
argument against the proposal made in this chapter. Under the proposal made here,
scrambling of a case-marked man-phrase should not change scope relations. I, however,
argue that this example does not give evidence against the current approach since the
ambiguity of (64b) is due to an independent factor, namely the ambiguous position of
the adverb. In (64a), the adverb is adjoined at TP and the ONLY head is right below TP,
68 Judgment in this case is rather heterogeneous compared to the data in section 2.3. For example,
some speakers say that (64b) only has the surface scope reading (only > always).
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which accounts for the scope relation (always > only). The inverse scope in (64b) (always >
only) arises when the man-phrase is scrambled. The sentential structure is the same,
except for the scrambling of the man-phrase. By contrast, the surface scope in (64b) (only
> always) is due to low attachment of the adverb hangsang. Here the ONLY head is still
below TP, but the adverb is attached at VP, which accounts for the new reading.
In order for the above account to work, we need to show that hangsang can
indeed be attached either at TP or at VP. This is supported by the following case.
(65) a. Hangsang Mary-ka cikakhanta.
always Mary-Nom be_late
'It is always Mary who is late, i.e. others are never late.'
b. Mary-ka hangsang cikakhanta.
Mary-Nom always be_late
(i) 'Mary is always late, i.e. others are occasionally late.'
(ii) ?'It is always Mary who is late.'
In (65a), the adverb precedes the subject, and in (65b), the subject precedes the adverb.
Surprisingly, the two different word orders are mapped to two different readings,
although there is only one scope-bearing element, namely the adverb. In (65a), the
adverb is adjoined at TP, whereas in (65b), it is attached at VP or at TP. When it is
attached at TP, the word order is due to scrambling. What is important here is that if the
adverb can be attached only at one position, this cannot explain all the readings.
Suppose that the adverb hangsang can be attached only at TP. This would account for the
reading in (65a), but it runs into a problem in (65b). If the new ordering in (65b) is due to
scrambling of the subject, (65b) is expected to have the same reading as (65a), since a
referential expression is scrambled. This is clearly not the case. This leads to the
conclusion that the adverb hangsang needs to be attached at VP, as well.
In order to complete the argument, we should look at another sentence in which
the man-phrase is not case-marked and precedes the scope-bearing element and compare
it with (64b). This is given below in (66).
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(66) Mary-manl [hangsang ti cikakhanta.]
Mary-only always be_late
(i) It is always the case that only Mary is late. (always > only)
(ii) Mary is the only one who is always late. (only > always)
This sentence is ambiguous, like (64b), and receives the same account. The surface scope
reading (only > always) is due to the VP-attachment of the adverb, while the inverse
scope (always > only) is due to TP-attachment of the adverb with scrambling of the man-
phrase. In both cases, the nominative marker is covert, and the position of ONLY-P is
the same.
Thus the account in this section does not prove that the nominative marker plays
the same role as the accusative marker. In order to make the argument stronger, we have
to look for a high adverb that is clearly not generated in the VP area. Unfortunately,
these sentential adverbs (e.g. amato 'probably') do not interact scopally with a subject
DP, and thus word order change does not lead to different interpretations.
2.9.3 Binding and the Man-Phrase
This section investigates how the man-phrase behaves as an antecedent of anaphors.
After providing some background about the effect of scrambling on binding relations,
the discussion turns to how they change when the particle man is added to a DP.
It is well known that clause-internal scrambling creates a new binding possibility
(Mahajan 1990, Tada 1990, Saito 1992, among others). This holds of Korean, as well, as
reported in J.-H. Cho (1994). Take (67) for example. The subject anaphor in (67a) has no
antecedent, thus the sentence is ungrammatical. If the object NP is scrambled across the
subject, however, the scrambled object can be the antecedent of the anaphor. This effect
leads to the conclusion that scrambling can be an A-movement.
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(67) a. *Cakicasin-i John-ul
self-Nom John-Acc
'(Lit.) Self blamed John.'
'(Intended) John blamed himself.'
pinanhayssta.
blamed
b. John-ull [cakicasin-i ti pinanhayssta.]
John-Acc self-Nom blamed
'(Lit.) John, self blamed t, i.e. John blamed himself.'
An interesting pattern appears when we look at the case of a man-phrase. As in the scope
case, case-marked and postposition-marked man-phrases contrast with bare man-
phrases. Let us first consider the case of a case-marked man-phrase.
(68) a. *Cakicasin-i John-man-(ul) pinanhayssta.
self-Nom John-only-Acc criticized
'(Lit.) Self criticized only John.'
'(Intended) John criticized only himself.'
b. *John-man-ull [cakicasin-i ti pinanhayssta.]
John-only-Acc self-Nom criticized
'(Lit.) Self criticized only John.'
'(Intended) John criticized only himself.'
c. John-man [cakicasin-i el pinanhayssta.]
John-only self-Nom criticized
'(Lit.) Only John, self criticized e.'
(i) Only John criticized himself, i.e. others didn't criticize themselves.
(ii) *John criticized only himself, i.e. John didn't criticize others.
Sentence (68a) is ungrammatical for the same reason as (67a): the anaphor is not bound.
In (68b), the man-phrase is scrambled to the S-initial position, where it can bind the
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anaphor. However, (68b) is still as bad as (68a). In contrast to these two, sentence (68c) is
grammatical. Apparently, the bare man-phrase can provide an antecedent. The same
pattern holds when we replace the anaphor with reciprocals.
The ungrammaticality of (68a) is easy to understand. The subject anaphor lacks
an antecedent. But the status of (68b) and (68c) requires further explanation. First, the
ungrammaticality of (68b) is not expected on our analysis. If John-man-ul 'John-only-acc'
is equivalent to a referential expression, as I have been claiming, it must be able to create
a new binding possibility, as John does in (67b). In fact, if the anaphor carries the same
index as John-man-ul, the intended meaning of the sentence is easily derived from its
structure. This suggests, then, that a purely syntactic condition rules out (68b), whatever
that is. Turning to (68c), we note that it is not ambiguous. The one reading available is
due to the high ONLY-P above TP, which says that John is the only one who criticized
himself. It does not allow the other reading in which the ONLY head is positioned below
TP. The unavailability of this reading will be for the same reason as the ungrammatical-
ity of (68b). The data becomes more complicated when we consider the case of PP-man.
(69) a. *cakicasin-i John-ekey malhayssta
self-Nom John-to talked
'(Lit.) Self talked to John.'
'(Intended) John talked to himself.'
b. John-ekeyl [cakicasin-i tl malyhayssta.]69
John-to self-Nom talked
'(Lit.) To John, self talked t, i.e. John talked to himself.'
69 This sentence may sound little bit awkward, but it is a grammatical sentence. If we replace the
anaphor with a reciprocal, the sentence is perfect.
(i) John-kwa-Mary-ekeyl [selo-ka tl sakwahayssta.]
John-and-Mary-to each_other-Nom apologized
'(Lit.) To John and Mary, each other apologized t, i.e. John and Mary apologized to each other.'
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c. *John-ekey-manl [cakicasin-i ti malyhayssta.]
John-to-only self-Nom talked
'(Lit.) Only to John, self talked to t.'
(i) *John talked only to himself.
(ii) *John is the only one who talked to himself.
The ungrammatical sentence in (69a) becomes grammatical in (69b) due to scrambling.
The postposition does not block the PP from being the antecedent of the following
anaphor (Takano 1998: 852-853). Yet the sentence in (69c) is ungrammatical under either
reading. The two readings are based on the two possible positions of ONLY-P. Recall
from the scope facts that the sentence-initial appearance of the PP-man can be either due
to scrambling or to focus movement. The binding, which is possible without the particle
man in (69b), becomes impossible if the particle is added to the PP.
The general answer to these problems relates to a property of the man-phrase and
the ONLY head. I claim that the spec of ONLY-P is an A-bar-position, and a phrase in
this position cannot move to an A-position to serve as an antecedent for the following
anaphor (cf. Improper Movement). This property holds whether the phrase got to the spec
position via movement or it was base-generated there. This explains the
ungrammaticality of (68b) and (69c). In (68b), the surface position of the man-phrase
cannot be an A-position since it moves from the spec of ONLY-P. This makes it
impossible for the man-phrase to bind the anaphor. In (69c), the DP either moves to the
surface position via [Spec, ONLY-P] (the first reading) or it directly moves to the spec
position (the second reading). In both cases, binding is not possible.
The question, then, is why (68c) is grammatical (under its first reading) where
the man-phrase is base-generated in the spec of the high ONLY-P. I argue that binding in
(68c) is possible because the empty element, i.e. pro, can scramble to an A-position. This
means that the real binder is not the man-phrase, but the pro. Scrambling of pro is not
visible since it is an empty element to begin with. When scrambling takes place, (68c)
has the following structure.
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(70) John-man [TP prol [TP cakicasin-i ti pinanhayssta.]]
John-only self-Nom blamed
'John is the only one who criticized himself.'
One argument for this idea comes from when we replace the empty pro in (68c) with an
overt pronoun.7 0 If the pro is replaced with an overt pronoun, the sentence becomes
ungrammatical. If the overt pronoun is scrambled, however, it can bind the anaphor and
the sentence becomes grammatical again:
(71) a. *John-manl [TP cakicasin-i ku-lull
John-only self-Nom he-Acc
'John is the only one who criticized himself.'
b. John-manl [TP ku-lull [TP cakicasin-i ti
John-only he-Acc self-Nom
'John is the only one who criticized himself.'
pinanhayssta.]]
blamed
pinanhayssta.]]
blamed
One might ask why the pro in (70) or the pronoun in (71b) does not cause a violation of
Condition B. Under the proposed idea, this is not a problem. The spec of ONLY-P is not
an A-position, thus it does not count as a binder. Note also that the option in (70) is not
available for the PP case. This is so because there is no pro that associates with the S-
initial PP. The empty element is always a trace.
This section has explored another property of man-phrases and the ONLY head
by looking at binding relations. Apparently complicated data is all explained by the
hypothesis that [Spec, ONLY-P] is an A-bar position. The man-phrase is distinguished
from other referential expressions by this special property, and thus does not create new
binding possibilities.
70 Thanks to Danny Fox for suggesting this idea.
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2.9.4 The Particle on an Embedded Clause
This section investigates the interpretation of the focus particle attached to an embedded
clause. The discussion provides further support for the null head analysis. I first point
out a case where the standard alternative semantics (Rooth 1985) runs into a problem,
and show that our analysis solves the problem without additional assumptions. The
sentence in (72) is the example to be discussed in this section.
(72) John-un [MaryF-ka Boston-ey on-ket]-man-ul anta.
John-Top Mary-Nom Boston-to came-that-only-Acc know
'(Lit.) John knows only that MaryF came to Boston.'
(i) John only knows that MaryF came to Boston.
(ii) *John knows that only Mary came to Boston.
Sentence (72) is not ambiguous. It only has the first reading: John knows that Mary came
to Boston, but he does not know whether others came to Boston or not. Suppose that the
particle man is a propositional operator, like English only. Roughly speaking, such an
operator would take a proposition, and assert that the selected proposition is the only
true proposition among the alternative propositions, which are of course contextually
constrained.
This position runs into a problem. Under the assumption that sentences are of
type <s, t> and that the particle man (not the ONLY head) carries the exclusive meaning,
such an entry wrongly predicts sentence (72) to mean (ii), instead of (i), as illustrated in
(73).
(73) [MaryF-ka Boston-ey on-ket]-man
Mary-Nom Boston-to came-that-only
= Xw.Mary came to Boston in w & VxEALT(Mary): x came to Boston in w - x = Mary
= Xw.Mary came to Boston in w & VxeALT(Mary): x did not come to Boston in w.
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The alternative propositions are determined by F-marking. In this particular case, they
are members of the set {p: 3x[xeALT(Mary) & p = w.x came to Boston in w]}. The
effect of the particle man would be to assert that all the propositions in this set are false
except the one that the particle is attached to. This amounts to saying that no one other
than Mary came to Boston, and John knows that this is the case. However, this is a much
stronger claim than the one the sentence is actually making.
One way to avoid this problem is to obligatorily type-raise complement
sentences (i.e. sentences in complement positions) from <s, t> to <<st, t>, t> or <<st,et>,
et>.71 Let's take the first option for example. If the sentence is type-shifted from <s, t> to
<<st, t>, t>, the embedded clause cannot be interpreted in-situ due to a type mismatch. It
must move to a higher position, leaving a trace of type <s, t>, similar to QR. A simplified
structure will be as follows.
(74) TP ()
CP
1 TP
[Mary came to Boston]-man
John VP
tl<s,t> knows
The semantic value of the embedded clause under this higher type would be that in (75).
The entry of the particle would be upgraded accordingly, but this is a trivial matter.
(75) I[CP] = XP<st,t>.P(Xw.Mary came to Boston in w) & ¥VxeALT(Mary): P(Xw.x
came to Boston in w) = 1 - x = Mary
= XP<st,t>.P(Xw.Mary came to Boston in w) & Vxe ALT(Mary): P(Xw.x
came to Boston in w) = 0
71Thanks to Irene Heim for pointing this out to me. See also Buring and Hartmann (2001: 264),
which points out the same problem.
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Through abstraction on the trace of the proposition (Xp<s,t>.John knows p), the top node
yields the correct reading, as shown below.
(76) (D] = (P<st,t>.P(Xw.Mary came to Boston in w) & VxeALT(Mary): P(Aw.x
came to Boston in w) = 0)(Ap<s,t>.John knows p)
= (Xp<s,t>.John knows p) (Xw.Mary came to Boston in w) & VxeALT(Mary):
(Xp<s,t>.John knows p)(Xw.x came to Boston in w) = 0
= John knows (Xw.Mary came to Boston in w) & Vxe ALT(Mary):
[John knows (w.x came to Boston in w)] = 0
= John knows that Mary came to Boston & VxALT(Mary): John does not
know that x came to Boston
Although type shifting derives the correct reading, the problem still remains in that the
obligatory type-shifting is not justified. The null ONLY head analysis, by contrast, does
not have any problem with sentences like (72). The embedded clause moves to [Spec,
ONLY-P], as shown below. Here the accusative head (AgroP) is omitted since it is not
relevant.
(77) TP
John
1 ONLY-P
[MaryF came to Boston]-man ONLY'
ONLY
2 VP
ti
CP V
I I
t2 know
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To make this structure interpretable, we need some minor changes with respect to the
types of the two arguments of the ONLY head. The first argument is of type <st, t> and
the second one is of type <s, t>, as given in (78a). The initial entry is given in (78b) for
comparison.
(78) a. P,<t,t>.Xp<,,t>.P(p) =1 & Vq<,,t>ALT(p): P(q) = 1 - q = p
b. AP<e,t>.Xxe.P(x) =1 & VzeEALT(x): P(z) = 1 --+ z = x
The tree in (77) yields the following meaning: John knows that Mary came to Boston &
Vq<s,t>E{p: 3x[xeALT(Mary) & p = Xw.x came to Boston in w]}: John knows q - q =
Xw.Mary came to Boston in w. That is, that Mary came to Boston is the only proposition
that John knows. All that is needed is to adjust the lexical entry of the ONLY head so
that it can take a proposition as its argument. Given this, the general version of the two
entries would be like the following.T2
(79) XP<a,t>.Xx.P(x) =1 & Vy. eALT(x): P(y) = 1 -+ y = x
Before closing the section, I will briefly discuss Biiring and Hartmann (2001),
who point out the same problem for complement sentences in German and advocate the
same solution as proposed here. Their proposal is that focus particles in German always
adjoin to non-arguments. Thus a focus particle adjacent to a DP, for instance, does not
form a constituent with it, as illustrated below.
72 Although I present this general version, we can get rid of it in favor of the initial entry in (78b).
Under Chierchia's (1984) position that propositions are of type e, the two entries collapse into
one, and the entry in (78b) suffices. Under this position, however, the problem does not arise to
begin with, and the standard Roothian analysis would do.
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(80) Nur Hans war betrunken.
only Hans was drunk
(i) *[TP [DP Nur Hans] war betrunken]
(ii) /[TP Nur [TP Hans war betrunken]]
As indicated, the particle nur is not adjoined to the following DP Hans, but modifies the
whole TP that follows it. They support this position by providing arguments related to
distribution and scope, details of which I will not go into here. I will only discuss the
case where the particle is attached to an embedded clause.
(81) [Nur [cP dass MARIA Hans gekiisst hat] wussten wir [VP tcp t]]
only that Maria Hans kissed has knew we
(i) The only thing we knew was that MARIA kissed Hans.
(ii) *We knew that only MARIA kissed Hans.
When nur is attached to an embedded clause, as in (81), only one reading is available,
namely the one where the focus particle takes matrix scope. Importantly, the reading
indicated in (ii) is not available. Biiring and Hartmann (2001) show that the reading in
(ii) is predicted to arise if the particle is adjoined to the complement clause, unless one
adopts type-shifting, as I suggested earlier. Under their approach, however, the problem
does not arise, since the particle is not a constituent with the argument CP to begin with.
This supports their position. In a broader sense, their position and the proposal made
here are essentially the same. They argue that nur Hans 'only John' is not a generalized
quantifier, since there is no such syntactic unit in the first place. I argued that John-man
'John-only' is not a generalized quantifier, since the particle man is an agreement
morpheme. Both cases are contrary to a familiar assumption that only John and possibly
its equivalents in other languages are generalized quantifiers.
To sum up, this section examined the interpretation of the particle man attached
to an embedded clause. I pointed out that the standard alternative semantics predicts an
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incorrect interpretation, and showed that the proposed analysis avoids this problem
without additional assumptions.
2.10 Summary
This chapter proposed an account of the distribution and interpretation of the Korean
exclusive particle man. I first presented some scope facts that are puzzling under the
assumption that the particle is a quantificational element. In order to solve this problem,
I argued that the particle is an agreement morpheme for an abstract head rather than a
scope-bearing element. As an agreement morpheme, the particle merely indicates the
presence of a null head ONLY, which carries the quantificational meaning. I claimed
that this null head can occur at various points in the tree, and its position (not that of the
particle itself) determines the scope relation with respect to other quantificational
elements. I also argued for a new correlation between the order of the nominal affixes
and the scope of the particle, thus supporting Baker's (1985) Mirror Principle in a new
area outside the domain of verbal morphology. Specifically, I argued that the relative
order among the particle, case markers, and postpositions reflects the hierarchy of
functional heads. This played a crucial role in identifying the position of the ONLY
head. The proposed analysis accounted for the puzzling scope facts without making
stipulations, and also derived the correlation between the particle's distributional
properties and its scopal behavior. Further predictions and apparent counterexamples
were also discussed, which provided additional support to the proposed analysis.
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Chapter 3
Additive Particles, Scope, and Presupposition
3.1 Introduction
This chapter turns to the scopal behavior of another focus particle in Korean, namely the
additive particle to. The particle to is ambiguous between the additive meaning
(corresponding to also and too in English) and the scalar meaning (corresponding to
even), and our discussion focuses on the additive meaning. In investigating the scopal
behavior of the particle to, we take the same strategy as in the previous chapter; that is,
we examine how the to-attached phrase (henceforth to-phrase) behaves scopally in
scrambling contexts. Specifically, we would like to see how the presupposition due to
the additive particle interacts scopally with another quantificational element in the
sentence, and how changes in word order due to scrambling affect the presupposition.
As will be shown shortly, the scopal behavior of the to-phrase is distinct from
that of QPs and the man-phrase. I present an account of this behavior built on the
following three elements: the anaphoric view of the additive particle, semantic binding,
and principles of economy, and present an account that builds on these three elements. I
argue that (i) the anaphoric view of the additive particle is superior to the widespread
existential view, (ii) both syntactic and semantic mechanisms are available for variable
binding, thus the presence of a bound variable in a dislocated position does not always
imply syntactic reconstruction, and (iii) covert operations such as reconstruction and
type raising are constrained by an economy principle.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes the particle's distribution
and case marking. Section 3.3 presents some comparison between the two particles to
and man, which will provide some background for the upcoming discussion. Section 3.4
presents the data which is the main concern of this chapter. In section 3.5, I introduce the
three components of the analysis, based on which I give an account of the scope facts in
section 3.6. Then, in section 3.7, I briefly discuss related facts in English, and in section
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3.8, I present some syntactic similarities between the two particles to and man. Finally,
section 3.9 concludes the chapter with a summary.
3.2 Background
This section describes some distributional properties of the particle to. In terms of the
constituents that the particle can attach to, the particle to has the same properties as the
particle man. It can be attached to DPs, PPs, and CPs; but it cannot be directly attached to
predicates (section 3.2.1). In terms of case marking, however, the particles to and man
diverge in that the former is not compatible with any grammatical case marking
(nominative, accusative, and genitive) unlike the latter. Yet, the particle to can still co-
occur with a postposition, in which case it must follow the postposition (section 3.2.2).
3.2.1 Distribution
The particle to shares the properties described in this section with the particle man. First,
it can attach to DPs (1), PPs(2), and both adjunct and argument CPs (3).
(1) a. Mary-to oassta.
Mary-also came
'MaryF came, too.'
b. Mary-ka thongsalon-to kongpwuhanta.
Mary-Nom syntax-also study
'Mary studies syntaxF, too.'
(2) a. Mary-nun Boston-eyse-to salassta.
Mary-Top Boston-in-also lived
'Mary has lived in BostonF, too.'
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b. Mary-ka John-ul Bill-hanthey-to sokayhayssta.
Mary-Nom John-Acc Bill-to-also introduced.
'Mary introduced John to BillF, too.'
(3) a. Mary-nun [John-ul mannaki-wihayse]-to Boston-ey oassta.
Mary-Top John-Acc meet-to-also Boston-to came
'Mary came to Boston also to meet John.'
b. Mary-nun [JohnF-i Boston-ey on-ket]-to anta.
Mary-Top John-Nom Boston-to came-that-also know
'Mary also knows that JohnF came to Boston.'
In each example, the particle to triggers a so-called existential presupposition (I.-H. Lee
1977, Karttunen & Peters 1979).73 In (la), for example, it is presupposed that there is
someone other than Mary who came. In (3a), it is presupposed that Mary came to Boston
with some other purpose, besides meeting John. When focus is only on the part of the
adjacent phrase, focus plays a role by restricting the set of alternatives, as in the case of
man 'only'. In (3b), for instance, the alternative propositions are elements of the set {p:
3x[x John & p = Xw.x came to Boston in w]}, where the F-marked element is replaced
by a variable. Due to the additive particle, the sentence presupposes that there is another
proposition from this set that Mary knows. As can be seen in the glosses, the particle is
always adjacent to a phrase that contains focus, and forms a constituent with it. In this
regard, it is different from its English equivalent too or also, whose distribution is more
constrained. Thanks to this constituency, the particle to undergoes scrambling along
with the focus phrase, which raises new questions to explore.
Next, when a predicate is to be focused, a nominalizer must be present between
the verbal stem and the particle to. Simultaneously, a dummy verb is inserted to mark
tense, again in parallel to the case of man.
73 This is a widespread view of additive particles, although I reject this view shortly (section
3.5.1).
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(4) a. Mary-nun yeppu-ki-to hay-ss-ta.
Mary-Top pretty-Nml-also do-Past-Decl
'Mary was prettyF, too (e.g. in addition to being smart).'
b. Ku-secem-un chayk-ul sa-ki-to ha-n-ta.
that-bookstore-Top book-Acc buy-Nml-also do-Pres-Decl
'That bookstore also buysF books (e.g. in addition to selling them).'
3.2.2 Case Marking
The particle to is not compatible with any case marking, unlike the particle man. Overt
case markers in any position render the sentences ungrammatical, as shown in the
following examples.
(5) a. Mary-(*ka)-to-(*ka) oassta.
Mary-(Nom)-also-(Nom) came
'MaryF came, too.'
b. Mary-ka thongsalon-(*ul)-to-(*lul) kongpwuhanta.
Mary-Nom syntax-(Acc)-also-(Acc) study
'Mary studies syntaxF, too.'
Postpositions, by contrast, are allowed to co-occur with the particle to. If they co-occur,
postpositions always precede the particle. Examples are repeated from (2) as (6).
(6) a. Mary-nun Boston-eyse-to salassta.
Mary-Top Boston-in-also lived
'Mary has lived in BostonF, too.'
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b. Mary-ka John-ul Bill-hanthey-to sokayhayssta.
Mary-Nom John-Acc Bill-to-also introduced.
'Mary introduced John to BillF, too.'
If the order is reversed, the sentences become ungrammatical.
3.3 Comparing the Two Particles To and Man
The previous section described distributional properties of the particle to, most of which
it shares with the particle man. This section turns to some differences that sets the two
particles apart, and then spells out basic assumptions regarding the syntax of the to-
phrase. This will set the stage for the upcoming discussion about the scopal behavior of
the particle to.
3.3.1 Quantificational Meaning of Focus Particles
Sentences containing exclusive and additive particles are often paraphrased as sentences
that contain some quantificational elements - in any language that has those particles.
For example, the (a) sentences in (7-8) are assumed to have the same truth conditions as
the (b) sentences.
(7) a. Only John came.
b. John came, and no one who is not John came.
(8) a. John came, too.
b. John came, and someone who is not John came.
For this reason, it has been proposed that the exclusive particle is a sort of a universal
quantifier (Ryu 1995, Horn 1996); and analogously that the additive particle is an
existential quantifier (Ryu 1995). A closer look, however, tells us that the quantificational
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force of the two particles is different in nature, especially with respect to where the
quantificational force belongs to. It is well known since Horn (1969) that the exclusive
particle carries the universal force as assertion, whereas the additive particle carries the
existential force as presupposition (see also Krifka 1998b). Therefore, if we make a
distinction between assertion and presupposition, (7a) and (8a) are represented as in (9a)
and (9b) respectively.
(9) a. Assertion: No one who is not John came.
Presupposition: John came.74
b. Assertion: John came.
Presupposition: Someone who is not John came.
If we focus on the assertion part, only the exclusive particle carries a quantificational
meaning. The additive particle does not contain a scope-bearing element in the assertion
part, and it is only in the presupposition that we find an existential quantifier.
This contrast between the two particles leads to a difference when we look at
their scopal behavior. When we investigated the scopal behavior of the particle man in
the previous chapter, we did not have to consider the issue of presupposition. This is,
however, not the case with the particle to. In order to tell the scope of the additive
particle, we need to look at the presupposition of the sentence. Specifically, we would
like to see how the presupposition due to the additive particle scopally interacts with
another quantificational element in the sentence, and how changes in word order due to
scrambling affect the presupposition. We also note that once the presupposition of a
sentence is affected, it is reflected in the discourse felicity of the sentence. A sentence can
be felicitous (or not) in the same discourse because the presupposition has changed.
74 Horn (1996) recants his earlier proposal, and proposes that only just carries an existential
presupposition. For example, the presupposition of only John came is that someone came, not that
John came. This change is due to his new position that only is the converse of all, and as such the
existential presupposition of the universal quantifier carries over to only.
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3.3.2 Multiple Occurrences
The previous section maintained that the additive particle is a quantificational element,
although the quantificational force resides in the presupposition part. One important
question to ask at this point is where the quantificational meaning comes from. In
particular, we are interested in whether the so-called existential presupposition is due to
the particle to itself, or there is an abstract head, say, ALSO, that carries the existential
presupposition, as claimed for the particle man. If the particle to is parallel to the particle
man in every aspect, the second option would be the null hypothesis. In such a position,
the particle to would be an agreement morpheme that is licensed by an abstract head.
Recall the claim of the previous chapter that the particle man is an agreement morpheme
for an abstract head ONLY. The abstract head, not the particle, carries the exhaustive
meaning.
Now the question is how we can test the existence of such an abstract head. One
way to answer this question is to see whether the multiple occurrences of the additive
particle give rise to the same kind of ambiguity as attested in the multiple occurrences of
the particle man (see section 2.6.2 for discussion). Specifically, we would like to know
whether the multiple occurrences of the particle to would be able to indicate one
instance of the hypothetical ALSO head. If that is possible, it would be evidence for such
a head. The relevant sentence is given in (11), and the case of the particle man is repeated
in (10) for a comparison.
(10) John-man sakwa-man mekesse.
John-only apple-only ate
'Only John ate only apples.'
(i) John is the only one who ate only apples. Others ate other fruits as wells as apples.
(ii) John is the only one who ate anything, and John ate only apples (not other fruits).
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(11) John-to sakwa-to mekesse.
John-also apple-also ate
'(Lit.) John-also ate apples-also.' 7 5
(i) Someone who is not John ate apples in addition to something else, and John
also ate apples in addition to something else.
(ii) *Someone who is not John ate something that is not apples. In addition to
this, John ate apples.
In order to facilitate the readings in (11), let us assume that the discourse context consists
of only two people, namely John and Mary. We also assume that apples and pears are
the only food under discussion. In this context, the first reading of (11) says that Mary
ate apples as well as pears, and John also did the same; that is, John also ate apples as
well as pears. This reading contains two distinct presuppositions, each of which is due to
the occurrence of the particle to. The existence of this first reading is not surprising.
Whether it is the particle to or an abstract head that carries the presupposition, this
reading is expected to be available.
The other reading, which is expected only under the abstract ALSO hypothesis,
is the following: <Mary, pears> is a pair that satisfies the eating relation (i.e. Mary ate
pears), and in addition to this pair, the pair <John, apples> also satisfies the eating
relation (i.e. John ate apples). Under this reading, the two presuppositions of the first
reading collapse into one presupposition. Now in order to see the availability of the
second reading, we have to see whether the sentence in (11) is felicitous in a context
where Mary ate only pears. The sentence is expected to be felicitous in such a context if
this second reading is available. Crucially, it does not constitute a felicitous discourse,
which means this reading is not available, as indicated above.
This result answers the question raised at the beginning of this section. We do
not postulate an abstract head for the additive particle. The particle itself is responsible
75 As already mentioned, the particle to directly follows the focused constituent, unlike its English
counterparts too, also, and as well. Here I provide a literal translation to make clear that the
particle forms a constituent with the focused phrase, although it is not grammatical in English.
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for the presupposition, and the to-phrase as a whole is defined as a generalized
quantifier of type <et, t> (see section 3.5.1).
3.3.3 Syntax of the To-Phrase
This section lays out basic assumptions regarding the syntax of the to-phrase. Although
the two differences noted in the preceding sections distinguish the additive particle from
the exclusive particle, these differences do not directly bear on how they are different
syntactically (of course, except for the presence or absence of the abstract head). On the
contrary, I pursue the null hypothesis that the particles man and to share the same
syntax, the specific details of which will be specified very shortly. I first present an
apparent difference between the two particles regarding their scope-taking properties
with respect to negation (briefly discussed in chapter 2), and then show that this
difference is due to an independent factor, and thus does not disprove the null
hypothesis.
The null hypothesis I am pursuing consists of two assumptions. First, I assume
that the to-phrase moves in the overt syntax to the spec of some focus projection in
parallel to the man-phrase (see also Sohn 1995). This focus projection would be distinct
from ONLY-P. The ONLY head carries a very specific meaning, whereas the focus head
for the to-phrase does not carry a quantificational meaning, as claimed in the previous
section. Yet, I submit that the relation between the focus head and the to-phrase could
still be some kind of licensing or agreement relation, as in the case of the ONLY head
and the man-phrase. Second, I assume that this focus head can occur in various positions
in the syntactic tree. Again, the null assumption would be that it would be able to occur
in the same positions as the ONLY head.76 Since the particle to always follows
postpositions, we infer, relying on the Mirror Principle, that the focus head is at least
above VP (or, more strongly, above PP). Since the to-phrase is not compatible with any
76 As Irene Heim points out, this may not be the null assumption. The ONLY has specific
requirements (i.e. lexical entries) to satisfy, whereas the focus head is only a licensing head that is
semantically vacuous. Given this, the distribution of ONLY is conditioned by its semantic types
(interpretability), whereas a vacuous head is expected to have more freedom in its distribution.
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case marker, however, we cannot tell where the focus head is positioned with respect to
some case head. It could be above or below relevant case heads, and the to-phrase could
be in the spec of the focus head or in the spec of the case head.77
With these assumptions in mind, we turn to how the particle to interacts scopally
with negation (see also section 2.7.2). The descriptive generalization is that only the
particle man can take scope below negation. The particle to always takes scope over
negation. This contrast is exemplified in (12) and (13).
(12) Mary-ka John-man mannaci ani hayssta
Mary-Nom John-only meet not did
(i) John is the only one that Mary didn't meet. (only > Neg)
(ii) It is not the case that Mary met only John. She met someone else,too. (Neg > only)
(13) Mary-ka John-to mannaci ani hayssta
Mary-Nom John-also meet not did
(i) Mary didn't meet John, either. (also > Neg)
(ii) *Mary didn't meet John, although she met someone else. (*Neg > also)
As can be seen in the translation, sentence (12) is ambiguous. The particle man, i.e. the
ONLY head, can take either narrow or wide scope with respect to negation. By contrast,
the particle to only takes wide scope over negation. The only reading available for (13) is
that Mary didn't meet John, and there is another person that Mary didn't meet. The
other reading (Neg > also) is expected to arise since presupposition survives negation.
This reading, however, is not available. If it were available, the sentence in (13) would be
77 Recall that there is no ONLY-criterion parallel to Neg-Criterion or Wh-Criterion (section 2.6.3).
That is, the surface position of the man-phrase is not the spec of ONLY-P. Analogously, the
surface position of the to-phrase may or may not be the spec of the focus head. If focus movement
precedes case-checking movement in derivation, DP-to will be a spell-out of DP-to-Case; if case-
checking movement precedes focus movement, DP-to will be a spell-out DP-Case-to. In either
case, case markers are realized as a zero variant.
110
felicitous in a situation where Mary met everyone except John. It is not an appropriate
utterance in such a context.78
Let us first focus on how the two readings in (12) are derived. Given that the
scope of the particle man is due to the position of the ONLY head, we can account for the
ambiguity of (12) by positing two ONLY heads around negation: one above negation,
and the other below negation. Depending upon which ONLY head is present in the tree,
we get one of the two readings. 79 Under the null hypothesis that we are pursuing, this
means that the focus head that licenses the to-phrase can in principle occur above or
below negation, and thus should allow the same type of ambiguity. This is not the case,
as we see in (13). Of the two possible positions, only the one above negation is available.
Based on the non-ambiguity of (13), one might argue that the to-phrase moves to the
spec of a focus projection that is positioned above negation; that is, there is no focus
head below negation. Hasegawa (1994) and Sohn (1995) indeed made such a proposal.
This position, however, cannot accommodate the fact in (12). If there is one focus
projection to the spec of which all focused phrases move, (12) is also expected to be
unambiguous, contrary to fact.
I claim that this difference between man and to is only apparent. The to-phrase
can in principle take scope below negation, and thus a focus head below negation exists
for a to-phrase, as well. One argument comes from the following case, where the topic
marker nun intervenes between the particle to and negation.
78 It is often assumed that too in English is a positive polarity item, as well. Given the right
context, however, too can occur within the scope of negation, and thus disproves the PPI account.
The following example is taken from Rullmann (2003).
(i) a. Mary ate the lasagna, but she couldn't eat the spaghetti, too.
b. If Ian cooked the food, he shouldn't wash the dishes, too.
79 This position is plausible only when we assume one fixed position for negation in Korean. If
negation in Korean does not have one fixed position, as advanced in Beck & Kim (1997), the
account of (12) should be different. Under such a position, the ambiguity will be explained by
moving negation around one ONLY head. Note, however, that the particle to should be a PPI
under this account, too, in order to account for the nonambiguity of (13), and the argumentation
in this section remains intact.
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(14) Mary-ka John-to mannaci-nun ani hayssta
Mary-Nom John-also meet-Top not did
(i) *Mary didn't meet John, either. (*also > Neg)
(ii) Mary didn't meet John, although he met someone else. (Neg > also)
Sentence (14) is the same as (13) except that the topic marker nun is added to the
predicate. As soon as the topic marker appears, it becomes possible for the particle to to
take scope below negation. This shows that the particle to can take scope below
negation, as long as it is not within the immediate scope of negation. This in turn
reminds us of the well-known property of polarity items. Negative Polarity Items (NPIs)
must be in the immediate scope of negation (among many other licensing operators),
and Positive Polarity Items (PPIs) must not be in the immediate scope of negation
(Linebarger 1980, 1987).80 Applied to the case in hand, this means that the particle to is a
PPI, and as such, it cannot take scope below negation; however, if there is another scope-
bearing element intervening between the particle and negation, it can escape the PPI
requirement.
The point of this discussion is that the difference between (12) and (13) does not
argue against our null hypothesis. The difference is due to an independent property of
the particle to as a PPI; and given its PPI status, the scope relation between the particle to
and negation is not a diagnostic for locating a focus projection whose spec the to-phrase
occupies. Therefore, we maintain our hypothesis that the two particles share the same
syntax. Both the man-phrase and the to-phrase move to the spec of a focus head, which
can occur in various positions in the tree.
8 0 A well-known PPI, some in English, exhibits the same property. Usually it cannot take scope
below negation, but can if it is not within the immediate scope of negation. Thanks to Irene Heim
for pointing this out to me. The following data from Szabolcsi (2004) illustrate this point.
(i) a. John didn't call someone. (* not > some)
b. No one called someone. (* no one > some)
(ii) a. Not every student said something. (4 not > every > some)
b. John doesn't always call someone. (AI not > always > some)
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3.3.4 Summary
In this section, I stated my position on three issues. First, I claimed that investigating the
scope of the additive particle amounts to examining the presupposition of sentences
containing the particle. Second, I showed that the so-called existential presupposition of
the additive particle comes from the particle itself, not from an abstract head; this is one
difference between the particle man and to. Third, I argued that, despite apparent
differences, the particles man and to share the same syntax. At one point in the
derivation, both man-phrases and to-phrases undergo focus movement to the spec of a
focus projection, which occurs in various positions in the tree.
3.4 The Scope Facts
This section presents the scopal behavior of the additive particle to, with special focus on
how the to-phrase interacts scopally with another quantificational element in scrambling
contexts. As mentioned already, presuppositions provide a window onto the scopal
relations of sentences containing the to-phrase. Thus we pay attention to how the
presupposition of the to-phrase interacts with a quantificational element in the sentence.
I introduce three factors that affect the scope of the to-phrase, each of which is dealt with
in the following three sections.
3.4.1 Scrambling and the Scope of the To-Phrase
Let us first see how scrambling affects the scope of the to-phrase. There are two cases in
which scrambling is relevant. In the first case, the to-phrase undergoes scrambling across
another QP. In the second case, a QP undergoes scrambling across the to-phrase. I will
start with the first case.8 1
81 The data in this section holds of the to-phrase marked by a postposition, as well. In the interest
of space, the examples of PP-to are omitted.
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(15) Motun-sonyen-i Mary-to coahanta.
every-boy-Nom Mary-also like
'(Lit.) Every boy likes Mary-also.'
(i) For each boy x, there is someone other than Mary who x likes. (every > also)
(ii) There is someone other than Mary who every boy likes. (also > every)
This sentence is ambiguous, as indicated. The to-phrase can take both wide and narrow
scope with respect to the QP motun-sonyen 'every boy.' If the to-phrase takes scope over
the QP, there should be another person besides Mary that every boy likes. Let's call this
a strong reading. By contrast, if the QP takes scope over the to-phrase, it is not required
that there is a particular person in addition to Mary that every boy likes. This reading
allows each boy to like different people, as long as they all like Mary. That is, co-
variation is allowed. Let's call this a weak reading. Note also that the strong reading is
not plausibly attributable to a covert movement of the to-phrase over the subject QP,
given the lack of covert movement in general in Korean.82
Given this ambiguity, we can think of two situations where one can utter (15)
felicitously. First, (15) is felicitous in a situation where a particular individual, say Jane,
is loved by every boy. This is the case of the strong reading. Yet, this sentence is also
appropriate when the context does not provide such an individual, as long as each boy
likes someone. For example, a list of pairs in which the first member (a boy) likes the
82 The same type of ambiguity is attested when a universal quantifier precedes an existential
quantifier, as shown in (i).
(i) Motun-sonyen-i enu-sonye-lul coahanta.
every-boy-Nom some-girl-Acc like
'Every boy likes some girl.'
a. For each boy, there is a girl that he likes.
b. There is a girl that every boy likes.
Again, under the assumption that Korean is a scope-rigid language, the ambiguity of (i) cannot
be due to a long QR of the existential quantifier. In order to account for this, it has been proposed
that the wide scope of the indefinite in reading (b) is due to its specific interpretation (Sohn 1995)
or to its choice function interpretation (Park 2002). Under either account, the ambiguity of (i) does
not argue against the scope-rigidity generalization.
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second member (a girl) can precede this sentence and forms a felicitous discourse, as
illustrated in (16). Here Alex, Chris, and Edward are all the boys in the discourse. 83
(16) Alex-ka Becki-lul, Chris-ka Diana-lul, Edward-ka Franny-lul coahanta.
Alex-N Becki-A Chris-N Diana-A Edward-N Franny-A like
'Alex likes Becki, Chris likes Diana, and Edward likes Franny.'
Motun-sonyen-i Mary-to coahanta.
every-boy-Nom Mary-also like
'(Lit.) Every boy likes Mary-also.'
Now let us see what happens if the to-phrase undergoes scrambling. This is
illustrated in (17).
(17) Mary-tol [motun-sonyen-i tl coahanta.]84
Mary-also every-boy-Nom like
'(Lit.) Mary-also, every boy likes t.'
(i) *For each boy x, there is someone other than Mary who x likes. (*every > also)
(ii) There is someone other than Mary who every boy likes. (also > every)
When the to-phrase is scrambled, only the strong reading remains; the weak reading has
disappeared. Since the weak reading is missing, the discourse in (16) would become
infelicitous if the second sentence in (16) is replaced by (17). This is indeed the case, as
illustrated in (18). The preceding pair-list does not meet the presupposition of the strong
reading, and thus the discourse is infelicitous.
83 The list in the preceding context does not have to be a pair. Each boy can like more than one
person.
84 This sentence is, by hypothesis, structurally ambiguous. The sentence-initial appearance of the
to-phrase can be either due to scrambling or base-generation, in parallel to the man-phrase (see
sections 2.8 and 3.8). Since the issue of reconstruction arises only under the scrambling structure,
I consider only the scrambling structure. For this reason, the empty element is marked as a trace
(t), rather than as e, which covers both pro and a trace.
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(18) Becki-lul Alex-ka, Diana-lul Chris-ka, Franny-lul Edward-ka coahanta.8 5
Becki-A Alex-N Diana-A Chris-N Franny-A Edward-N like
'(Lit.) Becki, Alex likes t, Diana, Chris likes t, and Franny, Edward likes t.'
#Mary-tol [motun-sonyen-i ti coahanta.]
Mary-also every-boy-Nom like
'(Lit.) Mary-also, every boy likes t.'
The contrast between (15) and (17) shows that the scrambled to-phrase does not undergo
reconstruction. This is surprising, given that we define the to-phrase as a quantifier and
scrambled QPs can undergo reconstruction. This is the first puzzle, which I refer to as
anti-reconstruction effect of the to-phrase.
Next, we turn to the second case of scrambling, where the object QP is scrambled
across the subject to-phrase. Here we find another unexpected pattern. Sentence (19)
exemplifies the relevant case, but with no scrambling.
(19) Mary-to motun-sonyen-ul coahanta.
Maryry-also every-boy-Acc like
'(Lit.) Mary-also likes every boy.'
(i) There is someone other than Mary who likes every boy. (also > every)
(ii) *For each boy x, there is someone other than Mary who likes x (*every > also)
In (19), the surface order determines the scope relation, in conformity with the scope-
rigidity. The to-phrase scopes over the QP, and thus only the strong reading is available.
The other scope relation where the QP takes scope over the to-phrase is not available. If
it were, the sentence would make a felicitous utterance when the preceding context
provides a pair-list. This is not the case:
8s In order to rule out a confounding factor, the preceding context also has a scrambling structure.
This, however, does not matter, since the discourse is still infelicitous even when the preceding
context has no scrambling.
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(20) Amy-ka Bill-ul, Cathy-ka Dave-lul, Emily-ka Fred-lul coahanta.
Amy-N Bill-A Cathy-N Dave-A Emily-N Fred-A like
'Amy likes Bill, Cathy likes Dave, and Emily likes Fred.'
#Mary-to motun-sonyen-ul coahanta.
Mary-also every-boy-Acc like
'(Lit.) Mary-also likes every boy.'
In the context provided, each boy has someone other than Mary who likes him. This
context satisfies the presupposition of the weak reading, but the discourse is not
felicitous. 86 This confirms that the weak reading is missing. By contrast, the availability
of the strong reading explains the infelicity of this discourse straightforwardly. The pair-
list does not provide an individual whom every boy likes, which is required by the
strong reading. The infelicity follows from this presupposition failure.
Now let us look at what happens when the object QP undergoes scrambling.
(21) Motun-sonyen-ull [Mary-to ti coahanta.]
every-boy-Acc Mary-also like
'(Lit.) Everyboy, Mary-also likes t.'
(i) There is someone other than Mary who likes every boy. (also > every)
(ii) *For each boy x, there is someone other than Mary who likes x (*every > also)
The scrambled sentence is still unambiguous. The to-phrase can only take scope over the
QP, although the QP precedes the to-phrase. Recall that scrambled QPs can take scope in
86 Some speakers find this discourse felicitous. For those speakers, the particle to seems to
function as a discourse particle (like a kind of conjunction); thus the second sentence means
something like 'In addition to what's already been said, it is also the case that Mary likes every
boy.' But note that this reading is not equal to the reading we are interested in. Under this
reading, there is no scopal interaction between the particle and the object QP. Therefore, the
felicity in this case does not prove the existence of the inverse scope in (19). Thanks to Sabine
Iatridou for pointing this out to me.
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their surface position. For example, if we replace the to-phrase in (21) by an existential
quantifier, the sentence becomes ambiguous.
(22) Motun-sonyen-ull [nwukwunka-ka
every-boy-Acc someone-Nom
'(Lit.) Everyboy, someone likes t.'
(i) There is someone who likes every boy.
(ii) For each boy x, there is someone who likes x
ti coahanta.]
like
(some > every)
(every > some)
Given that the scrambled QP can take scope in the scrambled position in (22), it should
be able to do the same in (21), which will lead to the weak reading. This is not the case.
The lack of the weak reading is confirmed by the infelicity of the following discourse.
(23) Bill-ul Amy-ka, Dave-lul Cathy-ka, Fred-lul Emily-ka
Bill-A Amy-N Dave-A Cathy-N Fred-A Emily-N
'(Lit.) Bill, Amy likes t, Dave, Cathy likes t, and Fred, Emily likes t.'
#Motun-sonyen-ull [Mary-to ti coahanta.]
every-boy-Acc Mary-also like
'(Lit.) Every boy, Mary-also likes t.'
coahanta.
like
If we compare this to the felicity of (16), the contrast becomes clearer. In both (16) and
(23), the QP precedes the to-phrase and is expected to take scope over it. Therefore, the
discourse in (23) is expected to be felicitous just like (16), contrary to fact. The apparent
generalization is that a QP undergoes obligatory reconstruction when scrambled across
the to-phrase, but not when scrambled across other QPs. This asymmetry suggests that
something about the additive particle triggers the reconstruction. In the following
discussion, we refer to this pattern as reconstruction effect of QPs.
This section identified two generalizations regarding how scrambling affects the
scope of the to-phrase. The first one is the anti-reconstruction effect of the to-phrase; the
to-phrase scrambled across a QP cannot undergo reconstruction. The second one is the
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reconstruction effect of the QP; the QP scrambled across the to-phrase seems to undergo
obligatory reconstruction. In both cases, the patterns are contrary to what we expect
based on the behavior of QPs.
3.4.2 The Role of Context: Pair-Lists vs. Natural Functions 87
This section presents another factor that affects the scope of the to-phrase, namely the
nature of the preceding context. Interestingly, the two effects due to scrambling
(reconstruction and anti-reconstruction effects) disappear if the preceding context
provides a functional term that contains a bound variable. Since both effects arise in
scrambled sentences, this section focuses on scrambled sentences.
Let us start with the anti-reconstruction effect. If a uniform relation, i.e. a
function, appears in the preceding context, the scrambled to-phrase seems to undergo
reconstruction. Since it takes scope in the trace position, co-variation becomes possible.
87 I borrow the terms 'pair-lists' and 'natural functions' from the literature on functional questions
(see section 3.5.2). I assume with Chierchia (1991) that natural functions (i.e. functions that have a
corresponding functional expression, e.g. his mother) are distinguished from pair-lists in that only
natural functions can be defined by intension.
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(24) Caki-emeni-lull [motun-sonyen-i ti coahanta.]88, 89
self-mother-Acc every-boy-Nom like
'(Lit.) Self's mother, every boy likes t.'
Mary-to, [motun-sonyen-i ti coahanta.]
Mary-also every-boy-Nom like
'(Lit.) Mary-also, every boy likes t.'
'For each boy x, x likes his mother, and x likes MaryF, too.'
Compare the discourse in (24) with the one in (18) in the previous section. In (18), we
noticed that if the to-phrase is scrambled, only the strong reading is available; thus the
pair-list in the preceding context cannot satisfy the presupposition of the strong reading.
What is surprising about (24) is that the same sentence becomes felicitous although the
preceding context still does not provide a salient individual whom every boy likes. In
the given context, each boy likes his own mother, so there is no one who is liked by
every boy. The discourse should be infelicitous. The felicity of the discourse in (24)
suggests, then, either that the to-phrase can undergo reconstruction in this particular
context, or that the function caki-emeni 'his mother' somehow can satisfy the
88 The discourse in (24) can be an answer to a question like Who does every boy like?, where the wh-
word is also scrambled to the S-initial position, as shown below in (i). Note that Korean is a wh-
in-situ language, and thus does not require wh-words to move to the S-initial position.
(i) Nwukwu-lull [motun-sonyen-i ti coahani?]
who-Acc every-boy-Nom like
'(Lit.) Who, every boy likes t?'
It is also important that the first sentence has a scrambling structure. Otherwise, the discourse is
not felicitous. We come back to this point again in section 3.6.1.
89 The bound variable caki has another life as a 2nd person pronoun in colloquial speech. Thus the
discourses in (24) and (25) have another interpretation, as given in (ia) and (ib) respectively.
(i) a. Every boy likes your mother, and every boy likes Maryp, too.
b. Your mother likes every boy, and MaryF likes every boy, too.
The discussion in this section only cares about cases where caki is interpreted as a bound variable,
and we do not consider this ambiguity in the following discussion.
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presupposition of the strong reading. Whatever the reason might be, the functional term
in the preceding context obviates the anti-reconstruction effect.
We find a similar pattern with respect to the reconstruction effect, too. Although
the scrambled QP seems to obligatorily reconstruct in (21), it seems to take scope in the
scrambled position if the preceding context provides a function, as illustrated in (25).
(25) Motun-sonyen-ull [caki-emeni-ka ti coahanta.] 90
every-boy-Acc self-mother-Nom like
'(Lit.) Every boy, self's mother likes t.'
Motun-sonyen-ull [Mary-to tl coahanta.]
every-boy-Acc Mary-also like
'(Lit.) Every boy, Mary-also likes t.'
'For each boy x, x's mother likes x, and MaryF likes x, too.'
Again, it is surprising that the discourse in (25) is felicitous. We noticed in the previous
section that only the strong reading is available in the second sentence of (25). Thus in
order for this sentence to be felicitously uttered, the preceding context should provide
an individual other than Mary who likes every boy. The first sentence of (25) does not
provide such an individual since each mother likes her own son and there is no one who
likes every boy. Thus this discourse is expected to be infelicitous. This shows that the
functional term in the preceding context cancels the reconstruction effect. As in the case
of (24), two possibilities emerge. Either the QP can somehow take scope in its surface
position in this context, or the function can meet the presupposition of the strong
reading.
To summarize, I showed that the reconstruction and the anti-reconstruction
effects require some modification. The scrambled to-phrase can take scope in its trace
90 Note that the scrambled QP can bind the bound variable in the subject position and rescues the
sentence from a weak crossover (WCO) violation. See Mahajan (1990), Tada (1990), Saito (1992).
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position if the preceding sentence contains a functional term in a position parallel to that
of the to-phrase. Similarly, the scrambled QP can take scope in its surface position if the
preceding sentence contains a functional term, again in a position parallel to that of the
to-phrase.
3.4.3 Ordering Restrictions
This section introduces an ordering restriction that correlates with the nature of the
focused phrase. In brief, a functional term can satisfy the presupposition of the to-phrase
that contains an individual term, whereas an individual term cannot satisfy the
presupposition of the to-phrase that contains a functional term. Thus the ordering
between a functional term and an individual term affects discourse felicity. Interestingly,
this restriction applies only to scrambled sentences. There is no such ordering restriction
in sentences with base order. Let me first show the good discourse. The discourses given
below are repeated from (24) and (25) in the previous section.
(26) Caki-emeni-lull [motun-sonyen-i
self-mother-Acc every-boy-Nom
'(Lit.) Self's mother, every boy likes t.'
Mary-tol [motun-sonyen-i
Mary-also every-boy-Nom
'(Lit.) Mary-also, every boy likes t.'
ti coahanta.]
like
ti coahanta.]
like
'For each boy x, x likes x's mother, and x likes MaryF, too.'
(27) Motun-sonyen-ull [caki-emeni-ka
every-boy-Acc self-mother-Nom
'(Lit.) Every boy, self's mother likes t.'
ti coahanta.]
like
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Motun-sonyen-ull [Mary-to
every-boy-Acc Mary-also
'(Lit.) Every boy, Mary-also likes t.'
ti coahanta.]
like
'For each boy x, x's mother likes x, and Mary likes x, too.'
In both (26) and (27), the uniform relation in the first sentences seems to be able to satisfy
the presupposition of the second sentences where an individual term is in focus (with
the particle to attached to it). Although there is no particular individual that will make
the strong reading felicitous, it does not cause a problem.
If a functional term is focused, however, an interesting contrast appears. It seems
that an individual term in the preceding context cannot satisfy the presupposition of the
to-phrase that contains a function. Consider the following discourses.
(28) Mary-lull [motun-sonyen-i
Mary-Acc every-boy-Nom
'(Lit.) Mary, every boy likes t.'
tl coahanta.]
like
#Caki-emeni-tol [motun-sonyen-i
self-mother-also every-boy-Nom
'(Lit.) Self's-mother-also, every boy likes t.'
ti coahanta.]
like
'For each boy x, x likes Mary, and x likes x's motherF, too.'
(29) Motun-sonyen-ull [Mary-ka
every-boy-Acc Mary-Nom
'(Lit.) Every boy, Mary likes t.'
tl coahanta.]
like
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#Motun-sonyen-ull [caki-emeni-to
every-boy-Acc self-mother-also
'(Lit.) Every boy, self's-mother-also likes t.'
tl coahanta.]
like
'For each boy x, Mary likes x, and x's motherF likes x, too.'
The discourses in (28) and (29) are not felicitous. Speakers find them confusing and
incoherent, and suggest that the preceding context should contain a functional term, too.
If the individual term in the first sentence is replaced by a functional term, the discourse
becomes felicitous.
(30) Caki-apeci-lull [motun-sonyen-i
self-father-Acc every-boy-Nom
'(Lit.) Self's father, every boy likes t.'
Caki-emeni-tol [motun-sonyen-i
self-mother-also every-boy-Nom
'(Lit.) Self's-mother-also, every boy likes t.'
ti coahanta.]
like
ti coahanta.]
like
'For each boy x, x likes x's father, and x likes x's motherF, too.'
(31) Motun-sonyen-ull [caki-apeci-ka ti coahanta.]
every-boy-Acc self-father-Nom like
'(Lit.) Every boy, self's father likes t.'
Motun-sonyen-ull [caki-emeni-to ti coahanta.]
every-boy-Acc self-mother-also like
'(Lit.) Every boy, self's-mother-also likes t.'
'For each boy x, x's father likes x, and x's motherF likes x, too.'
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What is more interesting is that this ordering restriction holds only of scrambled
sentences. There is no such restriction in sentences with base order. Whether a functional
term precedes a to-phrase that contains an individual, or an individual term precedes a
to-phrase that contains a function, the sequences form a felicitous discourse.
(32) Motun-sonyen-i caki-emeni-lul coahanta.
every-boy-Nom self-mother -Acc like
'Every boy likes his mother.'
Motun-sonyen-i Mary-to coahanta.
every-boy-Nom Mary-also like
'Every boy likes Mary, too.'
'For each boy x, x likes x's mother, and x likes MaryF, too.'
(33) Motun-sonyen-i Mary-lul coahanta.
every-boy-Nom Mary-Acc like
'Every boy likes Mary.'
Motun-sonyen-i caki-emeni-to coahanta.
every-boy-Nom self-mother-also like
'Every boy likes his mother, too.'
'For each boy x, x likes Mary, and x likes x's motherF, too.'
The fact that (32) is a good discourse is not surprising. We saw in section 3.4.1 that the
second sentence of (32) has a weak reading, which does not require someone whom
every boy likes. What is surprising is the felicity of (33). Contrast this with (28). Once the
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scrambled phrases are back to their original positions, the infelicity has disappeared.91
This suggests that the to-phrase that contains a functional term triggers different
presuppositions depending upon whether it is scrambled or not. Apparently, the
requirement becomes stronger in the scrambled case.
3.4.4 Summary of the Section
This section presented three generalizations regarding the scopal behavior of the to-
phrase. First, the scrambled to-phrase reconstructs only when the preceding context
provides a functional term in a position parallel to the to-phrase (the anti-reconstruction
effect). Second, a QP scrambled across the to-phrase reconstructs unless the preceding
context provides a functional term (the reconstruction effect). Third, the to-phrase that
contains a functional term triggers a stronger presupposition in scrambled sentences;
thus an individual term in the preceding discourse cannot satisfy the presupposition of
the to-phrase that contains a functional term.
3.5 Ingredients
This section introduces the three components of the analysis, based on which I account
for the scope facts presented in section 3.4. The three components are an anaphoric view
of the additive particle (section 3.5.1), division of labor between semantic and syntactic
binding (section 3.5.2), and principles of economy that regulate covert operations such as
reconstruction and type shifting (section 3.5.3). In the subsequent three sections, I
discuss how each of them is motivated.
91 If there is no scrambling in (29), the second sentence becomes ungrammatical due to a WCO
violation. Given that the base order sentences are ungrammatical to start with, we cannot
construct a felicitous discourse that corresponds to the infelicitous discourse in (29).
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3.5.1 The Anaphoric View of the Additive Particle
This section first discusses a well-known problem of the existential view of the additive
particle (Karttunen and Peters 1979), and then proposes a particular implementation of
an anaphoric view, building on Heim (1992). The problem, first pointed out by Kripke
(1990), is concerned with English too, but it carries over to Korean to as well. 92
Additive particles are often said to trigger an existential presupposition, as has
been assumed in the discussion so far. Sentence (34a) is thus said to presuppose (34b).
(34) a. Mary-to Boston-ey salkoissta.
Mary-also Boston-in live
'MaryF lives in Boston, too.'
b. 3x[x * Mary & live_in_Boston (x)]
A closer look, however, tells us that the existential presupposition in (34b) is too weak to
license the additive particle, and that something more specific is required. The problem
is the following: we all know that many people live in Boston, thus the presupposition in
(34b) is trivially satisfied. Independent of this, we also know that cooperative hearers are
able to add uncontroversial information to the conversational background. This is the
process called accommodation (see Lewis 1979, Stalnaker 1972, von Fintel 2000, and
Beaver 2001). Putting these two pieces together, it follows that if the presupposition of
(34a) were simply (34b), its hearer would be able to accommodate this uncontroversial
information. If that is the case, sentence (34a) is expected to be felicitous in almost any
context. In particular, it will be felicitous even when no salient individual who lives in
Boston is mentioned. This expectation, however, is not fulfilled. If uttered out of the
blue, (34a) sounds odd and calls for further identification of the person in question (e.g.
Who else lives in Boston?).
92 For more discussion on this issue, see also Soames (1989), Asher and Lascarides (1998), von
Fintel (2000), Beaver (2001), van der Sandt and Geurts (2001), and Suzuki (2003) among others.
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This is in a clear contrast with the presupposition of definite descriptions, where
accommodation works as expected:
(35) I am sorry that I am late. I had to take my daughter to the doctor.
(von Fintel 2000: 3)
This sentence can be appropriately uttered even when the speaker does not explicitly
mention that he has a daughter. The hearer would take for granted without much
objection that the speaker has a daughter. If the presupposition of the additive particle
were simply existential, the same process of accommodation would take place in (34a),
and there would be no contrast as noticed here. This is clearly not the case.
To solve this problem, an anaphoric view has been proposed, according to which
the presupposition of additive particles is similar to that of pronouns in that both of
them demand an antecedent in the context. This captures the fact that that when uttered
out of the blue, pronouns also resist accommodation. Heim (1992), in particular, assumes
that the additive particle is sort of like in addition to x, where x is an anaphoric element
whose reference is disambiguated at LF by means of a referential index. Under this
approach, the presupposition of (36a) is represented as in (36b).
(36) a. Mary-tol Boston-ey salkoissta.
Mary-also Boston-in live
'MaryF lives in Boston, too.'
b. g(1) # Mary & livein_Boston (g(1))
Note that the additive particle carries an index. The value of the index is determined by
a variable assignment function g, which is in turn determined by the utterance context.
The function g is a partial function from indices to individuals, and in this case includes
index 1 in its domain. The presupposition of (36a) is now that g(1) is not Mary and g(1)
lives in Boston. The existence of the pronominal element distinguishes the anaphoric
view from the existential view. The value of the pronominal element (index) depends on
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the utterance context, which means without a context, the value is not determined. This
explains why accommodation is difficult with additive particles.
Now turning to the particle to, I propose a specific implementation of Heim's
approach, and define the lexical entry of to within this proposal. For now, we will focus
on one specific case where the focused phrase is an individual, i.e. type e expression. I
argue that the particle to takes three arguments: two individuals and a predicate. The
first individual argument is an implicit pronoun that is provided by the context, and the
second one is the focused phrase that is overtly realized next to the particle. The implicit
pronoun behaves just like an overt pronoun: it requires an antecedent; it can be free,
bound, or E-type; and it induces a weak crossover (WCO) violation in certain
configurations. The lexical entry of the particle to is given in (37). Note that the particle is
defined as a partial function to encode the presupposition.
(37) [to = Xxe.Xye,.P<e, t>: x # y & P(x) = 1.P(y) =193
After the particle takes two individual arguments, we get the to-phrase, which is defined
as a generalized quantifier of type <et, t> (see also Suzuki 2003). The to-phrase takes a
predicate P, and the resulting sentence is defined if and only if the predicate holds of the
covert argument x, which is different from the overt argument y. If defined, then the
sentence asserts that the predicate holds of the overt argument y.94
One natural move that follows from this entry is what I call Type Parallelism. The
lexical entry of the additive particle requires that the two arguments x and y should have
the same type.95 In the entry in (37), this is trivially satisfied, but it becomes operative
when the two arguments start out having different types. In such a case, types are
adjusted to meet this condition. Specifically, the type of y is adjusted to be parallel to the
93 Compare this to the entry of the particle under the existential view, given in (i).
(i) [to]= xe.AP<e,t>: 3y[y * x & P(y) = 1].P(x) =1
94 As can be seen in the entry, the particle to is not defined as a sentential operator, unlike English
too (e.g. Asher and Lascarides 1998). This is due to the contrast between the two items, namely
that unlike too, the particle to is always adjacent to the focused phrase.
95 I thank Irene Heim for suggesting this line of thought.
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type of x, since argument x is the first one to combine with the particle and takes
precedence. If adjustments cannot be made, the structure becomes uninterpretable.
Let me give some examples here. The following sentences illustrate cases in
which the implicit pronoun is a free, bound, and E-type pronoun respectively. The first
sentence in each example provides a context in which the second sentence is uttered.
Note that the translations of the second sentences explicitly reflect the current proposal
that the additive particle takes one argument from the preceding context.
(38) a. Mary-ka Bill-ul
Mary-Nom Bill-Acc
'Mary met Bill.'
manassta.
met
Mary-ka John-to manassta.
Mary-Nom John-also met
'Mary met John in addition to Bill.'
b. Motun-sonyen-i cakicashin-ul
every-boy-Nom self-Acc
'Every boy loves himself.'
Motun-sonyen-i
every-boy-Nom
'Every boy loves
salanghanta.
love
Mary-to salanghanta.
Mary-also love
Mary in addition to himself.'
c. Motun-sonyen-i caki-emeni-lul
every-boy-Nom self-mother-Acc
'Every boy invited his mother.'
chotayhayssta.
invited
Motun-sonyen-i caki-apeci-to chotayhayssta.
every-boy-Nom self-father-also invited
'Every boy invited his father in addition to his mother.'
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Let us see how these sentences are computed with the entry given in (37). I will focus on
(38c), where the implicit pronoun is an E-type pronoun and most complex among the
three options. Extension to the other two cases will be straightforward. The following
tree represents the structure of the second sentence of (38c).
(39) TP (I)
every boy 1
FocP T
2
hislfather to / VP FocTHE /\ /
R7 pro tl
t2 invited
There are several points worth mentioning here. Note first that the to-phrase has moved
to [Spec, FocP] in line with the assumption made in section 3.3.3. This is an overt
movement, but due to the head-finality of Korean, the effect of this movement on word
order is vacuous. With respect to semantic calculation, however, this is a welcome result.
Thanks to this movement, the problem of type mismatch is resolved. Under an
alternative approach that does not assume this movement, the to-phrase would have to
move later at LF to the closest node of type t. That is, it will have to undergo a short QR
targeting VP (Heim and Kratzer 1998). It seems that the choice between overt and covert
movement does not matter for our purposes. I adopt the focus movement approach
simply following the null hypothesis that I am pursuing. Note also that the focus head is
positioned below TP. As already mentioned, I do not assume that FocP necessarily
belongs to the CP domain. Other than its position between VP and TP, more specific
position of the focus head is not specified, especially the hierarchical relation between
AgroP and FocP. This is because the relative hierarchy between FocP and AgroP cannot
be gathered from the order of nominal affixes, due the co-occurrence restriction (section
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3.2.2). Since we assume that both the case head (Agro in this case) and the focus head are
semantically vacuous, the choice on this issue does not affect the semantic computation.
As for the vacuity of the focus head, recall the discussion in section 3.3.2. We concluded
there that the particle carries the presupposition, and thus the focus head only functions
as a licensing head, similarly to T and Agro. Next turning to the internal structure of the
to-phrase, the first argument of to is a null E-type pronoun. Here I am following Heim &
Kratzer's (1998) implementation of Cooper (1979), where an E-type pronoun consists of a
definite article (THE, which is covert in Korean) and a predicate that is made of two
variables. The first variable R is of type <e, et> and receives its value from the context. In
the case in hand, it denotes a function [x.Xy.y is x's mother]. The second variable is of
type e and is bound by the subject quantifier (index 1).
Now we are ready to go into the semantic calculation of (39). The semantic value
of the top node of (39) is given in (40). See the appendix to check how this value is derived.
(40) [(T) ] = is defined if and only if for each boy x, x's mother is different from x's
father and x invited x's mother. If defined, I() ] is true if and only if for each
boy x, x invited x's father.
Since the particle denotes a partial function, the sentence as a whole has a definedness
condition. If the definedness condition is not satisfied, the sentence cannot be judged
either true or false. It would be a usual case of presupposition failure.
To sum up, this section supported the anaphoric view of the additive particle
over the existential view, and defined the lexical entry of the particle to that better
reflects its characteristic behavior. We will see later that in addition to its resistance to
accommodation, the scopal behavior of the particle to provides strong support to the
anaphoric view.
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3.5.2 Functional Dependencies and Semantic Binding
This section discusses two mechanisms that give rise to variable binding, and claims that
natural languages employ both syntactic and semantic mechanisms, not just one of the
two. Building on Engdahl (1986) and Sharvit (1999a), I argue that a semantic mechanism
should be available to accomplish variable binding, and that this mechanism is operative
in deriving a functional dependency. The discussion starts with functional dependencies
in questions, and then moves to functional dependencies in scrambling sentences in
Korean.
3.5.2.1 Some Background
It is well known that a question like (41a) can be answered in three ways as given in
(41b-d) (see among others May 1985, Engdahl 1986, Aoun and Li 1993, Cheirchia 1993,
and recently Agiiero-Bautista 2001).
(41) a. Which woman does every man love?
b. Mary
c. His mother
d. Alex, Becki; Chris, Diana; Edward, Franny.
The answers in (41b-d) are each called individual, functional, and pair-list answers. Of
the three answers, we focus on the functional answer, and derive functional readings of
questions from the tools available in analyzing questions in general (e.g. Karttunen
1977).96 One well-known proposal for this is due to Engdahl (1986) and Chierchia (1991,
1993), which propose that wh-phrases leave either a simple trace of type e or a complex
trace that contains more than one variable. If wh-phrases leave a simple trace, we get the
usual wh-questions that can be answered by individual answers as in (41b). By contrast,
96 There is another question here, namely the relationship between functional readings and pair-
list readings. One can argue that there is no relationship (Groendedijk and Stokhof 1984), or that
the pair-list reading is a variant of the functional reading (Engdahl 1986). See Agiiero-Bautista
2001 for comparison among these positions.
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if they leave a complex trace, which contains a function variable, we obtain functional
questions. For example, under the functional reading of (41a), the trace contains two
variables. One is a functional trace of type <e, e>, which is bound by the wh-phrase, and
the other is an individual variable of type e, which is bound by the trace of the subject
QP. The individual variable becomes an argument of the functional variable, and the
variable complex itself is interpreted by Functional Application; thus the whole trace
eventually comes out as type e, which can occur in argument positions.97 Under the
functional reading, the question in (41a) has the structure given in (42). The tree is
annotated with semantic values of relevant nodes (except the top node and the wh-
phrase). The question mark refers to the Q-morpheme posited by Karttunen (1977). 98
(42) (
which woman () Xf<e,e>.{Xw'.\x:  loves f(x) in w'}
1 {Xw'.Vx: x loves f(x) in w'}
Xw'.Vx[x is a man in w' - x loves f(x) in w']
Xp.{p}
every man Xx e.x loves f(x)
2 x loves f(x)
t2 Xy.y loves f(x)
love tl( 2 )
97 This is an important point in that it makes the present approach distinct from semantic
reconstruction assumed in literature. Cresti (1995) and Rullman (1995) argue that movement can
leave a higher type trace (T of type <et, t>), which makes possible for the moved phrase to take
scope in the original position without being (syntactically) reconstructed to the trace position.
Note that the functional trace we assume here ends with e (<e, e>), and the whole trace is of type
e, unlike theirs. Given this distinction between the two approaches, the fact that we adopt a
complex trace does not support the semantic approach to scope reconstruction. Throughout this
work, I assume that traces are of type e. Thanks to Irene Heim for discussion on this part.
98 In order to avoid unnecessary complications due to different frameworks assumed in each
paper, the discussion in this section presents Heim's (2001) implementation of Karttunen (1977)
and Engdahl (1986).
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Given that the functional trace is of type <e, e>, the functional abstractor (index 1) is of
type <e, e> as well. Accordingly, the lambda predicate in node () is of <<e,e>, <<s, t>,
t>>. Now in order to obtain the value of the top node, we need to combine the wh-
phrase with the lambda predicate in node (. But here we run into a problem. If which
woman in (42) has the usual denotation of type <<e, <st, t>>, <st, t>>, the computation
cannot proceed due to a type mismatch. We need a new entry of which woman.
The solution from Engdahl (1986) is the following. First, we allow a vacuous
binding on predicates. For instance, woman comes to denote [Xx.y.y is a woman], where
the first lambda abstractor is vacuous. Thus it denotes a relation, not a property. This
mechanism becomes useful when the wh-phrase contains a bound variable, as will be
shown shortly. Since the sister of which is of type <e, et>, the entry of which is modified
accordingly. In particular, it is defined as a kind of existential quantifier over functions
of type <e, e>.The new entry is given in (43a) along with the familiar one in (43b). 99 The
superscripts are used to distinguish between the two entries.
(43) a. Iwhichl = XQ<e,t>Pee ,<t.p<s , ,: 3f<,,e>[Vx E dom(f): Q(x)(f(x)) = 1 & p E P(f)]}
b. I[whichO] = XQ<e,t.P<e, t.{p<s,t>: 3fe[Q(f) = 1 & p E P(f)]}
By applying (43a) to woman, which denotes [x.Xy.y is a woman], we get the denotation
of which woman, as given in (44).
(44) I[ich' woman]w =
P<ee,<st.>.{p,: 3f<e,e>[Vx E dom(f): f(x) is a woman in w & p E P(f)]}
99 In fact, both (43a) and (43b) are special cases of the general which, which is defined as an
existential quantifier over functions of type <en, e>. The general entry of which is given below,
where n- 0.
(i) [whichn] = XQ<e'+l, t>.XP<<ene>, <st, t>>.{p<s, t>: 3f<en, e>[Vxl E dom(f): Vx2 E dom(f(xl)):
... Vxn E dom(f(xl).. .(xn-)): Q(xl)...(xn)(f(x).. .(xn)) = 1 & p E P(f)]}
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Finally, we can apply (44) to the lambda predicate in node (2). The value of the top node
is given in (45); (45a) is an informal description of (45b).
(45) a. Which woman-valued function fe, e, is such that every man x loves f(x)?
b. {p: 3f<e,e,[x E dom(f): f(x) is a woman in w & p = Xw'.Vx [x is a man in w'
- x loves f(x) in w']]}
This is the reading we want. We derived the functional reading by introducing the
functional trace, which is accompanied with type adjustments of the which-phrase. Other
than this, both individual and functional readings are derived in a parallel fashion.
Now we move one step further, and turn to functional questions where the wh-
phrase contains a bound variable, as shown in (46a).
(46) a. Which relative of his did every boy invite?
b. His mother/His grandfather/...
The bound variable in the which-phrase seems to be bound by the subject QP every boy.
The question here is how this is possible. Given that the which-phrase must move to a
position higher than the Q-morpheme, the surface position is too high for the pronoun
to get bound. One way that quickly comes to mind is to reconstruct (part of) the which-
phrase to the trace position, which is compatible with the standard view of binding (e.g.
the binder c-commands the bindee). Although this is an advantage to the reconstruction
idea, this option is not the best solution since under a particular implementation it
brings in other problems. For one, it misses the de re reading of questions.l00 For others,
100 If the restrictor of the which-phrase undergoes reconstruction, the descriptive content of the
which-phrase is asserted rather than presupposed. However, there is an argument showing the
presuppositional status of the restrictor.
(i) John wondered which of the students are students.
This sentence does not mean that John was wondering about a tautology, which would be the
case if of the students was evaluated inside the proposition. Rather, which of the students is taken as
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readers are referred to Engdahl (1986: 250-251). Faced with these problems, Engdahl
(1986) proposes that the bound pronoun in the restrictor of which can be bound in its
surface position without undergoing reconstruction. Under this position, the question in
(46a) is represented as in (47).
(47) (
which /
3 relative of his3 1
every boy
2
t2 
invited tl(2)
In (47), a binder index (index 3) is adjoined to the sister of which, which triggers
Functional Abstraction. The restrictor now denotes [XxAy.y is a relative of x]. Unlike the
case in (42), this abstraction is not vacuous due to the existence of the bound pronoun.
Now the computation of (47) proceeds in the same manner as that of (42). Up to node (2),
everything is the same as in (42), barring the denotation of the verb. The denotation of
the which-phrase is given in (48a), and the value of the top node is in (48b).
(48) a. [which' 3 relative of his3]w =
hP<eest,.>ps, : 3f<e,e>[Vx E dom(f): f(x) is a relative of x in w & p E P(f)]}
b. {p: 3f<e,e>[Vx E dom(f): f(x) is x's relative in w & p = Xw'.Vx [x is a boy in w'
- x invited f(x) ]]}
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the speaker's contribution and does not imply that John knows that the people under
consideration actually are students (Engdahl 1986: 250).
Due to the internal binding, the pronoun is bound within the which-phrase (without
undergoing reconstruction). Thus its apparent 'antecedent' (every boy) only binds part of
the trace (index 2 of ti(2)).101
10 Although this proposal derives the intended reading, some problems remain, as Heim (2001)
points out. For example, the choice of pronoun is as if the pronoun is bound by the subject QP,
which is not captured in a satisfying way under Engdahl's proposal.
(i) a. Which picture of herself did every girl like?
b. Which picture of her/*herself did every girl's father like?
In (ia), the pronoun is a reflexive. The question is how it satisfies condition A, if it is bound in situ,
or why it is exempt from it, if that is the case. The case in (ib) illustrates the same point. The
choice between a pronoun and a reflexive depends upon the subject QP. In order to solve this
puzzle, Heim (2001) incorporates the copy theory of movement/Trace Conversion (Fox 1999,
Sauerland 2001) and a new semantics of which-phrase (Rullmann & Beck 1998) into Engdahl
(1986). Before going to Heim's analysis, we need to see how Trace Conversion works. Roughly
speaking, Trace Conversion converts the copy of the moved phrase into a definite description
plus a variable, as exemplified below.
(ii) John invited every linguist.
Step 1: every linguist [John invited every linguist]
Step 2: every linguist Xx [John invited the x linguist]
Step 3: Vx[linguist (x) - John invited x]
In the first step, the QP leaves a copy in the trace position. This copy undergoes Trace Conversion
in the second step. In order to get to the final representation, the entry of the definite determiner
is adjusted - [xe.XP<,, t>:P(x) = 1.x], which results in the meaning of the sentence that arises due to
the usual QR. This process applies to all determiners including which. Finally, Trace Conversion
is also compatible with a complex trace. If the trace is of type <e, e>, for instance, the variable in
the copy of the moved phrase will be complex, (e.g. fix), where f is of type <e, e> and x is of type
e), and the lambda abstractor will be of type <e, e>, as well.
The next element of Heim's proposal is to remove the restrictor of the which-phrase from
the upper copy, following Rullmann & Beck (1998). Here the lexical meaning of which does not
allow a restrictor as its sister, as can be seen from the new entries in (iii). Compare these with the
ones in (43).
(iii) a. [whichll = P<,t>.{pc,t>: 3f~,,>: p E P(f)}
b. [which0l =XP,. t>.p, : 3fe p E P(f)}
c. [whichnl =AXP<,t,,>,tt>.{pt>: 3f,,e>: p e P(f)} (generalcase; n 0)
Now let us go back to the example in (47). When Trace Conversion and new semantics of which
are combined, this sentence undergoes the following derivation.
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The same issue arises in specificational sentences, as well. Here again, variable
binding is possible although the apparent binder does not c-command the bound
variable (so called connectivity effects), as illustrated in (49).
(49) a. The woman every man loves is his mother.
b. What every man enjoys most is his summer vacation.
c. The woman no man likes is his mother.
In these sentences, there is no movement assumed between the underlined position and
the postcopular phrase that contains a bound variable. Given this lack of movement, it is
difficult in this case to argue for reconstruction of the postcopular phrase to a precopular
position. Thus the c-command requirement for variable binding cannot be maintained
(but see Ross 1972 and recently Schlenker 2003 for a view which maintains the c-
command requirement without assuming movement structure. They argue connectivity
sentences equate a concealed question with an elided answer). One alternative might be
to scope the QP from the relative clause to a position where it can c-command the bound
(iv) Which relative of his did everyone invite?
Step 1: pre-movement representation
? every boy invited which' relative of his3
Step 2: wh-movement with copying
[which' relative of hiss] ? every boy invited [which' relative of hiss]
Step 3: Trace Conversion
[which' relative of hiss] 7 [? every boy invited [the 7(3) relative of hiss3]]
Step 4: deletion of the upper restrictor
[which] 7 [? every boy invited [the 7(3) relative of hiss3]]
Step 5: QR with a copy in the trace position (as in (50))
[whichl] 7 [? [every boy] 3 [the 3 boy] invited [the 7(3)' relative of his3 ]]
Notice that in the third step, the variable within the definite description (result of Trace
Conversion) is a complex trace. Accordingly, the lambda abstractor (index 7) is of type <e, e>.
With relevant entries, the final representation results in the following reading.
(v) Ip: 3 f<e,e>: p = Aw': Vx [x is a boy in w' - f(x) is a relative of x in w'].Vx [x is a
boy in w' - x invited f(x)]}
Note that under this approach, the variable his gets bound by the subject QP - they share the
same index (index 3), which explains the problems noted above with respect to Binding Theory.
The choice of the pronoun over the reflexive in (49b) is determined in the lower copy.
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variable. This option, however, is not tenable, either. It not only violates the well-known
locality conditions on QR, but it also wrongly predicts a stronger presupposition. This is
clearer when the determiner is no rather than every. The sentence in (49c) presupposes
that for every man there is some woman that he does not like. But the LF due to the long
QR presupposes that for every man there is a unique woman that he likes (Dahl 1981).
Given these problems, Sharvit (1999a) and Cecchetto (2001) argue that variable
binding in these sentences is possible thanks to the internal binding, which is made
available by the presence of a functional dependency (see also Jacobson 1994). For
example, (49a) expresses identity between two functions: the function which maps every
man to the woman that that he loves is the function which maps every man to his
mother. The relative operator leaves a functional trace in (49a), and the same is true of
the wh-word in (49b). Although it is not clear why functional dependencies make the
internal binding possible, the data seems enough to show that syntactic reconstruction is
not the only mechanism available for variable binding. With this background in mind,
we go into a functional dependency in scrambling sentences.
3.5.2.2 Functional Dependencies in Scrambling Sentences
Relying on the previous discussion, I argue that variable binding in Korean is also done
by two mechanisms. One is the usual syntactic binding, and the other is the semantic
mechanism introduced in the previous section, namely internal binding. The focus of the
discussion centers around the following two sentences.
(50) a. Caki-emeni-lull [motun-sonyen-i ti coahanta.]
self-mother-Acc every-boy-Nom like
'(Lit.) Self's mother, every boy likes t, i.e. Every boy likes his mother.'
b. Motun-sonyen-ull [caki-emeni-ka ti coahanta.]
every-boy-Acc self-mother-Nom like
'(Lit.) Every boy, self's mother likes t, i.e. For each boy x, x's mother likes x.'
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The two sentences in (50) (and their counterparts in other scrambling languages such as
Hindi and Japanese) are assumed to reveal the nature of scrambling (Mahajan 1990,
Saito 1992, among others). Under one common account, scrambling in (50a) is an A-bar
movement and the scrambled phrase undergoes reconstruction; thus variable binding
becomes possible. By contrast, scrambling in (50b) is an A-movement and the scrambled
QP can bind the variable from the scrambled position. Since this scrambling is an A-
movement, there is no WCO violation.
The idea that I am advancing here is that there is another mechanism that makes
variable binding possible. Under this option, the scrambled phrase in (50a) does not
need to reconstruct to the trace position, since the bound pronoun caki can be internally
bound. Similarly, the scrambled QP in (50b) is not binding the pronoun, since the real
binder is the binder index adjoined to the scrambled phrase. The following trees
represent the structure of the two sentences under the internal binding option.
(51) a. TP
THE / 1 TP
4 his4 mother
(Obj) every boy
VP
t3 (2 ) like
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b. TP
every boy
(Obj) 1 TP
VP
t3 like
There are a few points worth mentioning here. First, the bound pronouns are internally
bound, where the binder index (index 4) in both trees triggers Functional Abstraction.
Due to this internal binding, caki-emeni 'his mother' comes to denote a function of type
<e, et>, namely [Xx.Xy.y is the mother of x], instead of an open individual x's mother. To
make the structure interpretable, the type of the definite article changes accordingly.
Specifically, it is defined as a function from <e, et> to <e, e>, which is a variant of the
usual definite article of type <et, e> under the Fregean analysis. This is parallel to what
is done for which in earlier discussion. Of the two entries given below, (52a) is the one
that takes a relation as its argument; (52b) is the familiar entry; and (52c) is the
generalized entry. Since Korean lacks overt articles, both definite articles are assumed to
be covert.
(52) a. [THEII = Q<e, et>: 3!g<, e>[Vx E dom(g): Q(x)(g(x)) = 1] . tf[Q(x)(f(x)) = 1]
b. [THEO] = XQ<e, t>: 3!ge[Q(g) = 1] . tf[Q(f) = 1]
c. [THEn] = XQ<e+lt>: 3!g<en,e[Vxl E dom(g): Vx2 E dom(g(xl)): ... Vx E dom(g(x)
... (xn.l)): Q(xI) ... (xn)(g(x) ... (xn)) = 1] . tf[Q(x) ... (Xn)(f(XI) ... (Xn)) = 1]
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By applying THE to [4 his4 mother], we get a function that maps each individual to his or
her mother (z.z's mother). Note also that the functional terms (caki-emeni 'his mother')
leave a complex trace that contains two variables (t3(2) in (51a) and t2(l) in (51b)). The two
indices of complex traces are bound by two different elements. The function variables of
type <e, e> are bound by the functional terms (his mother), while the individual variables
of type e are bound by traces of the QP, which are in an A-position; in (51a), the
individual variable (index 2 in t3(2)) is bound by the trace of the QP in its 0-position (t2);
in (51b), the variable (index 1 in t2()) is bound by the intermediate trace of the scrambled
QP (ti) in [Spec, AgroP], which I assume to be an A-position. As indicated by arrows, I
assume that scrambling is a two-step movement (Mahajan 1990, Saito 1992, Sohn 1995,
and Ko 2004).102 Objects first scramble to the edge of vP, which can be identified with
case movement to the spec of AgroP. I also assume that the first step of this movement is
an A-movement, while the second step can be either A or A-bar movement. Thus t in
(51b) qualifies as an A-binder. In order for the internal binding to be possible, the
individual variable within the complex trace must be bound by the same index in an A-
position. Otherwise, the internal binding is not possible. As shown in sentences like *His
mother likes every boy, subjects cannot be bound by an object in its base position. In this
sense, semantic binding is not as free as one might think. Finally, the functional
abstractors (indices 1 and 3 in (51a) and index 2 in (51b)) are of type <e, e>.
Now we can calculate semantic values of the trees in (51). The following tree in
(53) has denotations of each node of (51a). See the appendix for the computation of (51b).
102 This was assumed in the previous chapter, as well. For example, when a man-phrase
scrambles, it always stops by [spec, ONLY-PI and [spec, AgroP].
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(53) Vx[x is a boy - x likes x's mother]
Aze.z's mother g<e,e>.Vx[x is a boy - x likes g(x)]
THE 1 Vx[x is a boy - x likes g(x)]
4 his4 mother
every boy x.x likes g(x)
2 x likes g(x)
t Xf<e, e> .x likes f(x)
3 x likes f(x)
t 2 Xy.y likes f(x)
t3(2) like
The value of the top node shows that the internal binding leads to the same meaning
that we get from syntactic binding, although the denotation of the scrambled phrase
varies with the kind of binding. Specifically, if the pronoun is internally bound, the
scrambled phrase in (50a) denotes a function of type <e, e>, a function that maps each
individual to his or her mother (x.zy[mother-of(y,x)). By contrast, if it undergoes
reconstruction, it denotes a function from assignment functions to individuals (x's
mother). The same is true of (50b). This contrast can be illustrated in the following
paraphrases. The ones in (54) are due to syntactic binding, whereas the ones in (55) are
due to internal binding.
(54) a. For each boy x, x likes x's mother.
b. For each boy x, x's mother likes x.
(55) a. The mother-function is a function f such that for each boy x, x likes f(x).
b. The mother-function is a function f such that for each boy x, f(x) likes x.
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Given this result, one might object by saying that it is redundant to have two
mechanisms that do the same job. Although it is a fair argument, it seems that the
redundant theory is needed on empirical grounds, which is one reason to object to the
redundancy argument. The discussion in section 3.6.2 will show that we cannot only
have syntactic reconstruction, and that both syntactic and semantic mechanisms should
be available. A system that has only syntactic binding makes wrong predictions
regarding discourse felicity.
This section presented the second component of the proposal, namely the
availability of semantic/internal binding. I argued that semantic binding is available as
an option, especially when there is a functional dependency in the sentence. Since we
allow both syntactic and semantic mechanisms for variable binding, the presence of a
bound variable does not always imply syntactic reconstruction. This position receives
further support from recent work by Cecchetto (2001), which also argues for the
independence of syntactic and semantic reconstructions and the need to adopt both
mechanisms. The scopal behavior of the to-phrase provides more specific arguments for
this claim, as will be shown shortly.
3.5.3 Principles of Economy
This section presents the third component of the analysis, namely principles of economy.
I introduce two principles that control the availability of covert operations. The first one
is a modified version of Fox's (2000) Scope Economy which regulates the availability of
reconstruction. The second one is a well-known strategy of assigning the lowest type to
an expression and using the higher type only when it is required (Partee & Rooth 1983,
Partee 1986). The common theme of the two principles is that operations are not allowed
without a motivation, although motivations for the two operations are different.
3.5.3.1 Reconstruction Economy
Let us start with the first principle. Fox (2000) proposes a set of economy principles, one
of which is Scope Economy stated in (56).
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(56) Scope Economy
Scope-shifting operations (SSOs) cannot be semantically vacuous. (Fox 2000:3)
Fox argues that SSOs (e.g. optional QR and QL/reconstruction) can apply only if it affects
semantic interpretation. If there is no such semantic effect, SSOs are not licensed. The
two sentences in (57) illustrate a contrast due to this restriction.
(57) a. A boy loves every girl.
b. John loves every girl.
Sentence (57a) is ambiguous between surface (a > every) and inverse scope (every > a),
where the inverse scope is the result of the QR that moves the object QP across the
subject QP. Fox argues that this QR is licensed, since the inverse scope is semantically
distinct from the surface scope. By contrast, sentence (57b), is not ambiguous, simply
because there is only one scope-bearing element, namely every girl. Here the surface
scope (John > every) and the inverse scope (every > John) are not distinct, and for this
reason, QR of every girl across John is not licensed. The QP in (57b) can only move up to
VP to resolve type mismatch. Fox provides arguments for this claim on the basis of the
scope facts in VP-Ellipsis, details of which we do not go into here. The crucial idea to
keep in mind is that SSOs are licensed only when they have semantic effects, in
particular effects on truth-conditions.
Here I propose following Fox (2000) that SSOs, especially reconstruction in our
case, are licensed only when they lead to different truth-conditions. In particular, I argue
that no reconstruction is licensed to change presuppositions.l0 3 This contrasts with
scrambling, which can be licensed not only by different truth-conditions but also by
different presuppositions and different word orders. Although what is the driving force
of scrambling is a controversial issue, when it comes to output effects, it is generally
agreed that it affects truth-conditions (e.g. scrambling of QPs), information structure, or
just word order with no semantic/pragmatic effect (see the discussion in section 2.5.3).
103 I thank Danny Fox for suggesting this line of thought.
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The claim here is that when a phrase is scrambled with a special purpose (other than
changing truth-conditions), that phrase does not undergo reconstruction at LF as long as
the two representations (one with reconstruction and the other without reconstruction)
have the same truth-condition. In fact, this position is fully faithful to the spirit of
economy in the following sense. Suppose that a phrase is overtly moved to induce a
certain effect, e.g. to change context. If that phrase undergoes reconstruction, the effect
of the overt movement is lost, but there is no gain in terms of truth-conditions, which is
the intrinsic driving force of SSOs. In such a case, it is more economical not to
reconstruct, everything being equal. The output effect, whatever that is, is valid, and the
truth-condition remains the same.
In formulating this idea, I borrow from von Fintel (1999) a notion of entailment,
which he calls Strawson-Entailment. I propose a reconstruction economy that works in
conjunction with Strawson-Equivalence, which is defined with the aid of Strawson-
Entailment. First, the definition of Strawson-Entailment is given in (58).
(58) A proposition p Strawson-Entails a proposition q if and only if q is true in every
possible world in which p is true and q has a truth-value.
The entailment under this notion is checked under the premise that the conclusion has a
semantic value, i.e. truth-value. In order for a proposition to have a semantic value, its
presuppositions must be satisfied; otherwise, the conclusion lacks a truth-value. The
reasoning given in (59) exemplifies this relation.
(59) A pug is a dog.
Mary owns a pug.
Mary is walking her dog.
·'. Mary is walking her pug.
One can easily check that this reasoning is valid. In every world in which Mary owns a
pug and she is walking her dog, she is walking her pug. It is crucial here that the
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presupposition of the conclusion, namely that Mary owns a pug, is in the premise.
Otherwise, reasoning becomes invalid; there can be worlds in which Mary owns a
chihuahua or a spaniel, and in those worlds, the conclusion is not true. This shows that
Mary is walking her dog Strawson-Entails Mary is walking her pug.
Next we define Strawson-Equivalence. As equivalence is defined via entailment,
so Strawson-Equivalence is defined via Strawson-Entailment. Specifically, Strawson-
Equivalence is defined as mutual Strawson-Entailment of two propositions.
(60) Propositions p and q are Strawson-Equivalent if and only if p Strawson-Entails q
and q Strawson-Entails p. I.e. p and q have the same truth-value in worlds where
the presuppositions of p and q are satisfied.
Now that we have a definition of Strawson-Equivalence, we can state the proposed
economy principle in more precise terms. I propose the following principle:
(61) Reconstruction Economy
Reconstruction is licensed only when the two resulting propositions (one with
reconstruction and the other one without reconstruction) are not Strawson-
Equivalent.
This is a more specific version of Fox's (2000) Scope Economy. It restricts reconstruction
in the same way as Scope Economy does. That is, reconstruction is licensed only when it
leads to two non-equivalent propositions. But it also has a new specification added;
reconstruction is not licensed if it affects only presupposition so the two propositions are
Strawson-Equivalent. This concludes the first principle of economy.
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__
3.5.3.2 Economy Principle on Type Shifting 10 4
The second principle of economy constrains the availability of type shifting. Following
Partee and Rooth (1983), I argue that each expression is assigned the lowest type among
possible alternatives unless there is a motivation to assign additional higher types. When
necessary, type shifting, specifically type raising, is licensed and provides an adequate
higher type meaning.
The type raising under consideration is a different kind from the well-known
operation LIFT proposed in Partee (1986). Partee defines LIFT as a device which turns an
individual (type e) into a generalized quantifier (type <et, t>) by taking all of the sets
that contain that individual. For example, LIFT turns j into AP.P(j). The type raising
operation we adopt here is responsible for an alternation between type e and type <e, e>.
Specifically, it turns an individual into its functional interpretation. This alternation
between type e and <e, e> comes from the assumption that all expressions have a
functional translation. For example, the type of woman is ambiguous between <e, t> and
<<e,e>, t>. The one with type <e, t> is the familiar one, which refers to a set of
individuals (Ax.x is a woman). This denotation of woman is marked as [womanOl - I will
use numerical superscripts to distinguish predicates of individuals and functions. The
other one with type <<e, e>, t> is a functional translation, which denotes a set of
functions whose range is a subset of Ivman 0] - let's call this [womanl]. Then, [woman]
denotes [f<e, e>.V x E dom(f): f(x) is a woman]. Similarly, an individual term like Mary
can denote a function of type <e, e>, namely a constant function which maps all
elements in the domain onto Mary (Ax.Mary). When multiple denotations are available
for an expression, an economy principle dictates that the lower type be preferred to the
higher type. I name this Type Raising Economy.
As mentioned at the beginning, this economy principle can be overridden when
a specific need arises for higher types. One motivation suggested in Partee and Rooth
(1983) and Partee (1986) is the lexical entry of conjunction. Under the assumption that
only expressions of the same type are conjoinable, type raising accounts for the
104 I thank Kai von Fintel and Irene Heim for suggesting the idea presented in this section.
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conjoinability of lower and higher type expressions. The conjunctions in (62) illustrate
such a case. In (62a), the type of an extensional verb (<e, <e, t>>) is raised to that of
intensional verbs (<<et, t>, <e, t>>). In (62b), an individual term is raised to be a
generalized quantifier.
(62) a. John needed and bought a new coat.
b. Professor Jones and every student came to the party.
By contrast, if the two conjuncts have the same type, there is no need for type raising.
This is indeed the case, as illustrated in (63).
(63) a. John caught and ate a fish.
b. Jones and Bill came to the party.
An interpretational difference between (62a) and (63a) confirms that the verbs in (63a)
retain the lower type of an extensional predicate. The salient reading of (63a) involves
just one fish, and thus it does not allow a paraphrase such as John caught a fish and ate a
fish, which is compatible with there being two different fish. By contrast, (62a) does
allow a paraphrase as John needed a new coat and bought a new coat.l0 5 A similar remark is
made in Engdahl (1986) with respect to mixed answers to functional questions, where
functional terms are conjoined with individual terms.
(64) a. Q: Who does every Frenchman admire?
A: His mother and Juliette Binoche.
b. Q: Who is the female star in The English Patient?
A: Juliette Binoche.
105 One question raised by Danny Fox is whether the position of Partee and Rooth (1983) will hold
under the Generative semanticist view (or its recent manifestation by den Dikken, Larson, and
Ludlow 1997) of the type of intentional predicates. I leave this for future investigation.
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The question in (64a) is a functional question, given the answer his mother. This means
that his mother is of type <e, e>, and thus Juliette Binoche should be of type <e, e> as well,
given the conjoinability of the two. This is possible thanks to type raising. When there is
no such a motivation, the same expression Juliette Binoche is assigned type e, for example,
as in a simple question like (64b).
Now I am proposing that the lexical entry of to also motivates type raising. In
section 3.5.1, I argued that the lexical entry of the additive particle requires that the first
two arguments of the particle to have the same type (Type Parallelism). If the two
arguments have different types, types are adjusted to satisfy Type Parallelism, similarly
to the conjunction case. Otherwise, the structure is not interpretable.
At first glance, type raising due to the additive particle looks just the same as the
one due to conjunction. However, there is one difference between the two, namely
directionality. In case of conjunction, both conjuncts have equal status. If one conjunct
has a different type from the other conjunct, type raising takes place irrespective of the
ordering between the two conjuncts. That is, it does not matter whether the conjunct
with the higher type precedes or follows the one with the lower type. For example, in
(64a), there is no contrast between His mother and Juliette Binoche and Juliette Binoche and
his mother.106 In either case, type raising takes place in order for conjunction to be
possible. This is not the case with the particle to. Type Parallelism specifies that among
the three arguments of the particle, the types of the first two should be equivalent. Now
out of the two arguments, only the second one can undergo type raising to meet Type
Parallelism. The first argument plays the role of a reference point, and is assigned the
lowest type possible in conformity with the general economy principle. That is, the first
argument by itself does not have a motivation for type raising. I will soon speculate why
this holds, but first in order to illustrate how this works, I will reintroduce the lexical
entries of the particle. The particle has multiple entries in accordance with the multiple
denotations of their arguments.
106 This may not be completely true. Some speakers find His mother and Juliette Binoche to be better
than Juliette Binoche and his mother, and report that it is difficult to have a functional reading for his
mother in the latter case.
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(65) a. [to] = Xfe.Xge.\P<e, t>: f # g & P(f) = 1.P(g) =1
b. [to' ] = f<e, e.Xgoe, e>.AP<ee, t>: f # g & P(f) = 1.P(g) =1
c. [ton] = Xfen, e>.Xgen, e>.XP<en+l, t: f # g & P(f) = 1.P(g) =1
The entry in (65a) is from section 3.5.1, where the first two arguments are of type e, and
the new entry in (65b) is for cases where the two arguments are functions of type <e, e>.
The one in (65c) is a generalized entry. In both (65a) and (65b), there is no issue of type
raising since Type Parallelism is a consequence of the entry in (65c). Type raising works
in the following manner. If the second argument of [ to'] is not a function but an
individual term, the individual term should be raised to be a constant function. By
contrast, if the second argument of [to 0] is of type <e, e>, there is no type raising in the
first argument. One might suggest for the latter case that the type of the second
argument be lowered so that both arguments can be of type e. However, this option is
not feasible. Type lowering is a partial function, and is defined only for those that
undergo type raising from e to <e, e>. Expressions that are inherently functional (e.g.
Ax.x's mother) cannot be lowered. By contrast, type raising is a total function, and is thus
defined for any individual term. This contrast between type raising and lowering is
analogous to the contrast between LIFT and LOWER in Partee (1986). It is a trivial
matter to define a generalized quantifier from an expression of type e, while one cannot
always define an individual term from quantificational NPs of type <et, t>.
In brief, the type of the first argument takes precedence over the type of the
second one, and thus the type of the first argument determines the type of the second
argument. If the type of the first argument is higher than that of the second one, type
raising is licensed in the second argument. By contrast, if the type of the first argument
is lower than that of the second argument, type raising is not licensed in the first
argument. The second component may be called laziness in type raising.l0 7 Type raising
is not licensed by looking ahead. It is licensed only when necessary.
Two questions arise at this point. First, why is it that the first argument of the
particle takes precedence over the second one? Second, why is the additive particle
107 I thank Manfred Krifka for suggesting this term.
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subject to different conditions from the one that applies to conjunction, where we do not
find an asymmetry between the two conjuncts? As for the first question, I believe this is
due to different status of the two arguments. The first argument belongs to the
presupposition, while the second one belongs to the assertion. Given that the first
argument is part of the presupposition, its type is determined before that of the second
argument. Simply speaking, what comes first determines what comes later. The second
question receives an answer in the same context. The first and the second arguments of
the particle (almost always) appear in separate sentences. When we get to the sentence
that contains the additive particle, the processing of the first argument is complete. The
first argument has already been assigned the lowest type, and the second argument
must have the same type. This contrasts with the case of conjunction, where the two
conjuncts occur within one phrase in the same sentence. Since both conjuncts have equal
status, neither of the two takes precedence over the other.
To summarize, this section introduced the last ingredient of the analysis, namely
two principles of economy. I proposed two economy principles, each of which is a
slightly modified version of the existing principles. I first argued that reconstruction is a
tool for changing assertion, but cannot be a tool for changing presupposition. I also
argued that each expression is assigned the lowest type among available meanings, and
additional higher type is provided by type raising. The type raising, however, is not
freely licensed, but only when it is motivated by lexical entries of some expressions, one
of which is the additive particle. How these principles apply to the scopal pattern of the
to-phrase will be shown in the following section.
3.6 Deriving the Scope Pattern
Now that we have all the tools needed, we can go back to the scope facts presented in
section 3.4 and account for them. This section contains four subsections. The first three
address the three factors that affect the scopal behavior of the to-phrase: scrambling, the
kind of function in the preceding context, and ordering restrictions. The final subsection
(section 3.6.4) discusses alternative analyses and points out their problems.
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3.6.1 Scrambling and the Scope of the To-Phrase
This section deals with the effects due to scrambling, which are the anti-reconstruction
and reconstruction effects. For each effect, we start with the basic case with no
scrambling, and then turn to the scrambled sentence.
3.6.1.1 The Anti-Reconstruction Effect
The anti-reconstruction effect arises when a to-phrase is scrambled across a QP. The
staring point is the sentence given in (66), which has no scrambling. As indicated, this
sentence is ambiguous between the weak (reading (i)) and strong reading (reading (ii)).
(66) Motun-sonyen-i Mary-to coahanta. 108
every-boy-Nom Mary-also like
'(Lit.) Every boy likes Mary-also.'
(i) For each boy x, there is someone other than Mary who x likes. (every > also)
(ii) There is someone other than Mary who every boy likes. (also > every)
Under the anaphoric view of the additive particle, the strong reading in (ii) arises when
the pronominal element, i.e. the first argument of to, is a free pronoun. Following the
convention in Heim (1992), I represent the implicit argument as an index next to the
particle. For example, in (66), Mary-to is represented at LF as Mary-to3 for the strong
reading. The utterance context provides a variable assignment function g, which will
map index 3 to an individual given in the context. Under the strong reading, the
sentence is defined iff for each boy x, x likes g(3) and g(3) is not Mary. If defined, the
sentence is true iff for each boy x, x likes Mary.
The weak reading in (i) is a bit complicated since each boy can love different
people. In order to derive this co-variation, the implicit pronoun must be an E-type
108 Although I adopt the anaphoric view of the additive particle, I continue to represent the
readings (e.g. (i) and (ii) in (66)) using existential quantification.
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pronoun (see an example in 3.5.1), and Mary-to is represented at LF as Mary-toth-R-pr.
The whole structure of the sentence is given in (67).
(67) TP (
every boy 1 FocP
Mary / 2
to / VP Foc
THE 
R7 prol t\
t2 like
Semantic computation of this sentence is straightforward, except that the value of the
free variable R7 should be determined by the assignment function. When sentence (70) is
preceded by a sentence like Every boy likes his mother, assigning the value of R7 is trivial.
It will be [Xx.Xy.y is x's mother]. In such a case, the sentence is defined iff for each boy x,
x likes x's mother and x's mother is not Mary. If defined, the sentence is true iff for each
boy x, x likes Mary. A more interesting case is the one where this sentence is preceded
by a pair-list, as illustrated in (68).
(68) Alex-ka Becki-lul, Chris-ka Diana-lul, Edward-ka Franny-lul coahanta.
Alex-N Becki-A Chris-N Diana-A Edward-N Franny-A like
'Alex likes Becki, Chris likes Diana, and Edward likes Franny.'
Motun-sonyen-i Mary-to coahanta.
every-boy-Nom Mary-also like
'(Lit.) Every boy likes Mary-also.'
The weak reading is allowed here, although there is no single expression that can denote
the variable R. What could be the value of R7 in this context? I argue that the pair-list in
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the preceding context invokes a function, which is defined extensionally (Engdahl 1986,
Chierchia 1991). This function will serve as a value of R7.
(69) g(7) = {<Alex, Becki>, <Chris, Diana>, <Edward, Franny>}
Given this value of R7, it is easy to compute the meaning of this sentence: the sentence is
defined iff for each boy x, Mary is not the one who is in the R7-relation with x, and x
likes the one who is in the R7-relation with x. If defined, the sentence is true iff for each
boy x, x likes Mary.
The next case to look at is the scrambled version of (66), given in (70).
(70) Mary-tol [motun-sonyen-i ti coahanta.]
Mary-also every-boy-Nom like
'(Lit.) Mary-also, every boy likes t.'
(i) *For each boy x, there is someone other than Mary who x likes. (*every > also)
(ii) There is someone other than Mary who every boy likes. (also > every)
This sentence exhibits the anti-reconstruction effect. That is, the scrambled to-phrase
does not reconstruct, and thus the ambiguity of (66) has disappeared. Since the strong
reading is the only reading available, the sentence does not form a felicitous discourse
with a preceding pair-list.
In explaining the anti-reconstruction effect, we appeal to an economy principle
introduced in the previous section, namely Reconstruction Economy. What it says is that
reconstruction is not allowed if it only affects presuppositions. Reconstruction must
have effects on truth-conditions. How this principle applies to the current case becomes
clear, if we compare the assertions and presuppositions of the weak and strong readings.
(71) The Weak Reading
a. Assertion: Each boy likes Mary.
b. Presupposition: Each boy likes someone other than Mary.
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(72) The Strong Reading
a. Assertion: Each boy likes Mary.
b. Presupposition: There is someone other than Mary whom every boy likes.
As one can see, the two readings have different presuppositions, but have the same
assertion. Since reconstruction only cares about assertion, reconstruction cannot be
licensed in (70). The two readings are Strawson-Equivalent to each other.
Recall here that possible readings of the sentences containing the particle to
depend on which options (among free, bound, and E-type pronouns) are available for
the pronominal within the additive particle. Now that the to-phrase in (70) has to be
interpreted in the scrambled position, bound and E-type pronouns are ruled out in this
configuration. The bound pronoun or the bound pronoun within the E-type pronoun
cannot be bound by the subject QP in the scrambled position. In particular, the
impossibility of the E-type pronoun explains the absence of the weak reading. Naturally,
a free pronoun is the only option available. At LF, Mary-to is represented as Mary-tos,
and the sentence is defined iff for each boy x, x likes g(5) and g(5) is not Mary. If defined,
the sentence is true iff for each boy x, x likes Mary. This accounts for why the sentence is
not felicitous following a pair-list, since it does not provide a particular individual that
every boy likes.
Given this account based on Reconstruction Economy, one prediction follows,
namely that if the to-phrase contains an element that has effects on truth-conditions,
reconstruction should become possible. 10 9 If the to-phrase contains a quantificational
element instead of a referential expression, the proposition due to reconstruction is not
Strawson-Equivalent to the proposition where there is no reconstruction. This prediction
is borne out, as illustrated in the following example adapted from Park (2002).
109 I thank Danny Fox and Shoichi Takahashi for bringing this prediction to my attension.
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(73) A: Motun-sonyen-i enu-paywu-lul coahay.
every-boy-Nom some-actor-Acc like
'(Lit.) Every boy likes some actor.'
(i) For each boy x, there is an actor that x likes.
(ii) There is an actor that every boy likes.
B: Enu-[kaswu]F-tol [motun-sonyen-i ti coahay.]
some-singer-also every-boy-Nom like
(i) For each boy x, there is a singer (in addition to an actor) that x likes.
(ii) There is an actor (in addition to an actor) that every boy likes.
In B's utterance, the to-phrase contains a QP where focus is on the predicative noun."o
Depending upon how A's utterance is interpreted in the context, B's utterance varies.
Specifically, the scope relations should be parallel in the two utterances (see Park 2002
for more discussion about this). Details aside, the point of (80) is that when the to-phrase
contains a scope-bearing element, reconstruction becomes possible. That is, the sentence
allows ambiguity, unlike the case where the to-phrase contains a referential expression
and exhibits the anti-reconstruction effect. Therefore, this case provides an argument for
Reconstruction Economy.
Before closing this section, we have to discuss another mechanism of variable
binding, namely semantic binding. If the implicit variable within the E-type pronoun
can be bound in the scrambled position by internal binding, the anti-reconstruction
effect should not hold. There seem to be two possibilities here. The first one is to restrict
internal binding to overt variables such as caki, so that this option may not arise to begin
with. However, it is not clear why this should be the case. The second option that I
endorse here is that even though semantic binding is possible for covert variables, some
other reason rules out a pair-list as a felicitous preceding context. As mentioned already,
110 Since focus is only on the noun, we have to revise the entry of the particle so that predicative
noun (or the whole QP) can be an argument of to, as well. Since this issue is not directly relevant
to discussion at this point, I will focus on the available reading rather than on how to derive them
compositionally.
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under semantic binding, the scrambled phrase is interpreted as a function of type <e, e>.
This means that both Mary and the preceding pair-list in (70) should be a function. Now
the problem is that the pair-list is a function that is defined only extensionally and has
no corresponding functional expression of type <e, e>. As will be introduced in section
3.6.2, the additive particle requires a linguistic antecedent in the preceding context, and
the pair-list does not satisfy this requirement.
3.6.1.2 Digression: The Problem of the Formal Link
Related to the account just given, one question arises, namely whether we can justify the
use of an E-type pronoun in the context of a pair-list which does not provide an NP
antecedent. It is well noted in the literature that E-type pronouns require an explicit NP
antecedent. This is dubbed the problem of the formal link (Kadmon 1987, Heim 1990).
The following examples from Heim (1990) illustrate the issue.
(74) a. Every man who has a wife sits next to her.
b. *Every married man sits next to her.
(75) a. John has a wife. She is sitting next to him.
b. John is married. ??She is sitting next to him.
Whether it is an E-type pronoun or a referential pronoun, pronouns seem to require an
NP antecedent in the preceding context. In (74), uttering man who has a wife makes the
wife-function salient, while uttering married man does not. Thus (74b) - unlike (74a) -
cannot mean that for each x such that x is a married man, x sits next to the unique y such
that y is married to x. If it is really the context that provides the value of R within the E-
type pronoun, as Cooper (1979) argues, we expect no difference between (74a) and (74b).
Similarly in (75), uttering John has a wife makes John's wife salient enough to be referred
to by she, whereas uttering John is married does not. In short, in order for a pronoun to be
appropriate, there seems to have to be a syntactic antecedent so that a "formal link" can
be established between the pronoun and the antecedent. Under this position, (74b) is
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bad because there is no antecedent to which the pronoun can be linked. This kind of
contrast led to a syntactic approach (Evans 1977 and recently Elbourne 2002) that argues
against an approach that relies heavily on the context.
Now if the contrast in (74 - 75) is indeed due to the (un)availability of an NP
antecedent, and if pronouns cannot be used in the absence of an NP antecedent, the
proposed analysis runs into a problem. How is it that a pair-list seems to provide a value
for R, although it does not provide an NP antecedent. As an answer to this question, I
argue that pronouns in Korean (unlike English) are a deep anaphor in the sense of
Hankamer & Sag (1976).111 As such, they do not require a linguistic antecedent and the
value of the anaphor is recoverable from the pragmatic environment. One supporting
example is given below.
(76) Na taum-tal-ey kyelhonhay.
I next-month-at getmarried
'I am getting married next month.'
(Ku-nun) chinhan-chinkwu-uy oppa-i-ya.
He-Top close-friend-Gen brother-be-Decl
'He/The man I am marrying is a brother of my close friend.'
In (76), the use of the pronoun is licit without an NP antecedent. This shows that the
presence of an NP antecedent is not a requirement, and that the discourse context alone
can license a pronoun. Note that the pronoun can be null, given that Korean is a pro-
drop language.
Then, what about E-type pronouns? Can they also occur without an antecedent?
This seems to be the case. The following discourse shows that E-type pronouns are
possible in the context of a pair-list.
1 I thank Shoichi Takahashi for discussion on this part.
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(77) Alex-ka Becki-lul, Chris-ka Diana-lul, Edward-ka Franny-lul coahanta.
Alex-N Becki-A Chris-N Diana-A Edward-N Franny-A like
'Alex likes Becki, Chris likes Diana, and Edward likes Franny.'
Alex-nun kunye-wa
Alex-Top she-with
'Alex wants to marry her.'
kyelhonha
get_married
kosipehanta.
want
Unlike in English (the translated sentence is not felicitous in English), the utterance of a
pronoun is appropriate in this context, and the pronoun kunye 'her' refers to Becki, the
one whom Alex likes. Thus it seems that here again, the pair-list in the preceding context
can provide the value of R within the E-type pronoun, where R is defined extensionally.
At the same time, it seems that the pronoun in (77) cannot be a free pronoun. If it were,
speakers would find it difficult to decide whom the pronoun refers to, since there are
three women in the context. Thus (77) supports the present position that E-type
pronouns in Korean are possible without an NP antecedent, unlike those of English.
Based on this, we conclude that the E-type pronoun analysis is tenable for the weak
reading of (66).
3.6.1.3 The Reconstruction Effect
Now we turn to the reconstruction effect, which arises when a QP in the object position
is scrambled across the to-phrase in the subject position. As before, we start with the
sentence with the basic word order.
(78) Mary-to motun-sonyen-ul coahanta.
Marr-also every-boy-Acc like
'(Lit.) Mary-also likes every boy.'
(i) There is someone other than Mary who likes every boy.
(ii) *For each boy x, there is someone other than Mary who likes x.
(also > every)
(*every > also)
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As mentioned already, this sentence is unambiguous. It only allows the strong reading.
The account of the lack of ambiguity is straightforward. Among the three options that
the pronominal within the to-phrase can take, only the free pronoun is a viable choice.
Since the object quantifier cannot bind the pronominal in the subject position, both
bound and E-type pronouns are ruled out. Assuming index 4 for the implicit pronoun,
the sentence is defined iff g(4) is not Mary and g(4) likes every boy. If defined, the
sentence is true iff Mary likes every boy.
The reconstruction effect arises when the object QP is scrambled across the to-
phrase, as illustrated in (79).
(79) Motun-sonyen-ull [Mary-to ti coahanta.]
every-boy-Acc Mary-also like
'(Lit.) Everyboy, Mary-also likes t.'
(i) There is someone other than Mary who likes every boy. (also > every)
(ii) *For each boy x, there is someone other than Mary who likes x. (*every > also)
The reconstruction effect refers to the obligatory reconstruction of the scrambled QP.
Since the scrambled QP can take scope in the scrambled position, we expect the weak
reading in (ii) to be available in (79). Especially, under the principle of economy that I
am arguing for, the QP must take scope in the surface position. The weak and strong
readings are Strawson-Equivalent to each other, and thus there is no motivation for the
QP to reconstruct. Given this reasoning, this sentence seems to be a problem for the
proposed analysis.
I argue, however, that this problem is only apparent. On the contrary, this case
supports the anaphoric view of the additive particle in contrast to the existential view.
The idea I put forward is that the lack of the weak reading in (79) is due to a WCO
violation. In order for the weak reading to be possible, the pronominal element within
the to-phrase must be either a bound or an E-type pronoun. Yet, both options trigger a
WCO violation, since the QP undergoing scrambling "crosses-over" its bindee, namely
the implicit argument of the particle (see also Jacobson 1977, Chierchia 1991, 1993,
Biiring 2004 for cases where implicit variables induce WCO violations). Behind this
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reasoning lies an assumption that scrambling across the to-phrase is an A-bar movement.
I assume that object scrambling, more precisely the second step of object scrambling, can
be either A or A-bar movement, but scrambling across the to-phrase is always an A-bar
movement. In the overt syntax, the to-phrase is in the spec of FocP or has already passed
by that position. Therefore, scrambling across this position becomes an A-bar movement.
The schematic structures in (80) illustrate how this works.
(80) a. [every boyl [[Mary-to-xl] t likes]]l2
b. [every boy, [[Mary-to-the_R_xl] ti likes]]
Variable binding is possible from c-commanding A-positions (Reinhart 1983, Buring
2004), and the scrambled QP in (80) does not qualify as an A-binder. Now that the two
options (out of three) are ruled out, the only option remaining is the pronominal being a
free pronoun, as shown in (81). Of course, this is not a WCO configuration.
(81) [every boyl [[Mary-to-y3] ti likes]]
Sentence (79) under the structure in (81) is defined iff g(3) is not Mary and g(3) likes
every boy. If defined, the sentence is true iff Mary likes every boy. This is the strong
reading. Notice that the strong reading is derived although the QP is interpreted in the
scrambled position. A free pronoun is a referring expression, and as such there is no
scopal interaction between the QP every boy and the to-phrase. Whether the scrambled
QP reconstructs or not, we get the same reading. This shows that the scrambled QP does
not have to undergo reconstruction in order for the strong reading to be available. The
strong reading is not due to the obligatory reconstruction of the QP, but due to the
implicit argument being a free pronoun. Given this, the name 'reconstruction effect' is a
misnomer. Now it follows naturally that a pair-list preceding (79) does not form a
felicitous discourse. The pair-list does not provide a salient individual that will serve as
an antecedent of the free pronoun.
112 Although I am assuming that object scrambling is a two-step movement, this structure does
not represent the first step of scrambling (section 3.5.2). The first step is an A-movement, thus it
does not matter for the issue of WCO.
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At the same time, this case provides an argument against the existential view.
Under the existential view, there is an existential quantifier within the to-phrase. Thus
sentence (79) is expected to have the following interpretation.
(82) The sentence is defined iff for each boy x, there is some y such that y is not Mary
and y likes x. If defined, the sentence is true iff for each boy x, Mary likes x. That
is, for each boy x, there is someone other than Mary who likes x.
As we know, this reading is not available for (79). If it were, (79) would be felicitous
following a pair-list, since a pair-list satisfies the definedness condition. Furthermore,
under the existential view, the weak reading must be the only reading available, since
the QP does not reconstruct in line with the economy principle. Then, in order to derive
the strong reading, the existential view has to stipulate that the scrambled QP somehow
obligatorily reconstructs in violation of the economy principle. Once we do so, however,
we lose the account of the anti-reconstruction effect in (70). By contrast, the anaphoric
view can derive the strong reading without real reconstruction of the object QP. This is
another argument (in addition to the difficulty of accommodation) which shows that the
anaphoric view is superior to the existential view. The anaphoric approach rules out the
weak reading by appealing to WCO, and derives the strong reading without violating
the economy principle, whereas the existential view needs a stipulation that requires a
reconstruction, which incurs a violation of the economy principle.
3.6.2. The Role of Context: Pair-Lists vs. Natural Functions
This section presents an account of the effect due to the preceding context. I showed in
section 3.4.2 that in some cases, specifically if the preceding context provides a natural
function instead of a pair-list, both reconstruction and anti-reconstruction effects seem to
disappear. First, see the contrast between (83) and (84).
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(83) Becki-lul Alex-ka, Diana-lul Chris-ka, Franny-lul Edward-ka coahanta.
Becki-A Alex-N Diana-A Chris-N Franny-A Edward-N like
'(Lit.) Becki, Alex likes t, Diana, Chris likes t, and Franny, Edward likes t.'
#Mary-tol [motun-sonyen-i ti coahanta.]
Mary-also every-boy-Nom like
'(Lit.) Mary-also, every boy likes t.'
(84) Caki-emeni-lull [motun-sonyen-i ti coahanta.]
self-mother-Acc every-boy-Nom like
'(Lit.) Self's mother, every boy likes t.'
Mary-tol [motun-sonyen-i ti coahanta.]
Mary-also every-boy-Nom like
'(Lit.) Mary-also, every boy likes t.'
'For each boy x, x likes his mother, and x likes MaryF, too.'
The discourse in (83) illustrates the anti-reconstruction effect. In the second sentence of
(83), the scrambled to-phrase does not reconstruct, and only the strong reading is
available. Since the preceding pair-list does not satisfy the presupposition of the strong
reading, this discourse is not felicitous. The discourse in (84), by contrast, is felicitous
although there is no one whom every boy likes and thus it is expected to be infelicitous.
One might suggest that the to-phrase somehow reconstructs in this case, because of the
bound-variable in the preceding context. This is a possible analysis, but it runs into a
problem once more data is taken into account (see section 3.6.4 for the problem of this
alternative account).
The account I am advancing here is that the phrase caki-emeni 'his mother' in (84)
invokes a natural function, and this explains the seeming reconstruction of the to-phrase
without adopting real reconstruction. Let's be more specific. In the first sentence of (84),
caki-emeni 'his mother' is interpreted as a function of type <e, e> (due to semantic
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binding). This function of type <e, e> becomes the first argument of the particle to. In
order to meet Type Parallelism, then, Mary in the second sentence of (84) undergoes type
raising, again due to internal binding. It denotes a constant function, which maps all
elements in the domain onto Mary (Ax.Mary). This type raising is licit since it has a
motivation. Under this option, the discourse is informally read as follows.
(85) The mother-function is a function f such that each boy x likes f(x).
The Mary-function is a function g such that each boy x likes g(x) in addition to f(x).
Note that the weak reading/co-variation is due to type raising of Mary and caki-emeni
'his mother', not to their reconstruction. The following tree represents the structure of
the second sentence of (84) in this context.
(86) TP O(
1 TP
4 Mary to /
THE / every bov
tP
t3(2) like
Since the first two arguments of the particle are functional terms, the entry of to is
adjusted to be compatible with that. The entry is repeated from section 3.5.3.
(87) Ito'] = f<e, e>.Xg<e, >.P<ee, t>: f # g & P(f) = 1.P(g) =1
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Now the value of the top node is given in (88). See the appendix for details.
(88) [ (Di is defined if and only if Xye.y's mother # Xye.Mary & for each boy x, x likes
x's mother. If defined, [(O)] is true if and only if for each boy x, x like's Mary.
In (88), one of the definedness conditions is that the two functions, namely the mother-
function and Mary-function are different. One might think that this condition is not
strong enough, since Mary may not stand in the mother-relation to any boy in a
context.ll3 If so, simply saying that the two functions are different may be too weak,
since two functions are different whenever there is at least one input for which the
values defined by the functions are different. We might need to require that for each boy
x, the value of the mother-function applied to x is different from the value of the Mary-
function applied to x. I believe, however, that we do not need a stronger condition here.
In some contexts, Mary can indeed be some boy's mother, as the value in (88) allows.
Imagine a context where one of the boys happens to be Mary's son and. For her son, the
value of the mother-function and the value of the Mary-function are one and the same.
In this context, one can still felicitously utter (84).
Two questions arise at this point. The first question is concerned with the other
mechanism for variable binding, namely syntactic reconstruction. Specifically, why is it
that we opt for the internal binding in (84)? What goes wrong if the phrase caki-emei 'his
mother' undergoes syntactic binding (via reconstruction) instead of semantic binding?
Second, we assumed that Mary in (84) is type-raised due to the preceding functional
term. If so, why is type raising not possible in (83) where the preceding context is a pair-
list, which is also a kind of function? Let's look at each of these in turn.
If caki-emeni 'his mother' reconstructs for syntactic binding, it is interpreted as a
bound variable individual rather than a function. Since the phrase caki-emeni 'his
mother' eventually denotes an individual, there is no reason for Mary in the following
sentence to be type-raised. It will be an individual term of type e. Now if this is
combined with the fact that the scrambled to-phrase does not reconstruct (the anti-
113 Thanks to Jon Gajewski for pointing this out to me.
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reconstruction effect), the problem becomes evident. The second sentence only has the
strong reading, and thus requires there to be someone other than Mary whom every boy
likes. The problem is that under the option of syntactic binding, the preceding context
does not satisfy this requirement. Therefore, the discourse is expected to be bad due to a
presupposition failure, contrary to fact.
This reasoning receives further support in the following example, where the first
sentence does not have scrambling. The first sentence in (89) would have the same LF
representation as the first sentence of (84) under the reconstruction option. Unlike (84),
this discourse is not felicitous, which confirms that syntactic binding does not account
for the felicity of (84).
(89) Motun-sonyen-i caki-emeni-lul coahanta.
every-boy-Nom self-mother-Acc like
'(Lit.) Self's mother, every boy likes t.'
#Mary-to, [motun-sonyen-i ti coahanta.]
Mary-also every-boy-Nom like
'(Lit.) Mary-also, every boy likes t.'
Given the current account, this case provides an argument against variable binding via
syntactic reconstruction. It does not argue against syntactic binding in general, but it is
enough to show that we cannot only have syntactic binding. We need semantic binding,
as well.
Finally, in order to complete this argument, we have to answer why caki-emeni
'his mother' cannot be interpreted as a function in its base position.ll4 If it were possible,
there would be no presupposition failure in (84) under the option of syntactic binding.
Similarly, the discourse in (89) would be felicitous exactly like (84). This shows that we
have to prevent caki-emeni 'his mother' from being a function in its original position. I
claim that this is due to an economy principle. In (84), if caki-emeni 'his mother' is bound
114 Thanks to Danny Fox and Irene Heim for bringing up this question.
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by undergoing syntactic reconstruction, why does it bother to do internal binding? An
economy principle would not allow this. Similarly in (89), binding is possible to begin
with, and thus there is no reason for the phrase caki-emeni to leave a complex trace.
The second question is why and how pair-lists are different from natural
functions. Given the contrast between (83) and (84), a pair-list seems different from a
natural function in that only the latter can motivate type raising of Mary from e to <e, e>.
If a pair-list were able to do so, there should be no difference between (83) and (84). If a
pair-list is a special kind of function that can be defined by extension (see section 3.6.1;
see also Engdahl 1986, Chierchia 1991), this is strange. Where does this contrast come
from?
One answer to this question can be given by requiring that the implicit argument
of the particle to needs a linguistic antecedent. 5 The implicit argument of the particle to
does not just share the type with the explicit argument, but it needs to be linguistically
present, as well.116 Again, this is a natural move, given the difficulty of accommodation
with the additive particle. For example, if Mary is of type e, the particle requires an overt
expression of the same type in the context. Analogously, if Mary is of type <e, e>, an
overt expression of the same type should be available in the context. With this in mind,
we go back to (82) and (83). In (83), if Mary were of type <e, e>, it would require an
antecedent of the same type. But in the preceding context, there is no expression of that
type. We might be able to derive a function (defined extensionally) from the preceding
list, but the sentence is not of type <e, e> but of type <s, t> as a proposition. Now
115 I thank Kai von Fintel for suggesting this idea.
116 There are some well-known exceptions to this requirement, as illustrated in (i).
(i) a. I found out that my neighbor is German, too.
b. Do you know that your neighbor is German, too.
(ia) can be felicitously uttered in a context where it is not explicitly mentioned that the speaker is
German. The same is true of (ib). The speaker does not have to say that the hearer is German. In
such a context, of course, both speaker and hearer share the relevant information, namely that the
speaker in (ia) and the hearer in (ib) are German. Otherwise, the discourse becomes infelicitous
and leads to a question like Who else is German?. I assume that in these cases, the antecedents are
very salient (the speaker or the hearer), and this is why the additive particle is felicitous without
an antecedent. Given this, the cases in (i) do not pose a problem for the requirement of the
linguistic antecedent. I thank Irene Heim for pointing this out to me.
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compare this to the case of (83), where we do have an antecedent of type <e, e>, namely
caki-emeni 'his mother.' In contrast to the pair-list, the natural function can satisfy the
requirement of linguistic antecedents of the same type. For this reason, Mary in (85) has
no other choice but to be of type e, and the pair-list does not satisfy the presupposition.
Thus the account of the infelicity of (82) remains the same as given in the previous
section.
Another point that follows from this discussion is that the pronominal element
within the particle to has a stronger requirement than regular pronouns in Korean. In
earlier discussion (section 3.6.1.2), I argued that pronouns in Korean are a deep anaphor,
and as such they do not require a linguistic antecedent. Here I claim that unlike those
pronouns, the first argument of the additive particle requires a linguistic antecedent, and
thus it is distinguished from regular pronouns. Lastly, I note that a similar contrast
between a pair-list and a natural function is noted in Hebrew.l17 Sharvit (1999b) notices
that in Hebrew, resumptive pronouns could range over natural functions, but not over
pair-lists. Under her assumption that resumptive pronouns require salient discourse
antecedents, this means that natural functions can be antecedents of pronouns, whereas
pair-lists cannot, in parallel to our case.
Now we turn to the obviation of the reconstruction effect in the presence of a
natural function. The contrast between a pair-list and a natural function is shown in (90)
and (91).
(90) Bill-ul Amy-ka, Dave-lul Cathy-ka, Fred-lul Emily-ka coahanta.
Bill-A Amy-N Dave-A Cathy-N Fred-A Emily-N like
'(Lit.) Bill, Amy likes t, Dave, Cathy likes t, and Fred, Emily likes t.'
#Motun-sonyen-ull [Mary-to ti coahanta.]
every-boy-Acc Mary-also like
'(Lit.) Every boy, Mary-also likes t.'
117 I thank Yael Sharvit for bringing this to my attention.
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(91) Motun-sonyen-ull [caki-emeni-ka tl coahanta.]
every-boy-Acc self-mother-Nom like
'(Lit.) Every boy, self's mother likes t.'
Motun-sonyen-ull [Mary-to tl coahanta.]
every-boy-Acc Mary-also like
'(Lit.) Every boy, Mary-also likes t.'
'For each boy x, x's mother likes x, and MaryF likes x, too.'
In (90), the scrambled QP appears to obligatorily reconstruct, whereas in (91) it seems to
take scope in the surface position. Although the preceding contexts in both (90) and (91)
do not provide a salient individual, (91) is a felicitous discourse, unlike (90).
The obviation of the reconstruction effect in (91) receives the same account as
that of the anti-reconstruction effect in (84). Thanks to semantic binding, caki-emeni 'his
mother' is interpreted as a function of type <e, e>. By Type Parallelism, Mary in the
following sentence undergoes type raising to be a constant function. The discourse in
(91) is informally read as follows.
(92) The mother-function is a function f such that for each boy x, f(x) likes x.
The Mary-function is a function g such that for each boy x, g(x) in addition to f(x) likes x.
Note here that the pronominal within the to-phrase is a free pronoun that is seeking an
antecedent of type <e, e>. Since it is a free pronoun, there is no binding relation between
the scrambled QP and this pronoun. The pronoun in the preceding sentence (caki-emeni
'his mother') is internally bound, not by the scrambled QP. For this reason, there is no
WCO violation in (91) although scrambling across the to-phrase is an A-bar movement.
Contrast this with the case in (90), where the second sentence does not allow the weak
reading, which is attributed to a WCO violation. Although we are dealing with the same
string of words in (90) and (91), it depends upon the preceding context whether there
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will be a WCO violation. The structure of the second sentence of (91) is given in (93)
along with the semantic value of the top node in (94). In (93), scrambling of the QP is
two-step. It first moves to [Spec, AgroP], which is an A-position, and then undergoes an
A-bar scrambling. Note that the argument of the functional trace is exempt from WCO,
since it is co-indexed with the c-commanding trace in [Spec, AgroP]. See the appendix
for a detailed calculation.
(93) TP 
every boy
1 TP
1P
t3 like
(94) 10] is defined if and only if Xye.y's mother # Xye.Mary and for each boy x, x's
mother likes x. If defined, [O] is true iff for each boy x, Mary likes x.
Note also that while comparing (90) and (91), we find the same contrast between a pair-
list and a natural function as noted earlier. If a pair-list is interpreted as a function and
Mary undergoes type raising, there would be no difference between the two discourses.
This again shows that pair-lists cannot be referred to by the free pronoun within the to-
phrase, whereas natural functions can. In (90), there is no functional expression that can
be an antecedent of the pronominal within the particle.
To recapitulate, this section showed why the presence of a functional term in the
preceding context obviates the reconstruction and anti-reconstruction effects. It turned
out that both the to-phrase and the QP are interpreted in the scrambled position, but
internal binding and type raising makes them look as if they undergo reconstruction.
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The data also proved the need of the semantic binding, which makes correct predictions,
unlike syntactic binding.
3.6.3. Ordering Restrictions
This section offers an account of the ordering restriction between functional terms and
individual terms. When the to-phrase containing a functional term is scrambled, an
individual term in the preceding context cannot satisfy the presupposition. The data is
repeated in (95) and (96) for convenience.
(95) Mary-lull [motun-sonyen-i
Mary-Acc every-boy-Nom
'(Lit.) Mary, every boy likes t.'
#Caki-emeni-tol [motun-sonyen-i
self-mother-also every-boy-Nom
'(Lit.) Self's-mother-also, every boy likes t.'
ti coahanta.]
like
ti coahanta.]
like
'For each boy x, x likes Mary, and x likes x's motherF, too.'
(96) Motun-sonyen-ull [Mary-ka
every-boy-Acc Mary-Nom
'(Lit.) Every boy, Mary likes t.'
#Motun-sonyen-ull [caki-emeni-to
every-boy-Acc self-mother-also
'(Lit.) Every boy, self's-mother-also likes t.'
tl coahanta.]
like
ti coahanta.]
like
'For each boy x, Mary likes x, and x's motherp likes x, too.'
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The cases in (95) and (96) contrast with those in (84) and (91) in the previous section,
repeated below as (97) and (98). Here a functional term satisfies the presupposition of a
to-phrase that contains an individual term, which undergoes type raising.
(97) Caki-emeni-lull [motun-sonyen-i
self-mother-Acc every-boy-Nom
'(Lit.) Self's mother, every boy likes t.'
Mary-tol [motun-sonyen-i
Mary-also every-boy-Nom
'(Lit.) Mary-also, every boy likes t.'
ti coahanta.]
like
ti coahanta.]
like
'For each boy x, x likes his mother, and x likes MaryF, too.'
(98) Motun-sonyen-ull [caki-emeni-ka
every-boy-Acc self-mother-Nom
'(Lit.) Every boy, self's mother likes t.'
Motun-sonyen-ull [Mary-to
every-boy-Acc Mary-also
'(Lit.) Every boy, Mary-also likes t.'
tl coahanta.]
like
tl coahanta.]
like
'For each boy x, x's mother likes x, and MaryF likes x, too.'
The contrast between the two cases illustrates how type raising is constrained by an
economy principle. Given the principle that there is no type raising without a motivation
(see section 3.5.3.2), the infelicity of (95) and (96) straightforwardly follows. In the first
sentence of (95) and (96), Mary is interpreted as an individual of type e. At this point,
there is no motivation for type raising, and thus no type raising takes place. Then the
second sentence follows, where the to-phrase contains a functional term, namely caki-
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emeni 'his mother.' In both (95) and (96), the functional interpretation is the only choice
available for the phrase. In (95), the to-phrase does not reconstruct for economy reasons,
thus caki-emeni 'his mother' within the to-phrase cannot be interpreted as a bound
variable. In (96), scrambling across the to-phrase is an A-bar movement. If caki 'his' is
interpreted as a bound variable, it would incur a WCO violation. It must be a functional
term, which is internally bound. Now see that the first and the second arguments of the
particle have different types. The former is of type e, and the latter is of type <e, e>, and
there is no way to adjust different types. The failure to satisfy Type Parallelism explains
the infelicity of the discourse. In order to fix the infelicity, the individual term in the first
sentences need to be replaced by a functional term:
(99) Caki-apeci-lull [motun-sonyen-i
self-father-Acc every-boy-Nom
'(Lit.) Self's father, every boy likes t.'
Caki-emeni-toi [motun-sonyen-i
self-mother-also every-boy-Nom
'(Lit.) Self's-mother-also, every boy likes t.'
ti coahanta.]
like
ti coahanta.]
like
'For each boy x, x likes x's father, and x likes x's motherF, too.'
(100) Motun-sonyen-ull [caki-apeci-ka
every-boy-Acc self-father-Nom
'(Lit.) Every boy, self's father likes t.'
Motun-sonyen-ull [caki-emeni-to
every-boy-Acc self-mother-also
'(Lit.) Every boy, self's-mother-also likes t.'
ti
ti
'For each boy x, x's father likes x, and x's motherF likes x, too.'
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coahanta.]
like
coahanta.]
like
All the occurrences of caki-emeni 'his mother' and caki-apeci 'his father' in the above are
instances of a function. There is no type mismatch, and the discourses are felicitous.
Related to the ambiguity between an individual and a function, I note that some
expressions can undergo type raising even without a motivation.ll8 One such example
would be nouns like The President. In the following discourse, an individual term
precedes a function, but the discourse seems felicitous, even though it may not be as
good as (99) and (100).
(101) Taythonglyeng-ul [motun-sonyen-i tl conkyenghanta.]
President-Acc every-boy-Nom respect
'(Lit.) The President (of his country), every boy respects t.'
Caki-emeni-to, [motun-sonyen-i ti conkyenghanta.]
self-mother-also every-boy-Nom respect
'(Lit.) Self's-mother-also, every boy respects t.'
'For each boy x, x respects the President, and x respects x's motherF, too.'
I assume that this is not a real violation of the economy principle on type raising. It is
possible that unlike other individual terms, these expressions are really ambiguous
between type e and type <e, e>. Or they are inherently relational/functional, and thus
contain an implicit argument.
Finally, we turn to an interesting fact about the ordering restriction. Surprisingly,
there is no ordering restriction of the same kind in sentences with a base order. The
following discourse is felicitous, although an individual term precedes a functional term.
118 I thank Sabine Iatridou and Shigeru Miyagawa for bringing this kind of data to my attention.
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(102) Motun-sonyen-i Mary-lul coahanta.
every-boy-Nom Mary-Acc like
'Every boy likes Mary.'
Motun-sonyen-i caki-emeni-to coahanta.
every-boy-Nom self-mother-also like
'Every boy likes his mother, too.'
'For each boy x, x likes Mary, and x likes x's motherF, too.'
As in the previous cases, Mary in the first sentence has no reason to be a function. If caki-
emeni 'his mother' in the second is a function of type <e, e>, this discourse should incur a
violation of Type Parallelism, and thus be infelicitous as (95) and (96). Contrary to this
expectation, this discourse is perfect, which shows that caki-emeni 'his mother' in the
second sentence is not a functional term. This means that the phrase caki-emeni 'his
mother' does not have to be a function. In fact, it cannot be a function in its original
position. Recall the claim made in the previous section, which says that if the bound
variable is in situ, semantic binding is not an option. The ordering restriction confirms
the same point. In the second sentence of (102), if caki 'his' is interpreted as a bound
variable, Mary in the first sentence can be an antecedent of a free pronoun within the to-
phrase. Type Parallelism is satisfied, since both are of type e.
In closing the section, I would like to point out that the ordering restriction
provides another supporting argument for the anaphoric view of the additive particle
and semantic binding. Note first that under the existential view, the ordering restriction
would be an arbitrary distinction. Why is it that a function can satisfy the presupposition
that requires an individual (e.g. there is someone other than Mary), while an individual
cannot satisfy the presupposition that requires a function (e.g. there is somefunction other
than the mother-function). Thus the contrast between the discourses in (95-96) and those in
(97-98) would remain as a puzzle. Type Parallelism, which is crucial in accounting for
the ordering restriction, is motivated by the anaphoric view, but not by the existential
view.
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Next, the syntactic binding wrongly predicts that the discourse in (95) would be
felicitous. Suppose that in (95) caki-emeni 'his mother' undergoes reconstruction in
violation of Reconstruction Economy. Under that option, the phrase contains a bound
variable, and as such it is an expression of type e. Since it has the same type as Mary in
the preceding context, Type Parallelism is satisfied. There is nothing wrong with this
discourse. Specifically, the syntactic binding predicts that there will be no difference
between (95) and (102). The first sentences of (95) and (102) are the same proposition,
because it does not matter whether Mary is interpreted in the scrambled position or in
the trace position. If syntactic binding takes place, the second sentences are the same, as
well, at LF. This shows that in order to account for contrast due to scrambling with
respect to the ordering restriction, semantic binding should be preferred over syntactic
binding.
3.6.4. Alternatives?
The previous sections covered all the data presented in section 3.4. This final subsection
considers a few alternative analyses, and rejects them.
One alternative analysis that 'almost' works is an account based on some kind of
scope parallelism. Fox (2000) proposes a constraint called Parallelism, which ensures
that two sentences involved in ellipsis have the same representations at LF. Specifically,
the two sentences have identical scope relations, as exemplified in (103).
(103) a. A boy admires every teacher. (3 > V) ( V > 3)
b. A boy admires every teacher. Mary does, too. (3 > V) (* V > 3)
As indicated, the sentence in (103a) is ambiguous; but in the ellipsis environment given
in (103b), the ambiguity disappears. Fox argues that Parallelism, combined with his
Scope Economy, accounts for this contrast. The account is as follows. The elided
sentence of (103b) has identical meanings under surface and inverse scope, therefore
Scope Economy does not license QR of every teacher across Mary. Since inverse scope is
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not allowed in the elided sentence, Parallelism blocks inverse scope in the antecedent
sentence as well. Another proposal made in Asher, Hardt, and Busquets (2001) argues
that a parallelism constraint needs to be defined at the level of discourse. Their proposal
is made in a different framework from the one that this work is adopting (Segmented
Discourse Representation Theory), but the gist of the proposal can be maintained within
different frameworks.
Now on the basis of these proposals, one might argue for Scope Parallelism
between the two sentences one of which contains the particle to. In combination with
some economy principle (e.g. no reconstruction without a motivation), this alternative
analysis seems to account for quite a few cases.
(104) Caki-emeni-lull [motun-sonyen-i
self-mother-Acc every-boy-Nom
'(Lit.) Self's mother, every boy likes t.'
Mary-tol [motun-sonyen-i
Mary-also every-boy-Nom
'(Lit.) Mary-also, every boy likes t.'
ti coahanta.]
like
ti coahanta.]
like
'For each boy x, x likes his mother, and x likes MaryF, too.'
(105) Motun-sonyen-ull [caki-emeni-ka
every-boy-Acc self-mother-Nom
'(Lit.) Every boy, self's mother likes t.'
Motun-sonyen-ull [Mary-to
every-boy-Acc Mary-also
'(Lit.) Every boy, Mary-also likes t.'
ti coahanta.]
like
tl coahanta.]
like
'For each boy x, x's mother likes x, and MaryF likes x, too.'
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The above cases are explained in the following manner. First, in the first sentence of
(104), the scrambled phrase undergoes reconstruction for variable binding (suppose that
this account does not adopt semantic binding). This reconstruction is allowed since it
has a motivation, namely variable binding. In order to satisfy the parallelism constraint,
the to-phrase in the second sentence undergoes reconstruction, too. If reconstructed, the
subject QP takes scope over the to-phrase, which accounts for the obviation of the anti-
reconstruction effect. Similar explanation can be made for (105). The scrambled QP in
the first sentence takes scope in the surface position so that the variable can be bound.
Then, Scope Parallelism requires that the scrambled QP in the second sentence also stay
in the surface position. This accounts for the absence of the reconstruction effect in
(105).119
This analysis, however, runs into a problem in other cases, one of which is the
following.
(106) Motun-sonyen-ull [Mary-ka ti coahanta.]
every-boy-Acc Mary-Nom like
'(Lit.) Every boy, Mary likes t.'
#Motun-sonyen-ull [caki-emeni-to ti coahanta.]
every-boy-Acc self-mother-also like
'(Lit.) Every boy, self's-mother-also likes t.'
'For each boy x, Mary likes x, and x's motherF likes x, too.'
In the first sentence of (106), the scope relation is the same irrespective of reconstruction,
thus Scope Economy does not allow reconstruction of the scrambled QP. In the second
sentence, the scrambled QP does not undergo reconstruction either, since it can bind the
119 Note that the similarity between this alternative and the parallelism account of the scope facts
is only apparent, given the different directionality. In the current case, the first sentence
determines the scope relation of the following sentence, whereas in the ellipsis case, the second
sentence affects the interpretation of the first sentence.
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variable in the scrambled position (recall that this will be a WCO violation under the
proposed account). Then, the parallelism constraint is satisfied, and the discourse is
predicted to be good, contrary to fact. This shows that the account based on scope
parallelism cannot cover all the data.
Another possibility is to assume different scrambling positions, namely A and A-
bar, which are associated with non-reconstruction and reconstruction respectively. If a
scrambled phrase occupies an A-position, it does not undergo reconstruction, which
would account for the anti-reconstruction effect. If a scrambled phrase occupies an A-bar
position, it does undergo reconstruction, which would account for the reconstruction
effect. This account is problematic in two ways. First, A and A-bar distinction does not
always match with non-reconstruction and reconstruction. Furthermore, reconstruction
effects seem to be found with all types of movement (Sportiche 2003, among others).
Second, as mentioned many times, the reconstruction and the anti-reconstruction effects
are not categorical. Functional terms in the preceding context obviate these effects. If a
position is always associated with reconstruction, there is no way to account for the case
in which some phrase in that position takes surface scope.
The last alternative to consider is the use of the particle to as a discourse particle
(see footnote 86). When it functions as a discourse particle, it takes a sentential scope,
which might be able to account for its scope pattern. For example, the following sentence
is hard to understand under any view of the anaphoric particle.
(107) Mary-ka John-ul coahanta. John-to Mary-lul coahanta.
Mary-Nom John-Acc like John-also Mary-Acc like
'Mary likes John, and John likes Mary, too.'
In the second sentence, the additive particle is attached to the subject position, and
triggers a presupposition that there is someone x other than John who likes Mary.
Although the preceding sentence does not provide any individual who likes Mary, the
discourse is absolutely felicitous. It seems that the property of to as a discourse particle
accounts for the felicity of this discourse. The particle in the second sentence is similar to
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some kind of conjunction, and the second sentence amounts to 'It is also the case that
John likes Mary.'
Although the particle does function as a discourse particle in some cases, this
hypothesis does not work for the facts we are looking at. Consider the following
sentence, which exhibits the anti-reconstruction effect.
(108) Mary-tol [motun-sonyen-i ti coahanta.]
Mary-also every-boy-Nom like
'(Lit.) Mary-also, every boy likes t.'
(i) *For each boy x, there is someone other than Mary who x likes. (*every > also)
(ii) There is someone other than Mary who every boy likes. (also > every)
The reading available under the discourse particle hypothesis would be something like
'It is also the case that every boy likes Mary.' If the preceding context contains some
related text, this sentence should be felicitous in that context, as in (107). This, however,
is not the case. As mentioned several times by now, this sentence is not felicitous when
preceded by a pair-list. This shows that the discourse particle hypothesis makes too
strong a prediction. It makes the particle to felicitous in virtually all contexts.
3.7 Implications for English
This section touches upon parallel facts in English. Although we cannot test the same
array of facts due to the lack of scrambling in English, basic cases exhibit the same
pattern. Look at the following sentences.
(109) a. Everyone likes MaryF, too.
b. MaryF also likes everyone.
Remember that additive particles in English do not form a constituent with the focused
element, and further that too and also have different distributional properties. Despite
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these differences, we get the same pattern in terms of semantics. The sentence in (109a)
allows both weak and strong reading, and thus cam be felicitous in two contexts. Either
there is someone other than Mary whom everyone likes (strong reading), or each boy
loves different individuals although they all love Mary (weak reading). For example, it is
felicitous to say 'Everyone likes his mother, and everyone likes MaryF, too.' By contrast,
the one in (109b) does not allow the weak reading. That is, co-variation is not possible,
and it always requires there to be someone other than Mary who likes everyone.
Let's think about how these readings arise in English. It is easy to derive the two
readings in (109a). Under the anaphoric view of the additive particle, the strong reading
arises when the implicit pronoun is a free pronoun, whereas the weak reading arises
when the implicit pronoun is an E-type pronoun that contains a bound variable, as is
done for Korean. Now the issue is how to rule out the weak reading in (109b). Here we
can turn to either Scope Economoy (combined with Strawson-Equivalence) or a WCO
violation. Both devices would do the same job, but it seems to be the economy principle
that is working here. The object quantifier in (109b) needs to undergo a short QR due to
type mismatch, but it cannot undergo a long QR across the additive particle that
associates with the subject. The reading due to the long QR is Strawson-Equivalent to
the reading that obtains without it. Since economy disallows QR of everyone to begin
with, the possibility of a WCO violation does not arise. WCO will be valid only when the
QR takes place. So we conclude that the facts in English also follow from the proposed
analysis.
3.8 Parallels between Particles To and Man
This section deals with some parallel facts between the two particles to and man.
Although the two particles behave differently with respect to scopal interaction, they do
share quite a few syntactic properties.
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3.8.1 Base-Generation vs. Movement
It was shown in the previous chapter that the man-phrase is generated via two strategies,
namely base-generation and movement, which correlate with the absence or presence of
case markers. This section shows that the same is true of the to-phrase. The bare to-
phrase at an S-initial position can be generated in its surface position, or have gotten
there via some movement.
(110) a. John-tol [motun-salam-i el coahanta.]
John-also every-person-Nom like
'(Lit.) John-also, everyone likes e.'
'There is someone other than John whom everyone likes.'
b. John-hako-tol [motun-salam-i tl akswuhayssta.]
John-with-also every-person-Nom shook_hands
'(Lit.) Also with John, everyone shook hands t.'
'There is someone other than John with whom everyone shook hands.'
In (110a), the empty element is marked as e, since it can be either a trace of scrambling or
a pro that is co-indexed with the DP in the to-phrase. In the latter case, the to-phrase is
base-generated in its surface position, more specifically, in the spec of FocP. In (110b), by
contrast, the empty element is a trace of scrambling. Under the assumption that PP is
generated within VP, the S-initial to-phrase in (110b) must have undergone movement to
the S-initial position. Note that there is no difference between the two cases in terms of
scope relations. In both cases, the to-phrase takes scope over the subject QP, and the
account given for (110a) is extended to (110b).
Arguments for this distinction between the two strategies come from resumption
and island tests, as discussed in the previous chapter for man (section 2.8). First, only the
base-generation structure allows the empty element to be replaced by an overt pronoun.
This means that resumption is possible in (110a), but not in (110b). This is the case, as
shown below.
184
(111) a. John-tol [motun-salam-i ku-lull coahanta.]
John-also every-person-Nom he-Acc like
'(Lit.) John-also, everyone likes him.'
'There is someone other than John whom everyone likes.'
b. *John-hako-tol [motun-salam-i ku-hakol akswuhayssta.]
John-with-also every-person-Nom he-with shook_hands
'(Lit.) Also with John, everyone shook hands with him.'
Second, the bare to-phrase in the S-initial position is not subject to island constraints. The
sentences in (112a) and (112b) illustrate Complex NP and Adjunct Islands respectively,
where the to-phrase associates with an empty element within an island.
(112) a. W&P-tol Mary-ka [el ilk-un salam-ul] chass-ulswuiss-ess-ta.
W&P-also Mary-Nom read-Rel person-Acc find-can-Past-Decl
'(Lit.) War and Peace-also, Mary could find a person who read e.'
(i) There is a book x other than War and Peace s.t. Mary could find a person who read x.
(ii) *Mary could find a person who also read War and Peace.
b. John-tol [Mary-ka el chwuchenhayss-ulttay] motun-salam-i chansenghayssta.
John-also Mary-N nominated-when every-person-N agreed
'(Lit.) John-also, when Mary nominated e, everyone approved of it.'
(i) There is someone x other than John s.t when Mary nominated x, everyone approved of it.
(ii) When Mary nominated John in addition to someone else, everyone approved of it.
In (112a), the to-phrase takes scope over the whole sentence, not just over the relative
clause. If it takes scope only over the relative clause, it implies a violation of island
condition on scrambling. Similarly, in (112b), the S-initial to-phrase can take scope over
the whole clause, which again confirms that the bare to-phrase is not subject to island
constraints. This sentence is ambiguous, as indicated, since the to-phrase can undergo
scrambling within the adjunct clause.
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The non-sensitivity to islands disappears if the to-phrase contains a postposition.
This is expected since the structure is generated via movement, namely scrambling.
(113) a. Mary-ka [John-i Sumi-ekey-to malhaycwu-n pimil]-ul alkoissta.
Mary-Nom John-N Sumi-to-also tell-Rel secret-Acc know
'Mary knows the secret that John told also to Sumi.'
b. *Sumi-ekey-tol Mary-ka [John-i tl malhaycwun-n pimil]-ul alkoissta.
Sumi-to-also Mary-N John-Nom tell-Rel secret-Acc know
'(Lit.) Also to Sumi, Mary knows the secret that John told t.'
(114) a. [Mary-ka John-hako-to akswuhayss-ulttay] motun-salam-i nolassta.
Mary-N John-with-also shook_hands-when every-person-N was_surprised
'When Mary shook hands with JohnF, too, everyone was surprised.'
b. John-hako-toi [Mary-ka ti akswuhayss-ulttay] motun-salam-i nolassta.
John-with-also Mary-N shook_hands-when every-person-N was_surprised.
'(Lit.) Also with John, when Mary shook hands t, everyone was surprised.'
(i) When Mary shook hands with JohnF, too, everyone was surprised.
(ii) *There is someone x other than John s.t. everyone was surprised when Mary
shook hands with x.
The data confirms that if the to-phrase contains a postposition, it becomes sensitive to
island constraints. In (113b), the sentence becomes ungrammatical, since the to-phrase
has scrambled out of a complex NP island. In (114b), the only reading available is the
one where the to-phrase undergoes scrambling within the adjunct clause. It cannot take
scope over the whole clause, in sharp contrast to the bare to-phrase. The data in this
section suggests again that the presence or absence of morphological marking can be a
window onto the structure of sentences.
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3.8.2 Binding and the To-Phrase
This section addresses how the to-phrase behaves as an antecedent of anaphors. We find
that the same pattern attested in the man-phrase (section 2.9.3) holds of the to-phrase as
well; namely, that scrambling of the to-phrase does not create new binding possibilities.
(115) a. *Cakicasin-i John-to pinanhayssta.
self-Nom John-also criticized
'(Lit.) Self criticized John-also.'
'(Intended) John criticized himself as well as someone else.'
b. John-tol [cakicasin-i el pinanhayssta.]
John-also self-Nom criticized
'(Lit.) John-also, self criticized e.'
(i) John criticized himself, and there is someone other than John who criticized himself.
(ii) *John criticized himself as well as someone else.
c. *John-ekey-tol [cakicasin-i ti malyhayssta.]
John-to-also self-Nom talked
'(Lit.) Also to John, self talked to t.'
(i) *John talked to himself as well as to someone else.
(ii) *John talked to himself, and there is someone other than John who talked to himself.
In (115a), the anaphor in the subject position is not bound. In (115b), binding becomes
possible, but by hypothesis only under the reading where the to-phrase is base-
generated in its surface position. The sentence under the second reading, in which the to-
phrase has undergone scrambling, is not grammatical. The same is true of (115c), where
the to-phrase containing a postposition cannot bind the anaphor in the subject position.
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The two readings of (115c) are provided based on the two possible positions of the to-
phrase (trace position and the surface position).20
The account provided for the binding property of the man-phrase is easily
extended to the case of the to-phrase. The to-phrase is an A-bar item, and as such it
cannot bind an anaphor. This explains the ungrammaticality of (115c) and the lack of the
second reading in (115b). As for the apparent binding relation in (115b) under its first
reading, I argue that the empty element (pro) undergoes scrambling to an A-position
where it can bind the anaphor. This option is available only when the to-phrase is base-
generated, but not for the PP case in (115c) where the empty element is a trace. Finally,
the ungrammaticality of (115a) is simply due to the absence of an antecedent.
3.9 Summary
This chapter investigated the scopal behavior of the Korean additive particle to. In the
course of this investigation, I identified three factors that affect the scope pattern of the
to-phrase: scrambling, the kind of function in the preceding context, and the nature of
the focused phrase, which leads to the ordering restrictions. I showed that the seemingly
confusing data is straightforwardly explained by the proposed account. The analysis is
composed of three elements, each of which is independently motivated. First, I argued
following Kripke (1990) and Heim (1992) among others that the anaphoric approach to
the additive particle is superior to the existential approach. One characteristic of the
proposal that best reflects the anaphoric view is that the particle takes two arguments
that share the same type (Type Parallelism). Secondly, I claimed that syntactic binding is
not the only mechanism that accomplishes variable binding. I showed that semantic
binding is also available, which is operative when we are dealing with functional
dependencies. This implies that the presence of a bound variable in some dislocated
position is not direct evidence of syntactic reconstruction. Finally, I proposed two
principles of economy that regulate reconstruction and type raising. Both operations are
'
20 If scope and binding always go together, we may not consider the first reading, since the to-
phrase takes scope only in its surface position, due to Reconstruction Economy. However, given
many cases that show asymmetries between the two, we consider both readings.
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allowed only when they are motivated. The motivation of reconstruction is a change in
truth-conditions. If reconstruction only affects presupposition, it is not licensed.
Similarly, type raising is possible when it is motivated by the lexical entry of the additive
particle, namely to avoid type-mismatch. I also considered some possible alternatives
and rejected them based on their problems, which highlighted the soundness of the
current proposal.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
This dissertation investigated the scopal behavior of two focus particles in Korean in
comparison to the scopal behavior of quantifier phrases. The discussion has focused on
how the focused phrases (man-phrases and to-phrases) behave in scrambling contexts.
We discovered that both of them exhibit more diverse pattern than we expect under the
assumption that they are all generalized quantifiers. Before we address implications and
open issues, I will summarize the new findings and claims made in this dissertation.
4.1 Summary
Let us start with the exclusive particle man. The starting point of chapter 2 was that the
scope of a man-phrase varies with its morphological marking. If it is marked by a case
marker, its scope is fixed to its case position no matter where it appears in the sentence.
If it is marked by a postposition, its surface position affects scope relations. Then, it was
shown that the apparent reconstruction effect of the case-marked man-phrase and the
scopal asymmetry between case-marked and postposition-marked man-phrases cannot
be accounted for under the assumption that the particle man is a scope-bearing element,
unless we adopt some special stipulations about it. This discussion led to the claim that
the particle is not a scope-bearing element, but an agreement morpheme for a null head
ONLY, which carries the exhaustive meaning of English only. In line with this claim, the
order of nominal affixes played a key role in identifying the position of the null head,
under the assumption that morphology reflects syntax.
Chapter 3 turned to the additive particle to. I first pointed out that the particle to
is different from the particle man in that the additive particle itself does carry the
quantificational meaning. Then, I identified a few generalizations regarding the scope of
the to-phrase; namely, the reconstruction effect of the QP, the anti-reconstruction of the
to-phrase, the obviation of both reconstruction and anti-reconstruction effects in the
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context of a functional expression, and finally an ordering restriction between a
referential expression and a functional expression. Each of these generalizations
motivated elements of the proposed account; namely, the anaphoric view of the additive
particle, semantic binding, and principles of economy. Specifically, the reconstruction
effect motivates the anaphoric view of the additive particle; the anti-reconstruction effect
motivates Reconstruction Economy; the obviation of both reconstruction and anti-
reconstruction effects in the context of a function expression motivates semantic binding;
and finally, the ordering restriction and its absence in certain contexts motivates type
raising economy.
4.2 Implications and Open Questions
Beyond the empirical findings stated above, the discussions in this work lead to other
interesting implications on issues in the syntax-semantics interface. The most prominent
one is the relation between morphology and syntax. As mentioned in the summary, the
order of nominal affixes played a crucial role in explaining the scope pattern of the man-
phrase. Such a correlation did not stop there. Both man-phrase and to-phrase exhibited
clear distinctions when they are bare, that is, when they do not carry any additional
marking. The presence of morphological marking (whether it is a pure case marker or a
postposition) made noticeable differences in their syntactic behavior, specifically with
respect to resumption and island tests, as also noticed in previous literature (Saito 1985,
Hoji 1987, Fukaya & Hoji 2000). Such contrasts led us to posit two different strategies of
generating focused phrases: movement and base-generation. The data and the
conclusion drawn from them suggest, then, that morphological marking provides
significant information about clausal structure. Although much discussion on this issue
has centered on verbal affixes, the findings in this work support the correlation between
syntax and morphology in other areas of grammar, namely in the nominal domain.
Another important issue is the syntactic representation of focus. One specific
claim made in this thesis was that there is no one fixed position for the focus head. It
was proposed that at least two positions are available for focus (including the ONLY
191
head), in accordance with some recent proposals along this line. If this position is on the
right track, it brings in new perspectives on issues in the focus domain. Specific
questions are concerned with the relation between lexical focus (due to lexical items
such as focus particles) and discourse focus (due to discourse structure); for example,
how focus is represented in syntax, and whether lexical focus and discourse focus share
the same syntax. Another set of questions pertains to other aspects of the particles man
and to. They exhibit ambiguity between quantificational and scalar meanings, and we
have focused on the former throughout the work. The issue is how to accommodate the
scalar uses to the proposed semantics and formalize them along the lines of proposed
analysis for each particle. Related to this, further work is required in comparing focus
particles. We have found out that the particles man and to behave differently in their
scope patterns, which is traced back to the different nature of their quantificational force
(assertion vs. presupposition). More work is required in comparing focus particles. One
step further, the cross-linguistic study of focus sensitive items is an interesting area to
look into. Ideally, a study done in one language should be tested in other languages and
extended to them. One question in this area is the correlation between focus particles
and their occurrence in the domain outside focus. In many languages, the scalar particle
(which corresponds to English even but shares the same form with the additive particle)
is closely related to NPIs and Free Choice Items (Lahiri 1998), and the nature of this
correlation is to be further elucidated.
The final issue to consider is the availability of semantic mechanism for variable
binding. If semantic binding is available, as argued here, how can we understand the
cases that argue for syntactic reconstruction based on Binding Theory (e.g. Romero 1997,
Fox 2000)? One might think that if semantic binding is an option in those cases, we
cannot derive the correlation between reconstruction and Condition C, for instance.
Although I cannot offer an answer to this question at this point, I concede that semantic
binding needs to be restricted in some way. Otherwise, it is too powerful. Of course,
there are more issues to this that go beyond this brief section, and I leave them as open
questions.
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Appendix
Chapter 2
(22) a1. TP ()
everyone (
1
AgroP ) T[NOM]
John-man-ul
2
ONLY-P (4) Agro[ACC]
t2 ONLY' ()
(2) ONLY
3 VP()
tl
t3 love
IODI = x loves y
[(I = Xy.x loves y
[(3 = Xz.x loves z & VweEALT(z): x loves w - w = z
[F1 = x loves u & VweEALT(u): x loves w - w = u
[E(i = Xu.x loves v & VweeALT(u): x loves w - w = u
[(I = x loves John & VweeALT(John): x loves w - w = John
[(1 = Xx.x loves John & VweEALT(John): x loves w - w = John
[(] = For each person x, x loves John & VweEALT(John): x loves w - w = John
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(23) a. TP 
John-man-ul (
1 TP ()
everyone ()
2
AgroP ) T [NOM]
tl i
3
ONLY-P () Agro[ACC]
t3 ONLY' (
() ONLY
4 VP 
t2
4 love
[(L = x loves y
[( = Xy.x loves y
( = z.x loves z & VweeALT(z): x loves w - w = z
[(1 = x loves v & VweEALT(v): x loves w - w = v
(~ = Xv.x loves v & VweEALT(v): x loves w - w = v
[( = x loves u & VweEALT(u): x loves w - w = u
I( = Xx.x loves u & VweEALT(u): x loves w - w = u
( = For each person x, x loves u & VweEALT(u): x loves w - w = u
= Xu.for each person x, x loves u & VweEALT(u): x loves w - w = u
[( = For each person x, x loves John & VweEALTohn): x loves w - w = John
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(35) a. TP (
John & Bill (
D
1 TP (
someone
2
AgroP ( T[NOM]
tl i
3
VP (I Agro[ACC]
t 2
t3 love
(~ = y loves z
I[(1] = Xz.y loves z
[(I = y loves v
I[( = Xy.y loves v
[(I = There is someone who loves v
[( = v.there is someone who loves v
[I1 = X. VlxE-X: there is someone who loves x
[(I = VxeJ&B: there is someone who loves x, i.e. there is someone who loves John
and there is someone who loves Bill.
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(38) TP 
John & Bill ()
D
1 TP ()
someone (
2
AgroP ) T [NOM]
tl i
3
ONLY-P () Agro[ACC]
t3 ONLY' (
(2) ONLY
4 VP )
t2
t4 love
[( = x loves y
I( = Xy.x loves y
[( = Xz.x loves z & weEALT(z): x loves w - w = z
[( = x loves v & VweEALT(v): x loves w - w = v
I( = Xv.x loves v & VweEALT(v): x loves w - w = v
[( = x loves u & VweEALT(u): x loves w - w = u
(~ = Xx.x loves u & VweEALT(u): x loves w - w = u
I( = There is someone x such that x loves u & VweEALT(u): x loves w - w = u
[(a = Xu.there is someone x such that x loves u & VweEALT(u): x loves w - w = u
F( = XZ.tzeZ: there is someone x such that x loves z & ¥VweEALT(z): x loves w
- w = z, i.e. there is someone who loves only z.
[I = VzeJ&B: there is someone who loves only z, i.e. there is someone who loves
only John and there is someone who loves only Bill.
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(62) a. DP
D
book
PRO
1 DP ()
John-man-uy O
2
ONLY-P ( D
t2 ONLY' ()
(4) ONLY
3 PossP (
tl Poss' 
t3 Poss (1)
[(1 = Xx.Xy.x possesses y
[(A = Xy.x possesses y
[(A = x possesses y
[(I = Xx.x possesses y
[(A = Xz.z possesses y & VweALT(z): w possesses y - w = z
[M = v possesses y & VweeALT(v): w possesses y - w = v
[(A = Xv.v possesses y & VweALT(v): w possesses y - w = v
[(] = John possesses y & VweEALT(John): w possesses y - w = John
[( = Xy.John possesses y & VweeALT(John): w possesses y - w = John
[(I = Xy.y is a book & John possesses y & VweEALT(ohn): w possesses y - w = John
[ j = The unique y such that y is a book & John possesses y & VweeALT(John):
w possesses y - w = John, i.e. the book that only John possesses.
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Chapter 3
(39) TP (
every boy
FocP () T
7 2
to ( VP () Foc
hisl father
THE / t
R7 pro, t2 invited
I(1 = x invited y
[(a = Xy.x invited y
a( = ty[y is the mother of x], i.e. x's mother
I( = x's father
[( = XP.x's mother * x's father & P(x's mother) = 1.P(x's father) = 1
Id( is defined if and only if x's mother * x's father & x invited x's mother.
If defined, I( = x invited x's father.
[l( = Ax: x's mother + x's father & x invited x's mother.x invited x's father.
I(® is defined if and only if for each boy x, x's mother * x's father & x invited x's
mother. If defined, (J = for each boy x, x invited x's father.
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(51)
every boy (
1 (
THE
4 his4 mother
tl
3
t2(1) O
t3 like
[( = Xye.y likes x
I[(J = f(y) likes x
[(I = Xxe.f(y) likes x
[(] = f(y) likes y
[( = Xf<e, e>.f(y) likes y
[(1 = ze.w[mother-of'(w,z)], i.e. Xze.z's mother
I(jI = y's mother likes y
[( = Xye.y's mother likes y
[(i = For each boy y, y's mother likes y
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b.
S
(3
(86)
® /\ 1 ®
/\ to 
4 Mary / every boy (5)
THE /\\
5 hiss mother 2 (
tl
3 (Z
t2 (
t3(2) like
= Xye.y likes f(x)
= x likes f(x)
= Xf.x likes f(x)
= x likes g(x)
= x.x likes g(x)
= For each boy x, x likes g(x)
= Xg.for each boy x, x likes g(x)
= Xze.z's mother
= we.Mary
= XP<e,t>: ze.z's mother * Xwe.Mary & P(Aze.z's mother) = 1.P(Xw.Mary) = 1
is defined if and only if Xze.z's mother * Awe.Mary & for each boy x, x likes x's
mother. If defined, lI = For each boy x, x likes Mary.
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[I
[FA
(93)
every boy 
1
/\ to ®
4 Mary
THE
5 his n
2
tl (
nother 3 (2)
t2(l) (
t3 like
[(I = Xye.y likes x
[(1 = f(y) likes x
[(] = Xxe.f(y) likes x
[(1 = f(y) likes y
[(iJ = Xf<e, e>.f(y) likes y
jj] = XZe.z's mother
[[( = we.Mary
[1 = XP<ee,t>: XZe.z's mother * Xwe.Mary & P(XZe.z's mother) = 1.P(Xwe.Mary) = 1
[(1 = is defined if and only if XZe.z's mother t Xwe.Mary & y's mother likes y.
If defined, [(® = Mary likes y.
[( = Xye: Xze.z's mother # Xwe.Mary & y's mother likes y.Mary likes y.
I[U = is defined if and only if Xze.z's mother * Xwe.Mary and for each boy y, y's mother
likes y. If defined, [(I = For each boy y, Mary likes y.
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